Manipoun v. Dibela et al
Filing
114
ORDER Granting in part and Denying in part Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 8/11/2020. (jrm)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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MERIDA MANIPOUN a.k.a. ANOMA
SENGVIXAY,
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR RULE 11
SANCTIONS
Plaintiff,
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Case No.: 17-CV-2325-AJB-BGS
v.
LOU DIBELLA; CHRIS KELLY;
LINDA CARR; JAMES COX; SAN
DIEGO EUROPEAN MOTORCARS,
LTD. d/b/a ASTON MARTIN OF SAN
DIEGO; and DOES 1-20,
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(Doc. No. 91)
Defendants.
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Pending before this Court is a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions filed by Defendants San
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Diego European Motorcars, Ltd. d/b/a Aston Martin of San Diego and James Cox
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(“Defendants”). (Doc. No. 91.) Oppositions were filed by Mr. VerStandig, (Doc. No. 102),
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Mr. Obagi, (Doc. No. 105), Mr. Vining, Ms. Colt, and Plaintiff, (Doc. No. 103). For the
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reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
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Defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.
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17-CV-2325-AJB-BGS
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BACKGROUND
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On May 7, 2016, Merida Manipoun (“Plaintiff”) participated in the “Dream
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Machine,” a promotional event held at Viejas Casino and Resort (“Casino”). (Doc. No. 50-
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1 at 4; Doc. No. 62-1 at 2–3.) Plaintiff was issued a “V Club Card” that garnered entries
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into a drawing each time the V Club Card was used on the slot machine. (Id.) Plaintiff
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“earned the opportunity” to participate in the drawing and was called on stage to select a
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single envelope from various envelopes available. (Doc. No. 50-1 at 5.) Plaintiff picked an
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envelope containing a certificate for an Aston Martin V8 Vantage (the “Car”). (Id.) The
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Casino issued Plaintiff a Form 1099 indicating a $134,000 income, the suggested retail
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value of the Car. (Id. at 6.)
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On May 12, 2016, Mr. Dibella, the Casino’s manager, called Plaintiff to inform her
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she would not be receiving the Car. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 26.) Defendants assert the Casino
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disqualified Plaintiff from the contest because she allowed her companion to use her V
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Club Card to improperly gain entries into the drawing, which constituted a violation of the
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contest rules. (Doc. No. 62-1 at 2.)
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On November 16, 2017, Plaintiff sued Defendants and three other defendants for
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fraud, conspiracy to defraud, breach of unfair competition, and breach of unilateral
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contract. (Doc. No. 1.) Other defendants to this action were Lou Dibella, Chris Kelly, and
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Linda Carr. (Id.) On May 10, 2018, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendants Dibella and
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Carr from this litigation. (Doc. No. 31.) Defendants’ filed a motion to dismiss that was
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subsequently denied on procedural grounds as it was untimely. (Doc. No. 54 at 3.) The
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parties then began discovery. Magistrate Judge Skomal granted in part sanctions against
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Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s failure to appear at her deposition and Plaintiff’s failure to respond
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to certain requests for admissions. (Doc. No. 58.) Plaintiff sought leave to file an amended
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complaint, however, this was denied as untimely. (Doc. No. 76.) Defendants then filed a
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motion for order requiring Plaintiff to post an undertaking and a motion for summary
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judgment. (Doc. Nos. 56, 62.) Plaintiff filed a motion to strike as her opposition to
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Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 65.) Plaintiff then sought to file a
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sur-reply, which the Court permitted. (Doc. No. 69.) The Court then held a hearing
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regarding Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the Court issued an order
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granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 89.) Subsequently,
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Defendants filed the instant motion for sanctions. (Doc. No. 91.)
