Castillo v. Renteria et al

Filing 38

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Re: Defendants'' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 30 ]. Signed by Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo on 8/5/2019.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(anh)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LEANDRO LEONEL GONZALEZ
CASTILLO,

Case No.: 17-CV-2104-CAB(WVG)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION RE:
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
A. RENTERIA et al.,
Defendants.

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[ECF No. 30.]

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Plaintiff Leandro Leonel Gonzalez Castillo, proceeding pro se and in forma

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pauperis, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violation of his

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constitutional rights under the First and Eighth Amendments. Defendants have filed a

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summary judgment motion (or “MSJ”) on the basis that Plaintiff cannot prove his claims

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as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts. Defendants Romero and Renteria further

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contend they are entitled to qualified immunity.

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Defendants’ MSJ be GRANTED and judgment be entered in their favor.

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This Court RECOMMENDS that

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17-CV-2104-CAB(WVG)

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I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Undisputed Material Facts

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Plaintiff is currently an inmate at Mule Creek State Prison in Ione, California. At all

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times relevant to this action, however, he was housed at the Richard J. Donovan

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Correctional Facility in San Diego, California. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Defendants Renteria and

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Romero were correctional officers at Donovan. (Id.) Defendant Segovia was a correctional

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sergeant there. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges claims against these three defendants based on

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three separate but related events.

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1.

February 6, 2016–Defendants Renteria and Romero

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On February 6, 2016, Renteria and Romero were yard officers who searched inmates

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when they left and returned to the yard. (Fact 2, ECF No. 30-2 at 2.) On that date, during

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a clothed body search yard, Plaintiff alleges Renteria sexually assaulted him by squeezing

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his right buttock three times, and that Romero was present but did not stop the assault.

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(Fact 1, id.) Plaintiff had a thin handkerchief folded into a square in his back pants pocket.

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(Fact 4, id.) While performing the clothed body search, Renteria put his hand exactly over

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Plaintiff’s back pocket and grabbed the handkerchief and Plaintiff’s buttocks cheek

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underneath and squeezed three times, but he did not do so in a “harsh” way. (Fact 5, id.)

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The patting of the back pocket did not last long—only seconds. (Fact 6, id.) At deposition,

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Plaintiff described Renteria’s actions during the search as “clowning around like that.”

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(Fact 7, id.) As part of this search, Renteria touched Plaintiff’s chest area, which is a

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normal part of the search, but he did not pat down Plaintiff’s groin area. (Fact 8, id. at 3.)

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2.

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After the above incident, Plaintiff complained to his clinician, which led to an

February 8, 2016–Defendant Segovia

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Investigative Services Unit (ISU) investigation.

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interviewed by two ISU staff members on February 8, 2016, Segovia allegedly retaliated

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against him for complaining by verbally threatening to kill Plaintiff about six times. (Fact

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10, id.) Plaintiff responded to Segovia by saying, “kill me.” (Fact 11, id.) When Segovia

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allegedly walked toward Plaintiff with his hands elevated as if to place them around

(Fact 9, id.)

After Plaintiff was

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Plaintiff’s neck, Plaintiff looked down at Segovia’s name tag and stated, “I got you.” (Fact

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12, id.) After being identified by his name, Segovia immediately left the cell. (Fact 13,

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id.) Plaintiff believed Segovia left the cell because he understood that Plaintiff knew his

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name and could file a complaint against Segovia if he wanted to do so. (Fact 14, id.)

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3.

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Plaintiff next alleges that on June 25, 2016, Renteria sexually assaulted him during

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a clothed body search by rubbing Plaintiff’s nipples, and that Romero was present, but did

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not stop the assault. (Fact 15, id. at 4.)

June 25, 2016–Defendants Renteria and Romero

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On June 25, 2016, Officer Renteria stopped Plaintiff to search him as Plaintiff

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returned to the yard from church. (Fact 16, id.) This was also a clothed body search. (Fact

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17, id.) Standing behind Plaintiff, Officer Renteria searched the sides of Plaintiff’s torso,

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then Plaintiff’s stomach, then his hands went up to Plaintiff’s chest. (Fact 18, id.)

