Soldwisch v. Berryhill
Filing
25
ORDER on 21 Motion for Attorney Fees Costs and Expenses. Signed by Judge Jeffrey T. Miller on 9/14/2020. (sjt)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
STEPHANIE T. SOLDWISCH,
Case No.: 19cv1127 JM (BLM)
Plaintiff,
12
13
v.
14
ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
15
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS
AND EXPENSES
Defendant.
16
17
Plaintiff Stephanie T. Soldwisch moves the court to award attorney fees, costs, and
18
expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Doc.
19
No. 21.) The motion has been fully briefed and the court finds it suitable for submission
20
without oral argument in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the below
21
reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
22
I.
23
Plaintiff requests attorney fees, costs, and expenses related to her appeal of the denial
24
of her application for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration (SSA). On
25
February 5, 2020, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the case be remanded to the
26
SSA for additional administrative proceedings. (Doc. No. 17.) The Magistrate Judge
27
issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) finding that the case should be remanded
28
because 1.) the SSA found Plaintiff disabled on a subsequent application for benefits
BACKGROUND
1
19cv1127 JM (BLM)
1
apparently based on the same evidence that the SSA considered in conjunction with the
2
application at issue, and 2.) the SSA failed to provide the court with a complete
3
administrative record upon which to review the SSA’s final decision. (Id.) The SSA did
4
not object to the R&R. On March 20, 2020, the court fully adopted the R&R. (Doc. No.
5
18.) Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion on June 19, 2020. (Doc. No. 21.) The SSA
6
filed an opposition on July 6, 2020, (Doc. No. 22), to which Plaintiff replied on July 11,
7
2020, (Doc. No. 23).
8
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
9
“Under EAJA, a litigant is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs if: (1) [s]he is the
10
prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was substantially
11
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested fees and
12
costs are reasonable.” Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005); 28 U.S.C.
13
§2412(d)(1)(A). An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the
14
purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of
15
whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded.” Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255,
16
1257 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
17
“[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
18
documenting the appropriate hours expended.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437
19
(1983). “[T]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee
20
is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable
21
hourly rate.” Id. at 433. Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary
22
should be excluded from an award of fees. Id. at 434. “There is a strong presumption that
23
the ‘lodestar figure’ represents a reasonable fee,” and it should be reduced only in “rare
24
instances.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
25
Doan v. Berryhill, Case No. 16-cv-00841-BAS-AGS, 2018 WL 2761733, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
26
June 7, 2018) (“Generally, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional
27
judgment as to how much time was required for the case.”). If the government disputes
28
the reasonableness of the fee, then it “has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of
2
19cv1127 JM (BLM)
1
evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours
2
charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates v.
3
Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992).
4
III.
5
Plaintiff requests a total of $12,397.10 in attorney fees for 60.4 hours of work at a
6
rate of $205.25 per hour. She also requests $540.35 in costs and expenses. In support of
7
her request, Plaintiff attached itemized records of the time her counsel spent on each task
8
for which she billed. (See Doc. No. 21-2.) She also attached a declaration from her counsel
9
citing eight EAJA cases outside of this district in which she was awarded more than the
10
DISCUSSION
amount sought here. (See Doc. No. 21-2 at 2-3.)
11
The SSA does not dispute, and the court agrees, that Plaintiff is the prevailing party,
12
that the SSA’s position was not substantially justified, and that no special circumstances
13
make the award unjust. The SSA also does not dispute, and the court agrees, that Plaintiff’s
14
counsel’s $205.25 hourly rate is reasonable and consistent with the EAJA. See Beatriz B.
15
v. Saul, Case No.: 3:19-cv-785-AHG, 2020 WL 5203371, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2020)
16
(“The Ninth Circuit’s hourly EAJA rate for attorney work performed in 2019, factoring in
17
an increase in the cost of living, was $205.25.”).
18
From an overall perspective, similar cases in this district involving similarly
19
experienced attorneys support the reasonableness of the total hours worked and amount
20
requested here. See Truong v. Berryhill, Case No.: 3:17-cv-02179-BEN-RNB, 2019 WL
21
1863655, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019) (77.75 hours and $19,476.52); Minh Doan v.
22
Berryhill, Case No.: 3:17-cv-02179-BEN-RNB (S.D. Cal. 2018) (97.5 hours and
23
$ 23,642.76); Alzayadie v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-1886 JLS (JMA), 2011 WL 940766, at *1
24
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011) (noting that courts have found it reasonable to spend 60, 69, 72,
25
and 73 hours litigating social security cases). The SSA nonetheless takes issue with several
26
specific aspects of Plaintiff’s motion.
27
28
3
19cv1127 JM (BLM)
1
A.