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LEGAL STANDARD
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Rule 11 sanctions are warranted when a party files a lawsuit or motion that is
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frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation, or is otherwise brought for an
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improper purpose. Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.1994). Complaints filed
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in the face of previous dismissals involving the same legal issues or the same parties
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warrant sanctions under Rule 11. See Harris v. Heinrich, 919 F.2d 1515, 1516 (11th
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Cir.1990); Kurkowski v. Volcker, 819 F.2d 201, 204 (8th Cir.1987); Warren, 29 F.3d at
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1390. When one party seeks sanctions against another, the Court must first determine
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whether any provision of Rule 11(b) has been violated. Id. at 1389. A finding of subjective
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bad faith is not required under Rule 11. See Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1488 (9th
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Cir.1994) (“Counsel can no longer avoid the sting of Rule 11 sanctions by operating under
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the guise of a pure heart and empty head”). Instead, the question is whether, at the time the
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paper was presented to the Court (or later defended) it lacked evidentiary support or
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contained “frivolous” legal arguments. Where such a violation is found, Rule 11 authorizes
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sanctions against persons-attorneys, law firms, or parties-responsible. See Pavelic &
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LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Gp., 493 U.S. 120, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989);
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2) (“If warranted, the court may award to the prevailing party the
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reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred for the motion.”).
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Where such sanctions are sought by motion, Rule 11 contains a “safe harbor”
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provision stating that a motion for sanctions may not be filed until 21 days after it is served.
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See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(c)(1)(A). This “safe harbor” gives the party subject to the Rule 11
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motion 21 days to withdraw the offending pleading and thereby escape sanctions. See
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Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir.1998). The 21–day “safe harbor” period is an
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absolute prerequisite (unless some other period is established by a court) to a motion for
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sanctions brought by any party. This provision does not apply to bar court-initiated sanction
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proceedings; however, the court must issue an order to show cause and there are restrictions
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on the court’s sua sponte sanctions authority. See id.
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DISCUSSION
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Defendants seek sanctions under Rule 11 on the basis that this case is a “clear
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example of an abuse of the judicial process.” (Doc. No. 91-1 at 8.) Furthermore, Defendants
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argue that this was not a temporary lapse in judgment, but rather was prolonged because
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Plaintiff pursued this case through summary judgment. (Id.) Defendants specifically
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identify three instances of conduct that violated Rule 11: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint, (2)
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, and (3) Plaintiff’s Opposition to
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Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id. at 9.)
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A.
Request for Judicial Notice
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Defendants request judicial notice of the Court’s docket in this matter as Exhibit 1.
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Plaintiff, Mr. VerStandig, Mr. Obagi, Mr. Vining, and Ms. Colt do not oppose judicial
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notice of these documents. However, the Court need not take judicial notice of the its own
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docket or documents filed on the docket in this case. Henricks v. California Pub. Utilities
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Comm’n, No. 17CV2177-MMA (MDD), 2018 WL 2287346, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 18,
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2018) (citing Asdar Grp. v. Pillsbury, Madison, & Sutro, 99 F.3d 289, 290 n.1 (9th Cir.
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1996)) (finding moot Plaintiff’s request for the Court to take judicial notice of pleadings
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filed on the docket in this case). Since this document is the Court’s docket in this case, the
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Court DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ request for judicial notice. (Doc. No. 91-2.)
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B.
Safe Harbor Notice
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Rule 11 contains a “safe harbor” provision that a motion for sanctions may not be
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filed until 21 days after it is served. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(c)(1)(A). Here, Defense
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counsel informed Plaintiff throughout the litigation that Defense counsel would be seeking
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sanctions. On December 21, 2017 and January 24, 2018, Defense counsel informed Mr.
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Obagi and Mr. VerStandig that Defense counsel believed there was no factual or legal basis
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to proceed with this case. (Doc. No. 91-1 at 7.) On May 17, 2018, Defense counsel formally
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served its Rule 11 “safe harbor” notice. (Id.) On August 29, 2018 and October 4, 2018,
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Defense counsel informed Mr. Vining of the “safe harbor” notice. (Id.) On September 5,
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2018, Defense counsel informed Ms. Colt of the “safe harbor” notice. (Id.) Accordingly,
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Defense counsel has met the procedural requirement for Rule 11 sanctions.
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C.
Sanctions Against Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi
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Plaintiff was originally represented by Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi. (Doc. No.
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102 at 5.) Out of the three pleadings Defendants allege create the basis for Rule 11
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Sanctions, Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi only represented Plaintiff for the complaint. The
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complaint alleged claims of fraud, conspiracy to defraud, breach of unfair competition, and
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breach of unilateral contract. (See generally Doc. No. 1.) Both Mr. VerStandig and Mr.