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Renteria’s hands were open and his fingers were apart as he rubbed and “caressed” the

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front of Plaintiff’s torso. (Fact 19, id.; ECF No. 30-4 at 12-14.) When Renteria reached

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Plaintiff’s nipples, he allegedly started rubbing them. (Fact 20, ECF No. 30-2 at 4.)

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Renteria did not use his thumb, just his four fingers, which were flat on Plaintiff’s chest.

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(Fact 21, id.) Plaintiff yelled “sexual assault,” and Renteria allegedly told Plaintiff to be

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quiet or he would throw him to the ground. (Fact 22, id.) The touching of Plaintiff’s

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nipples lasted no more than fifteen to twenty seconds. (Fact 23, id. at 5.) Thereafter,

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Renteria completed the search by patting the bottom part of Plaintiff’s legs. (Fact 24, id.)

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B.

Procedural Background

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Plaintiff commenced this action on October 12, 2017 and alleges that Defendants

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violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights based on the three incidents described

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above. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, a

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preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and cost of suit and reasonable

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attorney’s fees.

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On March 27, 2019, Defendants filed a summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 30.)

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That same day, the Court advised Plaintiff of his rights and obligations to oppose the MSJ
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pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988) and Rand v. Rowland, 154

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F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). (ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff filed two oppositions on April 24 and

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25, 2019. (ECF Nos. 32 and 33.) Defendants filed their reply on May 20, 2019. (ECF No.

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35.)

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

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Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any

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material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 56(c). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make

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a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,

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and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

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477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

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the non-moving party and may not resolve disputed issues of material fact by crediting one

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party’s version of events and ignoring another. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (per

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curium). Judgment must be entered “if, under the governing law, there can be but one

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reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

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250 (1986).

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III.

DISCUSSION

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Defendants have identified undisputed material facts based on Plaintiff’s own

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Complaint and deposition. They have not submitted competing evidence of their own or a

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different version of events. Accordingly, there is no dispute of facts, and Defendants

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contend they are entitled to summary judgment even if the facts in the Complaint and

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Plaintiff’s deposition are credited as true. This Court agrees.

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A.

Eighth Amendment Claim Against Renteria and Romero

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Plaintiff claims Renteria violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel

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and unusual punishment because Renteria sexually assaulted him during two clothed body

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searches on February 6, 2016, and June 25, 2016. (ECF No. 1 at 9-10.) Plaintiff claims

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that Romero violated his Eighth Amendment rights because he was present during the two

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Renteria searches at issue, observed the alleged assaults, but did not intervene. (Id. at 144
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15.) Defendants Renteria and Romero argue they are entitled to summary judgment

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because neither incident violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights and because they

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are entitled to qualified immunity.

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The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment of a person

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convicted of a crime. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. A sexual assault on an inmate by a prison

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official implicates the rights protected by the Eighth Amendment. Schwenk v. Hartford,

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204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000). “[N]o lasting physical injury is necessary to state a

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cause of action.” Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1196. “Rather, the only requirement is that the

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officer’s actions be ‘offensive to human dignity.’” Id. (citation omitted). In order to prevail

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on an Eighth Amendment claim for an allegedly inappropriate body search, a plaintiff must

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demonstrate that the search amounted to the “unnecessary and wanton” infliction of pain.

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Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding opposite gender

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searches constituted more than mere “momentary discomfort” exhibited in other cases).

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However, “a single instance of physical contact, while sexually suggestive in nature, does

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not satisfy the standard set forth in Schwenk.” Castillo v. Valencia, No. 19CV338-KJM-

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DB-P, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95598, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2019).

Legal Standard

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In evaluating a prisoner’s claim, courts consider whether “the officials act[ed] with

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a sufficiently culpable state of mind and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively

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‘harmful enough’ to establish a constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

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1, 8 (1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

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2.

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Based on the totality of Plaintiff’s allegations and his deposition, the February 6,

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2016 incident amounted to Defendant Renteria momentarily squeezing Plaintiff’s buttocks

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during a fully clothed pat-down in Donovan prison’s recreation yard. Crediting Plaintiff’s

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allegations and deposition testimony as true, the squeezing lasted “only second,” it was not

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done in a “harsh way,” and Renteria’s actions were done “clowning around like that.” As

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part of this search, Renteria touched Plaintiff’s chest area, which is a normal part of the

February 6, 2016 Incident—Renteria

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search, but he did not pat down Plaintiff’s groin area. There is also no evidence that

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Renteria made sexually suggestive comments during this incident.

