Trammell v. Gore et al
Filing
5
ORDER DISMISSING First Amended Complaint for Failing to State a Claim. The Court grants Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to file an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved form civil rights complaint for his use in amending. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 10/25/18.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service including civil rights complaint)(dlg)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
12
vs.
14
16
17
18
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM
PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
Plaintiff,
13
15
Case No.: 3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
BRANDON M. TRAMMELL,
Booking No. 17163702,
SHERIFF WILLIAM D. GORE; GBDF
Faculty 8; COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO;
SAN DIEGO SHERIFFS DEP’T; DOES
1-3 MEDICAL STAFF,
Defendants.
19
20
21
22
23
I.
Procedural History
On June 4, 2018, Brandon M. Trammell (“Plaintiff”), currently housed at the
24
George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) located in San Diego, California, and
25
proceeding pro se, filed a civil complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
26
Doc. No. 1 at 1.
27
28
1
3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
1
Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the
2
time of filing; instead he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to
3
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (Doc. No. 2).
4
On June 12, 2018, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but sua
5
sponte DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief
6
could be granted. See Doc. No. 3 at 7-8. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended
7
pleading in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order.
8
See id. at 8. On July 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
9
(Doc. No. 4).
10
II.
Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)
11
A.
12
As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is
Standard of Review
13
proceeding IFP, his pleadings requires a pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
14
§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a
15
prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
16
a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
17
F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2));
18
Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C.
19
§ 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or
20
malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d
21
903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d
22
680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
23
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
24
which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
25
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668
26
F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th
27
Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard
28
applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
2
3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
1
12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter,
2
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
3
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
4
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
5
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
6
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
7
relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
8
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or
9
“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting
10
this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
11
(9th Cir. 2009).
12
B.
13
In January of 2018, while Plaintiff was housed at GBDF, he was “trying to get”
Plaintiff’s Allegations
14
into his bed when he slipped and fell against the desk in his cell causing a “cut” to his leg.
15
(FAC at 3-4.) Plaintiff informed an unnamed Sheriff Deputy who “allowed [Plaintiff] to
16
shower.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff took a shower but claims that the cleanliness of the shower
17
“does not live up to health and safety codes.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff claims he
18
developed a “flesh eating infection” from “either the shower or from the desk.” (Id.)
19
At some point, Plaintiff was examined by a GBDF nurse who “took [his] vitals”
20
and found he had a high fever. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that unnamed officials took
21
him to an “observation room” where he “passed out due to the infection spreading.” (Id.)
22
At some point, Plaintiff was taken to the hospital where he was given “emergency
23
surgery.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks three (3) million in compensatory and punitive damages,
24
along with two (2) million for “mental anguish.” (Id. at 8.)
25
C.
26
Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and
42 U.S.C. § 1983
27
statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d
28
1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
3
3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
1
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
2
United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
3
acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye,
4
789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).
5
D.
6
As an initial matter, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff includes the San Diego
7
Sheriff’s Department as a Defendant, his claims must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to
8
both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) for failing to state a claim upon
9
which § 1983 relief can be granted. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.
10
A local law enforcement department (like the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department or
11
its Jail) is not a proper defendant under § 1983. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928
12
F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not
13
an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation
14
omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section
15
1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under
16
color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not a ‘person.’”).
Improper Defendant
17
E.
18
To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim against the County of San Diego
19
itself, his allegations are insufficient. A municipal entity is liable under section 1983 only
20
if plaintiff shows that his constitutional injury was caused by employees acting pursuant to
21
the municipality’s policy or custom. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429
22
U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
23
(1978); Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008). Local
24
government entities may not be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the
25
unconstitutional acts of its employees under a theory of respondeat superior. See Board of
26
Cty. Comm’rs. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).
Municipal Liability
27
Plaintiff claims it is the County’s “fault for lack of cleanliness” and insufficient
28
“health inspections.” (FAC at 5.) These claims raise issues of negligence but fail to
4
3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
1
identify any specific policy generated by the County of San Diego that resulted in
2
Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
3
F.
