Torres v. KIA Motors America, Inc. et al

Filing 8

ORDER Remanding Case. Because subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 is lacking, removal was improper. Accordingly, the Court remands this action to the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. Signed by Judge Dana M. Sabraw on 7/2/2018. (Certified copy of order sent to Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, as to case No. 37-2018-00017292-CU-CO-CTL) (jdt).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LUPITA CRUZ TORRES,

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Plaintiff,

Case No. 18-cv-0907 DMS (BLM)
ORDER REMANDING CASE

v.
KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC.,
and DOES 1 to 10,
Defendants.

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On May 23, 2018, the Court held a telephonic conference with the parties.

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After consulting with counsel, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental

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briefing discussing whether subject matter jurisdiction existed over the present

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action. Having considered the parties’ briefs, the relevant legal authority, and the

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record, the Court remands the action.

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This action arises from Plaintiff Lupita Torres’s purchase/lease of an allegedly

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defective 2016 Kia Optima. On April 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against

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Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. in the Superior Court of California, County of

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San Diego, alleging claims for violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty

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Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1790 et seq., breach of express warranty under Cal. Civ. Code

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§§ 1791.2(a) & 1794, breach of implied warranty of merchantability under Cal. Civ.

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Code §§ 1791.1 & 1794, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal.
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18-cv-0907 DMS (BLM)

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Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. On May 10, 2018, Defendant removed the action to

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this Court based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

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Defendant premises subject matter jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s reference to a federal

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law in her prayer for relief, which requests, in part, “costs of the suit and Plaintiff’s

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reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d)

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and/or the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §

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2310(d)(2)[.]” (Compl. at 8.)

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Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter

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jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See

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Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant

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may remove a civil action from state court to federal court only if the district court

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could have original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A removed

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action must be remanded to state court if the federal court lacks subject matter

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jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v.

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Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter

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jurisdiction may not be waived, and, … the district court must remand if it lacks

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jurisdiction.”). “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party

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seeking removal[.]” Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th

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Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit has directed courts to “strictly construe the removal

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statute against removal jurisdiction[,]” so that “any doubt as to the right of removal”

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is resolved in favor of remanding the case to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980

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F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil

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actions “arising under” federal law. “A case ‘arises under’ federal law either where

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federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the vindication of a right under state

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law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.’” Republican Party of

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Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Franchise Tax

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Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). “The presence or
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18-cv-0907 DMS (BLM)

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absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint

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rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

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presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc.

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v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

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Here, Plaintiff’s claims do not “arise under” federal law. The Complaint

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alleges causes of action under California law. The allegations neither cite to nor

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depend on any federal law. Moreover, the causes of action do not require resolution

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of a substantial issue of federal law. Although Plaintiff’s prayer for relief includes

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a reference to federal law, it is not sufficient on its own to create federal question

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jurisdiction. “‘The valid exercise of federal question jurisdiction ... depend[s] upon

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the substantive claims raised[,]’ not on any remedy requested.” Palantir Techs. Inc.

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v. Abramowitz, No. 16-CV-5857-PJH, 2017 WL 926467, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9,

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2017) (quoting Carter v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 2004)

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(“[t]he valid exercise of federal question jurisdiction ... depend[s] upon the

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substantive claims raised[,]” not on any remedy requested)); see Rains v. Criterion

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Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 343 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In its prayer for relief, the complaint

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seeks attorneys’ fees and pre-judgment interest under both federal and state law….

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However, we do not find the attorneys’ fee and pre-judgment interest requests

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determinative. It is the nature of the cause of action that is controlling.”). Because

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subject matter jurisdiction under § 1331 is lacking, removal was improper.

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Accordingly, the Court remands this action to the Superior Court of California,

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County of San Diego.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 2, 2018

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18-cv-0907 DMS (BLM)