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The above conduct is not objectively egregious, as it is not uncommon for a

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correctional officer to squeeze an inmate’s back pocket to determine whether an inmate is

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hiding contraband within a handkerchief in that pocket or to squeeze a portion of the

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buttocks in the process. See Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1998);

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Castillo v. Valencia, No. 19CV338-KJM-DB-P, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95598, at *8 (E.D.

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Cal. June 5, 2019) (dismissing claims without leave to amend where “Plaintiff alleged the

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officers briefly touched [his] buttock incident to a search without sexual comment.”). This

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incidental touching was part of a routine pat down—one that is part of the daily life of an

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inmate when leaving and coming back from the yard. See Walker v. Whitten, No. 2:09-

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CV-0642 WBS CKD, 2013 WL 943282, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013). Moreover, no

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sexual comments were made, and the groin area was not searched. See Castillo, 2019 U.S.

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Dist. LEXIS 95598, at *8. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot establish that Renteria’s conduct

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on February 6, 2016 was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.

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See generally Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding no

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objectively serious conduct where guard entered cell while the inmate “was still on the

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toilet, rubbed his thigh against [the inmate’s] thigh, ‘began smiling in a sexual contact

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[sic] . . . .’”); Cooper v. Roche, No. ED-CV-17-38-PSG(PLA), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

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176197, at *35-37 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018) (allegations that guard “touched or rubbed

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the area between plaintiff’s ‘butt cheeks,’” did not give rise to constitutional violation).

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Renteria’s conduct also fails to satisfy the subjective requirement that he had a

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“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).

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Plaintiff testified at deposition that Renteria was “clowning around like that,” and made no

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sexual comments. This at best establishes that Renteria was merely joking with Plaintiff—

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not that he possessed the subjective intent to sexually assault Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff

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cannot establish that Renteria possessed the requisite sufficiently-culpable state of mind.

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Berryhill, 137 F.3d at 1076 (holding no Eighth Amendment violation where “[a]ccording
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to Berryhill’s deposition testimony, the brief touch to his buttocks lasted mere seconds, it

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was not accompanied by any sexual comments or banter, and he thought the defendants

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were trying to embarrass him . . . .”) (emphasis added); Castillo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

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95598, at *8.

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Based on the undisputed evidence in this case, there is no genuine issue of fact

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regarding whether the February 6, 2016 incident was objectively serious—it was not. Nor

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is there a genuine dispute of fact regarding Renteria’s mental state—he lacked any culpable

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mental state to sexually assault Plaintiff.

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3.

June 25, 2016 Incident—Renteria

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More than four months later, Renteria again conducted a fully-clothed pat-down of

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Plaintiff in the prison yard on June 25, 2016. This time, Renteria touched Plaintiff’s nipples

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during the course of the pat-down. While standing behind Plaintiff, Renteria searched the

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sides of Plaintiff’s torso, then Plaintiff’s stomach, and then his hands went up to Plaintiff’s

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chest. Renteria’s hands were open, and his fingers were apart as he rubbed and “caressed”

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the front of Plaintiff’s torso. When Renteria reached Plaintiff’s nipples, Plaintiff alleges

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Renteria started “rubbing” Plaintiff’s nipples with an open hand with his hand flat on

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Plaintiff’s chest as he swept Plaintiff’s torso. The touching of Plaintiff’s nipples lasted no

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more than fifteen to twenty seconds. Thereafter, Renteria completed the search by patting

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the bottom part of Plaintiff’s legs.

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Here, Renteria’s conduct on June 25, 2016 first fails to satisfy the requirement that

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the touching be objectively serious. Even if Renteria “caressed” the front of Plaintiff’s

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torso and nipples in the manner Plaintiff describes, the one-time, isolated touching of non-

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genitalia fails to rise to the objectively serious touching required for a federal claim alleging

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a constitutional violation. Indeed, the touching in this case was objectively less serious

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than touching in other cases that have also failed to meet this threshold. See, e.g., Watison,

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668 F.3d at 1112 (no Eighth Amendment violation where officer “approached [an inmate]

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while [the inmate] was still on the toilet, rubbed his thigh against [the inmate’s] thigh,

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began smiling in a sexual [context], and left the cell laughing.”); Rice v. King Cnty., 2000
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U.S. App. LEXIS 29897 (9th Cir. 2000) (No Eighth Amendment violation where prison

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guard “shoved her hand very hard into” inmate’s testicles during a search); Smith v. L.A.

