Chatman v. Toyota of Escondido
Filing
3
ORDER : (1) Denying Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis As Barred by 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)(ECF No. #2 ); and (2) Dismissing Civil Action Without Prejudice for Failure to Pay Filing Fee Required by 28 U.S.C. 1914(a). Signed by Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo on 1/10/2020. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(anh)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
12
ERIC CHATMAN,
CDCR #BI-6355,
Case No.: 3:20-cv-00041-CAB-LL
ORDER:
13
14
Plaintiff,
(1) DENYING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
(ECF No. 2); AND
v.
15
16
TOYOTA OF ESCONDIDO, et al.,
17
18
(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR
FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE
REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)
Defendants.
19
20
21
22
Eric Chatman (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison
23
(“SQSP”) located in San Quentin, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil
24
action in which he claims to have been raped at work at Toyota of Escondido in 1997 or
25
1998. (ECF No. 1, Compl.)
26
27
28
Plaintiff did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time
he filed his Complaint; instead he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)
1
3:20-cv-00041-CAB-LL
1
2
3
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2.)
I.
Motion to Proceed IFP
A. Standard of Review
4
“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty.
5
Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however,
6
“face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full
7
amount of a filing fee,” in “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b),
8
Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform
9
Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:
10
11
12
13
. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the
grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’
provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).
“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.”
Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter
“Cervantes”) (stating that under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought
unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes
rule . . . .”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing
frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312
(9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims
dismissed both before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.
“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner,
which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state
a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the
2
3:20-cv-00041-CAB-LL
1
district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the
2
action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153
3
(9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by
4
section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show
5
he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);
6
Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which
7
“make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious
8
physical injury’ at the time of filing.”).
9
10
B. Application to Plaintiff
As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and has
11
ascertained that it does not contain “plausible allegations” which suggest he “faced
12
‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d
13
at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, Plaintiff alleges that more than twenty
14
years ago he was raped by his supervisor at the car dealership at which he worked. (See
15
Compl. at 13.)
16
A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without
17
the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at
18
issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v.
19
Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel.
20
Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).
21
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff, while incarcerated, has had at least
22
three prior civil actions in this district alone dismissed on the grounds that they were
23
frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28
24
U.S.C. § 1915(g). They are:
25
1)
Chatman v. Toyota of Escondido, et al., No. 3:17-cv-01853-BAS-JLB, ECF
26
No. 18 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (dismissing action for failing to state a
27
claim and without leave to amend) (strike one);
28
3
3:20-cv-00041-CAB-LL
1
2)
Chatman v. Cush Acura, et al., No. 3:17-cv-01852-WQH-JLB, ECF No. 20
2
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2017) (dismissing action for failing to state a claim and
3
without leave to amend) (strike two);
4
3)
Chatman v. Super 8 Motel, et al., No. 3:17-cv-02517-DMS-JMA, ECF No. 9
5
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018) (dismissing action for failing to state a claim and
6
without leave to amend) (strike three); and
7
4)
Chatman v. Super 8 Motel Co., et al., No. 3:18-cv-00213-BAS-NLS, ECF
8
No. 6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018) (dismissing action as frivolous and without
9
leave to amend) (strike four).
10
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated at least the
11
three “strikes” permitted pursuant to § 1915(g), and fails to make a “plausible allegation”
12
that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his
13
Complaint, he is not entitled to proceed IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at
14
1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent
15
all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of
16
abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also
17
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed
18
IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).
19
III.
Conclusion and Order
20
For the reasons set forth above, the Court:
21
1)
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g);
2)
DISMISSES this civil action without prejudice for failure to pay the full
statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);
3)
CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and
therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and
4)
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.
4
3:20-cv-00041-CAB-LL
1
2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 10, 2020
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
3:20-cv-00041-CAB-LL
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?