Clerical Tasks
2
The SSA argues that Plaintiff’s counsel unreasonably billed for 5.2 hours, or
3
$1,067.30, performing clerical tasks. (Doc. No. 22 at 3-4.) In motions for attorney fees in
4
social security cases, district courts have found a variety of tasks to be unreasonably
5
clerical, two of which are included in Plaintiff’s counsel’s bill. See Keovongsa v. Colvin,
6
Case No.: 3:16-CV-00842-BTM-NLS, 2019 WL 354621, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019)
7
(preparing summonses and cover sheets); Kirk v. Berryhill, 244 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1084
8
(E.D. Cal. 2017) (preparing service of process and consent forms). Here, however, the
9
bulk of the disputed entries, i.e. eight of the 23 disputed entries, or 2.1 hours’ worth of
10
work, involve communications with Plaintiff via letter, phone, and e-mail. Although
11
Plaintiff’s counsel does not state the reason for each communication with her client,
12
communicating with her client is part of her professional responsibilities and is not, as the
13
SSA suggests, per se clerical. The SSA does not explain why any of these communications
14
were clerical or otherwise undeserving of compensation. Additionally, the amount of time
15
Plaintiff’s counsel billed for communicating with her client is within the reasonable range.
16
See Yesipovich v. Colvin, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding it
17
reasonable for Plaintiff’s counsel to have spent 2.3 hours communicating with her client
18
via letter, phone, and e-mail).
19
Additionally, the remaining entries challenged by the SSA, though perhaps routine,
20
involve tasks that are just as much legal as they are clerical, if not more so. These include
21
communicating with referring counsel, drafting the complaint, preparing documents for
22
service, drafting a certificate of service, preparing a declination of assignment to a
23
magistrate judge, communicating with opposing counsel, reviewing an ex parte motion,
24
and attempting to settle the instant dispute. To the extent these tasks did not necessarily
25
require the work of an attorney, the amount of time billed by Plaintiff’s counsel is within
26
the reasonable range. See Nelson v. Berryhill, Case No.: 17-cv-00614-AJB-KSC, 2019
27
WL 2232954, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2019) (“[M]inimal time spent on litigation-related
28
tasks may be reasonable in some circumstances.”). For example, Plaintiff’s counsel billed
4
19cv1127 JM (BLM)
1
a total of 2.3 hours for preparing an engagement letter and drafting a letter to the client
2
(1 hour), drafting the complaint and civil cover sheet (24 minutes), drafting a letter to the
3
client and SSA (30 min), preparing documents for service on the SSA (12 minutes),
4
drafting a certificate of service (6 minutes), and preparing a declination of assignment to a
5
magistrate judge (6 minutes). (See Doc. No. 21-2 at 8.) Accordingly, based on the
6
documentation provided by Plaintiff’s counsel, and the minimal argument put forth by the
7
SSA, the court declines to find that any of Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing entries were
8
unreasonably clerical.
9
B.
Duplicative Billing
10
The SSA argues that six minutes of Plaintiff’s counsel’s bill, or $20.53 worth of
11
work, were unreasonably duplicative. The SSA complains that Plaintiff’s counsel billed
12
12 minutes of work for drafting a declaration, and four days later, billed for six minutes of
13
work “redrafting” the declaration. (Doc. No. 22 at 4.) Plaintiff’s counsel states she
14
redrafted the declaration after reviewing an e-mail from the referring attorney. (Doc. No.
15
23 at 4.) Although this does not explain why the declaration needed to be “redrafted,”
16
spending a total of 18 minutes on a declaration is reasonable.
17
C.
Drafting the Instant Motion
18
Plaintiff’s counsel billed a total of 7.5 hours, or $1,539.38, for researching and
19
drafting the instant motion. (Doc. No. 21-2 at 8, 12.) Plaintiff also requests an additional
20
4.5 hours, or $923.63, for drafting her reply to the SSA’s opposition, for a total of 12 hours,
21
or $2,463.01, related to litigating the instant motion. (Doc. No. 23 at 7.) The SSA argues
22
that, based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s extensive experience, she should only be awarded two
23
hours, or $410.50, for researching and drafting the instant motion. (Doc. No. 22 at 4-5.)
24
Certainly, some courts have reduced the amount of time experienced social security
25
attorneys can bill for preparing motions for attorney fees. See Anh Tuyet Thai v. Saul, Case
26
No.: 18cv2647-JAH-RBM, 2020 WL 4697971, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020) (reducing
27
9.5 hours spent preparing motion to 2 hours); see also Adams v. Saul, No. 19CV335-BLM,
28
2020 WL 1332473, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2020) (approving 4.5 hours for filing a motion,
5
19cv1127 JM (BLM)
1
not including the reply). Here, however, Plaintiff’s counsel submits declarations attesting,
2
under the penalty of perjury, that she spent 12 hours litigating the instant motion. (Doc.
3
Nos. 21-2, 23-1.) Nothing in the record suggests she did not reasonably do so. See Guzman
4
v. Berryhill, Case No.: 17cv2593-CAB-AGS, 2019 WL 1923932, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 29,
5
2019) (“[T]he Court sees no reason to dispute Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation that all
6
hours were reasonably expended”).