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Cnty., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61985 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (finding that pretrial

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detainee failed to state due process claim, or unreasonable search claim, based on

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allegations that guard pulled inmate’s boxers to look at his buttocks, inserted his hand

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between inmate’s buttocks, and cupped inmate’s genitals during search), adoption aff’d,

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452 F. App’x 768 (9th Cir. 2011); Ganner v. Gibson, No. CIV-S-08-1445-GGHP, 2009

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107755 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009) (No Eighth Amendment violation where

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prison guard “rubbed [inmate’s] legs, thighs and buttocks” during a search).

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The facts of the instant case are a far cry from Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521

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(9th Cir. 1993), where the Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited clothed

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body searches of female prisoners by male guards directed by a prison policy to “push

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inward and upward when searching the crotch and upper thighs of the inmate,” to “squeeze

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and knead” “the leg and the crotch area,” and to “search the breast area in a sweeping

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motion, so that the breasts will be ‘flattened.’” 986 F.2d at 1523 (indications of alteration

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omitted). While the touching in that case was also part of a routine pat-down search—and

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indeed sanctioned by prison policy—the opposite-gender touching there was far more

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invasive and prolonged than what transpired here by a male guard against a male inmate.

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When compared to Jordan, the touching Plaintiff describes was not serious. The touching

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did not involve his genitalia, no sexual comments were made, and the incident was isolated.

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See generally Jackson v. Madery, 158 Fed. Appx. 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005) (guard’s

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conduct in allegedly rubbing and grabbing prisoner’s buttocks in degrading manner was

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“isolated, brief, and not severe” and so failed to meet Eighth Amendment standards).

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There is also no evidence of Renteria’s subjective mental state to sexually assault

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Plaintiff in any way. Plaintiff never alleged in his Complaint that Renteria made any

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sexually suggestive comments to him during this incident, and no such evidence has been

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uncovered since then.

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Based on the undisputed evidence in this case, there is no genuine issue of fact

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regarding whether the June 25, 2016 incident was objectively serious—it was not. Nor is

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there a genuine dispute of fact regarding Renteria’s mental state—he lacked any culpable

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mental state to sexually assault Plaintiff.

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4.

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Although Plaintiff never alleges or testifies that Defendant Romero had any physical

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contact with him, he proceeds on an Eighth Amendment claim on the theory that Romero

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failed to intervene in Renteria’s violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.

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However, because this Court has concluded that Renteria did not violate Plaintiff’s rights

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in the first place, it necessarily follows that Romero cannot be vicariously liable for such a

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non-violation. Accordingly, Romero is entitled to summary judgment to the same extent

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as Renteria.

Eighth Amendment Claim Against Romero

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5.

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Renteria and Romero argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because under

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the circumstances, “any prison official ‘could have believed [their] actions lawful at the

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time they were undertaken.’” (ECF No. 30 at 18 (quoting Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d

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847, 858 (9th Cir. 2009). This Court agrees.

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Renteria and Romero are Entitled to Qualified Immunity

a.

Legal Standard

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“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions [are entitled to] a

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qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions

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could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have

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violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (citations omitted). “Qualified

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immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

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or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Kisela v.

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Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam). The reasonableness of the officer’s

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conduct is “judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.” Id.

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(quotation marks and citation omitted).

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The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part analysis for resolving government

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officials’ qualified immunity claims. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001),

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overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

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First, the court must consider whether the facts “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the

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party asserting the injury . . . show [that] the [defendant’s] conduct violated a constitutional

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right[.]” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “If there is no constitutional violation, the inquiry ends

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and the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.” Ioane, 903 F.3d at 933. Second, the

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court must determine whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

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violation. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

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b.