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Obagi declare that they each investigated the facts alleged in the complaint prior to bringing
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this suit. (Doc. No. 102 at 7, Doc. No. 105 at 5.) Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi attest that
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they reviewed evidence of the Casino’s promotion, reviewed the Form 1099 that was sent
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to Plaintiff, verified the Casino’s promotions, and assessed the financial viability of the
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promotions. (Doc. No. 102 at 8, Doc. No. 105 at 5–6.) These publicly available facts did
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not reveal any inconsistencies or other problems to both Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi.
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(Id.) Defendants allege that Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi failed to identify any
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information from these other available sources that supported the claims against
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Defendants.
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Defendants sent a safe harbor version of a motion for sanctions in May of 2018.
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Upon review of this letter, Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi began to press the Plaintiff for
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further assurances as to certain facts not verifiable in the public record. (Doc. No. 102 at 6,
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Doc. No. 105 at 4.) Thereafter, while Plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories were being
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worked on and Plaintiff’s deposition was nearing, Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi “became
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uncomfortable prosecuting the case any further.” (Id.) Both sought leave of the Court to
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withdraw as counsel. (Id.) Accordingly, Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi request that they
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not be responsible beyond the scope of the complaint.
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While Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi did press Plaintiff for further assurances after
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they received the safe harbor version of the motion, they are required to do this before
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filing the complaint. Attorneys and parties are required to “think first and file later” and
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“look before leaping.” See Stewart v. RCA Corp., 790 F.2d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 1986); Lied
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v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986). Further, after they pressed
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Plaintiff for further assurances, Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi became uncomfortable.
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However, it is unclear to the Court what information Plaintiff could have originally
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provided to Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi to support the allegations in the complaint.
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Plaintiff’s claims were not legally supportable. Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi should have
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conducted the necessary research and investigation before filing this litigation. Had counsel
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properly done so, it should have prevented the filing of this baseless lawsuit. Accordingly,
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the Court GRANTS sanctions against Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi.
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D.
Sanctions Against Ms. Colt, Mr. Vining, and Plaintiff
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First, Plaintiff’s counsel states that its arguments will be strengthened once Plaintiff
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has the hearing transcript and can file a supplemental response. However, the transcript of
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the hearing was attached to the Declaration of Joseph A. Gonella in support of Defendants’
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motion for sanctions. (Doc. No. 91-9.) It is unclear if Plaintiff’s counsel read the motion
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for sanctions. Furthermore, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear at the Court’s
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hearing on this matter on December 12, 2019.
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Second, Plaintiff’s counsel states that they recall that the Court was willing to
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consider that course of conduct established an objective contract under California law.
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(Doc. No. 103-1 at 3–4.) The Court did consider the course of conduct argument in its
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Order granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 89.) Further, Mr.
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Vining presented this argument at the hearing, and the Court addressed it at the hearing.
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(Doc. No. 91-9 at 19, 22.)
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Further, Plaintiff’s counsel states that the Mr. Samouris led the Court to believe that
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Plaintiff was lying about the 1099 Form. (Doc. No. 103-1 at 4.) However, this is not what
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Mr. Samouris stated. Mr. Samouris explained that a 1099 Form was issued incorrectly, and
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the Casino then issued a correction to the IRS. (Doc. No. 91-9 at 18.) Mr. Samouris did
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state that Plaintiff was lying about paying taxes on the Car, but he did not state that she
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was lying about the 1099 Form. (Id. at 19.) Mr. Samouris never stated that Plaintiff
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submitted a fraudulent document to the IRS. However, this point simply does not matter.
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The Casino issued the 1099 Form, not Defendants. Accordingly, the existence of the 1099
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Form and whether Plaintiff paid taxes on the Car does not establish the existence of a
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contract between Plaintiff and Defendants.
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Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel explains that the Court would not grant a
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continuance of the hearing despite Ms. Colt’s car being stolen the morning of the hearing
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on the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 103-1 at 4.) However, Plaintiff’s counsel
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never requested a continuance. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel did not contact the Court to
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explain that they would be late for the hearing due to Ms. Colt’s car being stolen. Instead,
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Plaintiff’s counsel simply showed up twenty-eight minutes late for the hearing.