4
In addition, Plaintiff names Sheriff William Gore as a Defendant in his individual
Respondeat Superior
5
capacity but provides no factual allegations as to this Defendant. As a result, Plaintiff
6
fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted because he sets forth no
7
individualized allegations of wrongdoing by Sheriff Gore, and instead seeks to hold him
8
vicariously liable for the actions of his deputies and medical staff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
9
676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits,” Plaintiff “must
10
plead that each Government-official defendant, though the official’s own individual
11
actions, has violated the Constitution.”)
12
Plaintiff’s FAC contains no factual allegations describing what Defendant Sheriff
13
Gore knew, did, or failed to do, with regard to Plaintiff’s needs. Estate of Brooks v.
14
United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required
15
element of a § 1983 claim.”) “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and
16
focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or
17
omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844
18
F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg
19
v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986).
20
Thus, without some specific “factual content” that might allow the Court to “draw
21
the reasonable inference” that Sheriff Gore may be held personally liable for any
22
unconstitutional conduct directed at Plaintiff, the Court finds his FAC, as currently
23
pleaded, contains allegations which Iqbal makes clear fail to “state a claim to relief that is
24
plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 568.
25
G.
26
Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s
Inadequate Medical Care
27
serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Clouthier
28
v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle’s
5
3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
1
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims
2
alleged to violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights), overruled on other grounds by
3
Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016).
4
Here, Plaintiff does claim to have suffered injuries that demonstrates that his
5
medical needs may be objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059
6
(9th Cir. 1991) (defining a “serious medical need” as one which the “failure to treat ...
7
could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
8
pain.’”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th
9
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A]
10
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
11
relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The “existence
12
of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of
13
comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
14
individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples
15
of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974
16
F.3d at 1059-60.
17
Even if the Court assumes Plaintiff’s medical needs were “objectively serious”
18
medical conditions, nothing in his FAC supports a “reasonable inference that [any
19
individual] defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
20
678. “In order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to
21
indicate that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501
22
U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial;
23
inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a
24
constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060
25
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v.
26
Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334
27
(9th Cir. 1990)). A difference of opinion between a pretrial detainee and the doctors or
28
other trained medical personnel at the Jail as to the appropriate course or type of medical
6
3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
1
attention he requires does not amount to deliberate indifference, see Snow v. McDaniel,
2
681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.
3
1989)), and any delay in providing an appropriate course of treatment does not by itself
4
show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is alleged have caused harm. See
5
McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d
6
404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).
7
Here, Plaintiff alleges he was examined by GBDF staff and found to have a fever.
8
See FAC at 4. He was placed in an “observation room” and a “culture” was taken from
9
his wound. (Id.) Ultimately, he was transferred to an outside hospital. (Id.) However,
10
Plaintiff alleges no facts that any medical personnel at GBDF acted in “deliberate
11
indifference” to his serious medical needs. Instead, he alleges that he disagrees with
12
how they treated him for his medical condition which is insufficient to state a claim. See
13
Snow, 681 F.3d at 987. Without more, Plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claims
14
currently amount only to “unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me
15
accusation[s],” which “stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
16
‘entitlement to relief’” as to any constitutionally inadequate medical care claim. Iqbal,
17
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
18
H.
19
A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his pleading to state a claim unless
Leave to Amend
20
it is absolutely clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d
21
at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when a complaint is dismissed under
22
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect”).
23
Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim upon which relief
24
can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix the pleading deficiencies discussed in
25
this Order, if he can. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing
26
Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).
27
///
28
7
3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
1
III.
Conclusion and Order
2
For all the reasons discussed, the Court:
3
1.
4
5
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983
relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A;
2.
GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave to file an Amended Complaint
6
which cures all the deficiencies of pleading described in this Order. Plaintiff is cautioned,
7
however, that should he choose to file an Amended Complaint, it must be complete by
8
itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any claim not re-
9
alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.
10
Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended
11
pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir.
12
2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an
13
amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).
14
15
16
17
3.
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved form civil
rights complaint for his use in amending.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 25, 2018
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8
3:18-cv-01168-GPC-KSC
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?