Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC v. Salva et al

Filing 6

ORDER Sua Sponte Remanding Action to State Court; Denying as Moot Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 2/20/2018.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)Certified copy of order sent to San Diego Superior Court.(acc)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BRECKENRIDGE PROPERTY FUND
2016, LLC,

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ORDER:

Plaintiff,

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Case No.: 18-cv-00357-AJB-MDD

v.

(1) SUA SPONTE REMANDING
ACTION TO STATE COURT FOR
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION; AND

IGOR SALVA, AND DOES 1 TO 10,
Defendants.

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(2) DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS

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(Doc. Nos. 1, 3)

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On February 15, 2018, Defendant Igor Salva (“Removing Defendant”) filed a notice

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to remove an unlawful detainer action filed in San Diego Superior Court to this Court.

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(Doc. No. 1.) The removal was based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 12 U.S.C.

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§ 5201 the “Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009.” (Id. at 2–3.) For the reasons

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set forth below, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the action for lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction and DENIES AS MOOT Removing Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma

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pauperis. (Doc. Nos. 1, 3.)
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DISCUSSION
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

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After a review of Plaintiff Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”)

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complaint and Removing Defendant’s notice of removal, the Court notes that the only

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cause of action asserted in the present matter is for unlawful detainer. (See generally Doc.

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No. 1-2.) Accordingly, the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

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Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction

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only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian

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Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action from state

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court to federal court only if the district court could have original jurisdiction over the

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matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “[R]emoval statutes are strictly construed against removal.”

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Luther v. Countrywide Home Loan Serv., L.P., 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008).

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Moreover, there is a “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction and the party

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seeking removal always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Gaus v.

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Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Remand is necessary if it appears from the

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face of the complaint that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed

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action. See id. (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of

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removal in the first instance.”).

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Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff is bringing a single cause of action against

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Removing Defendant for unlawful detainer. (See generally Doc. No. 1-2.) Thus, because

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this is a purely state law cause of action, the Court does not have federal question

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jurisdiction and must remand the matter. See Galileo Fin. v. Miin Sun Park, No. EDCV 09-

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1660 PSG, 2009 WL 3157411, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) (“Here, the complaint only

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asserts a claim for unlawful detainer, a cause of action that is purely a matter of state law.

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Thus, from the face of the complaint, it is clear that no basis for federal question jurisdiction

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exists.”).

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Removing Defendant attempts to argue that the complaint was properly removed as

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it expressly references the “Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009.” (Doc. No. 1 at
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2–3.) Unfortunately, no such reference to the Act is clearly made on the face of the

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complaint. Thus, the Court is not persuaded that this case “arises under” federal law. See

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Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (explaining that the determination

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as to whether a case “arises under” federal law is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint

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rule,” which provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

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presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”).

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In addition, the face of the complaint clearly shows that this Court does not possess

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diversity jurisdiction over the matter. For a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction

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there must be “complete diversity” between the parties and the amount in controversy

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requirement of $75,000 must be met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the complaint clearly

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states that the demand does not exceed $10,000. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 1.) Moreover, even

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calculating the damages that Plaintiff seeks—$91.67 per day in damages beginning on

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October 25, 2017—it only amounts to a little over $10,000 as of the date of this Order,

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which is far less than the $75,000 needed to employ diversity jurisdiction. (Id. at 6.)

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Further, the notice of removal illustrates that both parties do business or reside within

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California. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Thus, the Court also lacks diversity jurisdiction in the present

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case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

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CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the

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action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to the San Diego Superior Court.

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Consequently, Removing Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED

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AS MOOT.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: February 20, 2018

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