Discussion

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Here, Renteria and Romero are entitled to qualified immunity both because there

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was no constitutional violation and because such a right was not clearly established even

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if the Court assumes a constitutional violation existed for the sake of argument. First as

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explained above, the undisputed evidence in this case has established that Renteria and

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Romero did not violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Second, even if the Court

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assumes that Renteria’s conduct did constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, he is

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nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because no court has held that the minimal

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touching Plaintiff experienced here was sufficiently objectively serious to rise to the level

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of an Eighth Amendment violation. In other words, the right to be free from such minimal

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touching under the Eighth Amendment was not clearly established at the time of the two

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incidents in 2016.1 Likewise, Romero is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not

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clearly established that standing and watching such minimal touching constituted an Eighth

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Amendment violation.

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Nor has such a right been established since then.
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6.

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Now that the full array of the facts in this case have come to light, it is clear that

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Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are wholly meritless. As the United States District

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Court for the Eastern District of California recently found in a strikingly similar case

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brought by Plaintiff in that District, “[n]o single incident described in the complaint was

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severe enough to be ‘objectively sufficiently serious,’ nor are the incidents cumulatively

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egregious in the harm they inflicted.”2 Castillo v. Valencia, No. 19CV338-KJM-DB-P,

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2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95598, at *8 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (dismissing Plaintiff’s similar

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claims against other corrections officers without leave to amend). So too here, Plaintiff

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has established only objectively non-serious touching during a pat-down and nothing more.

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Defendants Renteria and Romero are entitled to summary judgment as to the Eighth

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Amendment claim against them.

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Conclusion

Finally, and with the foregoing notwithstanding, Renteria and Romero are entitled

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to qualified immunity even if a constitutional violation is assumed.

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B.

First Amendment Claim Against Segovia

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Plaintiff asserts that Segovia retaliated against him by threatening to choke and kill

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him because of the prison grievances he had field against Renteria and Romero. Segovia

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argues he is entitled to summary judgment because the alleged choking incident did not

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violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. This Court finds that because Plaintiff cannot

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establish all of the elements of a First Amendment violation, Segovia is entitled to summary

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judgment.

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It is well-established that prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison

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grievances. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2005). “Retaliation

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against prisoners for their exercise of this right is itself a constitutional violation, and

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prohibited as a matter of ‘clearly established law.’” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269

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Although Plaintiff alleges two separate incidents against Renteria and Romero, two
incidents separated by four months hardly constitute a series or pattern of abusive conduct.
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(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 566). In order to prevail on a First Amendment

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retaliation claim in the prison context, Plaintiff must prove (1) “that a state actor took some

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adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and

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that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the

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action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at

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567-68.

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With respect to the fourth element, Plaintiff need not demonstrate a “total chilling

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of his First Amendment rights,” only that Segovia’s challenged conduct “would chill or

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silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Rhodes,

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408 F.3d at 568-69. Direct and tangible harm will support a retaliation claim even without

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demonstration of a chilling effect on the further exercise of a prisoner’s First Amendment

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rights. Id. at 568 n.11. “[A] plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a

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claim if he alleges he suffered some other harm” as a retaliatory adverse action. Brodheim,

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584 F.3d at 1269 (citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 n.11).

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Here, Segovia is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed material facts

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demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot establish the fourth element of a First Amendment

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retaliation claim. Segovia argues that even if he threatened to kill Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s

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speech was not chilled because (1) Segovia immediately retreated from his physical threat

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once Plaintiff saw his nametag and (2) “Plaintiff himself concedes that he knew no more

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intimidation would follow.” (ECF No. 35 at 9.) Indeed, in his opposition to Defendants’

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MSJ, Plaintiff concedes that he “knew that no more intimidation would follow since he

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knew Sgt. Segovia’s name.” (ECF No. 11-12.) In other words, Plaintiff knew that

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Segovia’s threats were idle, and they accordingly were not the type of threats that would

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chill or silence an inmate or ordinary firmness. This concession is significant because “[t]he

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power of a threat lies not in any negative actions eventually taken, but in the apprehension

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it creates in the recipient of the threat.” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271. Here, there is no

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evidence that Segovia took any subsequent action against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff concedes

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that Segovia’s threats created no apprehension in him because he knew there would be no
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further intimidation. Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot establish the “chilling effect”

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element of his First Amendment claim, Segovia is entitled to summary judgment on this

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claim.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ summary judgment
motion be GRANTED and that judgment be entered in their favor.

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This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted

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to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 6, 2019, any party to this action

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may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

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should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” No reply briefs in

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response to the Objections will be accepted.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: August 5, 2019

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