7
experienced and has previously filed similar motions that may have been used as templates,
8
she still had to gather the supporting documents, fill-in the relevant party and factual
9
information, address particularized legal issues, edit supporting declarations, update case
Although Plaintiff’s counsel is undoubtably
10
citations, proof-read, file the motion, etc.
11
Additionally, replying to the SSA’s opposition could reasonably occupy 4.5 hours given
12
that replies depend on the arguments raised in the opposition, which in this case appear to
13
be at least somewhat particularized. The SSA also provides no specific reason to impose
14
a two-hour cap on preparing the instant motion. See Costa v. Comm. of SSA, 690 F.3d
15
1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is improper for district courts to apply a de facto cap on
16
the number of hours for which attorneys may be compensated under the EAJA in a ‘routine’
17
case challenging the denial of social security benefits.”); see also Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-
18
98 (if challenging the reasonableness of fees supported by affidavit, the SSA has the burden
19
of submitting evidence). Accordingly, the requested fees related to drafting the instant
20
motion appear reasonable.
21
D.
This could reasonably occupy 7.5 hours.
Costs
22
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(a), “[a] judge . . . . may tax as costs . . . . [f]ees of the
23
clerk[.]” The SSA argues that the $400 filing fee for which Plaintiff seeks reimbursement
24
is a cost pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, not an expense under the EAJA. (Doc. No. 22 at
25
5.) The SSA does not dispute, however, that Plaintiff is entitled to a total of $540.35, in
26
costs and/or expenses, which includes the $400 filing fee. In her reply, Plaintiff does not
27
address whether the $400 filing fee is an expense under the EAJA or a cost under 28 U.S.C.
28
§ 1920. Based on the documentation provided by Plaintiff in support of her request for
6
19cv1127 JM (BLM)
1
costs, and because the SSA does not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to $504.35 in costs
2
and/or expenses, the court finds this amount is reasonable without deciding which authority
3
is more applicable. See Thorne v. Saul, Case No.: 18cv1874-MMA (LL), 2019 WL
4
3974088, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) (doing the same).
5
E.
Payment
6
Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel requests that payment be made directly to her, rather than
7
to Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 21 at 14.) The SSA argues that under the EAJA, fees are payable
8
only to the “prevailing party.” (Doc. No. 22 at 5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)).) The
9
SSA explains:
10
14
To comply with the Treasury Offset Program, when a court issues an order for
EAJA fees (ordered payable to the plaintiff, not counsel), the government
considers any assignment of EAJA fees to determine whether they are subject
to any offset. If the plaintiff does not owe a government debt that qualifies
for offset, then payment may be made in counsel’s name based on the
government’s discretionary waiver of the requirements of the AntiAssignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727.
15
(Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff responds by arguing that “[t]his Court and others have issued orders
16
for EAJA fees, costs, and expenses to be paid directly to a Plaintiff’s counsel, subject to
17
administrative offset due to the Plaintiff’s government debt, if any exists, in accordance
18
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010).” (Doc. No.
19
23 at 8 (listing cases).)
11
12
13
20
District courts have repeatedly addressed this specific issue by ordering that payment
21
be made directly to plaintiff’s counsel after it is determined that the plaintiff owes no debt
22
subject to offset. See Beatriz B., 2020 WL 5203371, at *4 (“[S]hould Plaintiff not have a
23
debt that is subject to offset, the award of fees may be paid directly to counsel.”); Toni
24
Lynn B. v. Saul, Case No.: 3:19-cv-925-AHG, 2020 WL 4001981, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 15,
25
2020) (“[S]hould Plaintiff not have a debt that is subject to offset, the award of fees may
26
be paid directly to counsel.”); Truong, 2019 WL 1863655, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2019)
27
(“This award shall be payable directly to the Plaintiff and is subject to offset to satisfy any
28
preexisting debt that Plaintiff owes the United States pursuant to Astrue[.]”); Guzman, 2019
7
19cv1127 JM (BLM)
1
WL 1923932, at *2 (“Pursuant to Astrue, if the government determines Plaintiff does not
2
owe a federal debt, then the government shall cause the payment of the award to be made
3
directly to Plaintiff’s attorney.”). Accordingly, as ordered below, payment will be directed
4
in a similar manner.
5
IV.
6
Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees, expenses, and costs because she is the prevailing
CONCLUSION
7
party and the SSA’s position was not substantially justified.
8
§ 2412(d)(2)(H). Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees, costs, and expenses are reasonable in light of
9
the tasks performed and results achieved. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney
10
Fees, Costs, and Expenses (Doc. No. 21) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded $12,397.10
11
in attorney fees and $540.35 in costs and/or expenses. Payment shall be made payable to
12
Plaintiff and delivered to Plaintiff’s counsel, unless Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt.
13
If the United States Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a
14
federal debt, the government shall accept Plaintiff’s assignment of EAJA fees and pay fees
15
directly to Plaintiff’s counsel. See Beatriz B., 2020 WL 5203371, at *4.
16
17
18
See 28 U.S.C.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 14, 2020
JEFFREY T. MILLER
United States District Judge
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8
19cv1127 JM (BLM)
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?