Campos v. Saul

Filing 5

ORDER granting #2 Plaintiff's in forma pauperis motion. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew G. Schopler on 4/27/2021. (jpp) (dlg).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Richard C.,

Case No.: 21-cv-802-AGS

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS
(ECF 2)

Plaintiff,

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v.

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Andrew M. SAUL,

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Defendant.

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Plaintiff moves to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Plaintiff qualifies to proceed

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without paying the initial filing fee, and his complaint states a claim for relief. So, the Court

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grants plaintiff’s motion.

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Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

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Typically, parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay

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a filing fee of $402. 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). But if granted the right to proceed in forma

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pauperis, a plaintiff can proceed without paying the fee. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176,

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1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Here, plaintiff owns no assets and receives $200 in food stamps and $676 in

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unemployment each month, for a total of $876. (ECF 2, at 2-3.) Plaintiff’s household

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expenses are $1,563.99. (Id. at 4-5.) Because his unemployment does not cover his

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expenses, plaintiff’s “mother helps [him] with the things [he] can not pay.” (Id. at 3.) The

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Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently shown an inability to pay the initial $402 fee.

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) Screening

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When reviewing an IFP motion, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss it

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if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $52.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (effective Dec. 1, 2020).
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21-cv-802-AGS

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immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127

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(9th Cir. 2000). In the Social Security context, a plaintiff’s complaint must set forth

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sufficient facts to support the legal conclusion that the Commissioner’s decision was

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incorrect. “[T]o survive the Court’s § 1915(e) screening,” a plaintiff must (1) “establish

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that she has exhausted her administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and that

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the civil action was commenced within sixty days after notice of a final decision,” (2)

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“indicate the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides,” (3) “state the nature of

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plaintiff’s disability and when the plaintiff claims she became disabled,” and (4) “identify[]

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the nature of the plaintiff’s disagreement with the determination made by the Social

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Security Administration and show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Varao v. Berryhill,

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No. 17-cv-02463-LAB-JLB, 2018 WL 4373697, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018) (alteration

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and citation omitted).

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Plaintiff meets all four elements to survive a § 1915(e) screening. First, plaintiff

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“exhausted all administrative remedies by seeking review with the Appeals Council,”

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which denied his request on March 3, 2021. (ECF 1, at 4.) At that time, the ALJ’s decision

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became the Commissioner’s final decision. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).

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Next, plaintiff claims to reside in Santee, CA “within the jurisdictional boundaries of this

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Court.” (Id. at 1.) The complaint also states the nature of plaintiff’s disability:

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“degenerative disc disease of the thoracic and lumbar spine; arthritis of the left knee; major

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depressive disorder; and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),” which “rendered him

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disabled since August 15, 2015.” (Id. at 3.) Finally, plaintiff identifies the nature of his

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disagreement with the Social Security Administration’s determination, arguing that the

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ALJ “improperly identified . . . occupations . . . which require abilities” that run contrary

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to plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ

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“improperly reject[ed plaintiff’s] testimony regarding pain, symptom, and limitation.” (Id.)

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Based on these allegations, plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to survive the “low threshold”

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for proceeding past the § 1915(e) screening. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123

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(9th Cir. 2012).
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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants plaintiff’s IFP motion.
Dated: April 27, 2021

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