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Additionally, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel failed to appear for the hearing on this matter.
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Plaintiff then argues that her attempt to file an amended complaint was not frivolous
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because they had just recently discovered new evidence. (Doc. No. 103-1 at 5–6.)
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However, this newly discovered evidence was a fact that was known to Plaintiff since the
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start of this litigation. Furthermore, Plaintiff sought leave to amend after the discovery
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cutoff date and had not been diligent throughout the discovery process.
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Plaintiff then filed a response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but
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claimed it was in fact a new motion to strike. Plaintiff failed to obtain a hearing date from
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the Court to file a new motion to strike. Plaintiff then sought leave to file a sur-reply to the
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motion for summary judgment. The Court typically does not allow for a sur-reply, but
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allowed it in this case due to Plaintiff’s claim that her response was a new motion to strike.
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Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was not procedurally
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proper and was also frivolous. After all of the extensive briefing, Plaintiff decided at the
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hearing for the motion for summary judgment to abandon her claims of fraud, conspiracy,
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and unfair competition. However, puzzling to the Court, Plaintiff argues in her response to
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this motion that the Court erroneously granted the motion for summary judgment for fraud,
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conspiracy, and unfair competition.
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It is clear to the Court that the filing for an amended complaint, the opposition to
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Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and continuing to pursue this case to the
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summary judgment stage were frivolous. There was absolutely no evidence to establish a
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contract between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff throughout this entire litigation seems
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to confuse Defendants with the Casino. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel continued to pursue
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a baseless lawsuit. Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi became uncomfortable prosecuting the
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case further. Of concern to the Court is that Mr. Vining and Ms. Colt still do not express
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this same sentiment.
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Mr. Vining and Ms. Colt also attempted to extract a quick settlement from
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Defendants with the threat of filing an amended complaint with “incendiary” allegations
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that would attract the interest of the “news media.” (Doc. No. 107 at 3.) Now, Mr. Vining
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states that he had undisclosed evidence to support Plaintiff’s case that was stolen from Ms.
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Colt’s car the night before the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The discovery
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cut-off date was September 10, 2018. Plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary
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judgment was due February 20, 2019. Further, Plaintiff has failed to provide any
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description of this evidence to the Court in her response to the instant motion. It is unclear
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to the Court what this undisclosed evidence would have been that was suddenly stolen the
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night before the hearing that occurred over a year after the discovery cutoff date. The Court
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finds Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel behavior throughout the entire course of the litigation
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to be inappropriate.
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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS sanctions against Ms. Colt, Mr. Vining and
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Plaintiff.
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E.
Reasonableness of Fees Requested by Defendants
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Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi argue that Defendants fail to attach any billing
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records for the attorneys’ fees sought and thus, makes it impossible to assess the
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reasonableness and necessity of the fees incurred. (Doc. No. 102 at 14, Doc. No. 105 at
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11.) Plaintiff, Mr. Vining, and Ms. Colt do not present such an argument.
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“The moving party bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours spent in
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the litigation and submitting evidence in support of the hours worked.” Zest IP Holdings,
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LLC v. Implant Direct Mfg., LLC, No. 10-CV-0541-GPC (WVG), 2014 WL 6851612, at
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*6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2014). After the moving party provides evidence of the hours billed,
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the opposing party has the burden of submitting evidence “challenging the accuracy and
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reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its
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submitted affidavits.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the
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Court agrees with Mr. VerStandig and Mr. Obagi that Defendants failure to file any billing
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records for the attorneys’ fees sought in their original motion made it difficult to assess the
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reasonableness and necessity of the fees incurred. Defendants did attach this information
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in their reply, but that did not provide Mr. VerStandig, Mr. Obagi, Mr. Vining, Ms. Colt,
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and Plaintiff an opportunity to respond. Accordingly, the Court will not assess the
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reasonableness of the fees requested by Defendants in this motion. The Court requests that
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Defendants file a motion to address the fees sought within 30 days from the date of this
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Order. Defendants must call the Court’s chambers to obtain a hearing date once Defendants
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are prepared to file this motion.
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CONCLUSION
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Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
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Defendant’s motion for sanctions.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: August 11, 2020
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