Dalton et al v. County of San Diego et al

Filing 45

ORDER (1) Granting Motion to Seal 27 , (2) Granting Joint Motion to Authenticate Documents 40 , and (3) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Summary-Judgment Motion 29 . Signed by Judge Thomas J. Whelan on 3/27/2024. (exs)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STEVEN DALTON, et al.,

Case No.: 3:21-CV-2143 W (WVG)
Plaintiffs,

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v.

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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

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Defendants.

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION TO
SEAL [DOC. 27], (2) GRANTING
JOINT MOTION TO AUTHENTICATE
DOCUMENTS [DOC. 40], AND
(3) GRANTING IN PART AND
SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION
[DOC. 29]

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summary judgment. Defendants have also filed a motion to seal certain exhibits.

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Plaintiffs oppose the motion for summary judgment but not the motion to seal.

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Additionally, the parties have filed a joint motion to authenticate documents.

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The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument.

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See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d.1). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to seal

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[Doc. 27], GRANTS the joint motion to authenticate documents [Doc. 40] and

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GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the summary-judgment motion [Doc. 29].

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3:21-CV-2143 W (WVG)

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I.

MOTIONS TO SEAL
Defendants move to seal Exhibits A through N, filed in support of their summary-

judgment motion. (See Defs

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[Doc. 27] 1:26 28.) The basis for the motion

are either marked as Confidential under the protective order in this

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case, which requires the parties to request filing under seal, or implicate juvenile police

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and mental health records.

Id.)

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Kamakana v. City

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and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner

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, 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n. 7 (1978)). Although access to judicial records is

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secret for policy reas

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Id. (citing Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d

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particular court

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Id. (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d
1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)).

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ds applies fully to dispositive

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Kamakana

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whether by trial or summary judgment, is at the heart of the interest in ensuring the

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Id.
(quoting Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986)).

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dicial records attached to a

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Id. (citing Foltz
the dispositive motion, or its attachments, were previously filed under seal or protective
Id.

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3:21-CV-2143 W (WVG)

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D.

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On December 29, 2021, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the County and Deputy

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Collins. The Amended Complaint asserts three claims for relief against the Deputy under

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) unreasonable seizure (

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(Pizzo

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claims against both Defendants for negligence, false arrest (as to Dalton) and Violation of

Plaintiffs file this lawsuit.

arrest), (2) unreasonable seizure

) and (3) state-created danger. Plaintiffs also assert three state-based

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Defendants now move for summary judgment. They contend Deputy Collins is
entitled to qualified immunity for the section 1983 claims. Defendants also seek summary
adjudication of all of the state claims and the request for punitive damages.

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III.

LEGAL STANDARD

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Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party

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demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment

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as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

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(1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the

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outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman

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v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

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The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the

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absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party

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can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential

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failed to m

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on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-

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T.W.
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, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
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3:21-CV-2143 W (WVG)

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Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Richards v.
Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)).

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If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

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586 (1986); Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995)

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(citing Anderson

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support of the nonmovin

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there is a gen

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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from

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the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita,

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475 U.S. a

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of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

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IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Qualified Immunity

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for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

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Pearson v.

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Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

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(1982)).

the need to hold public
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3:21-CV-2143 W (WVG)

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probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
District of Columbia v. Wesby,

U.S.

, 138 S.Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quoting

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Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). However, the information upon which

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probable cause is based must be reasonably trustworthy. See Allen v. City of Portland, 73

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en, at the time of arrest, the
agents know reasonable trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in

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Because Deputy

probable cause determination relied on information from

O.D., Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 2003), is helpful to the

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Peng, the defendant officer was dispatched to a family dispute over

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title documents relating to property. While at the scene, the victim, through a translator,

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told the officer that her brother forcibly took the documents from her. The officer then

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interviewed two other witnesses using the same translator, who told the officer that the

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witnesses saw the brother grab the documents again

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arrested the brother for robbery

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Id. at 976.
Charges were not filed against the brother, who sued the officer under section 1983

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for unlawful seizure. The officer moved to dismiss arguing that because there was

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probable cause to arrest plaintiff, there was no constitutional violation, and the officer

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was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.

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On appeal, plaintiff argued, among other things, that there was no probable cause

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Id. at 973. In rejecting the

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argument, the Ninth Circuit cited the office

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translator represented confirmed the victim

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concluded:

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. Id. at 978 979. The court then

We are satisfied that [the officer] made a reasonable investigation under the
circumstances before he arrested [plaintiff]. [Citation omitted.] We conclude
that
scene of an alleged domestic disturbance does not defeat probable cause if:
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confirmed O.D. had been violent. And Dalton also confirmed O.D. had pulled a knife on

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Pizzo and was yelling. This information further contradicts

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Next, t

contention.

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state and

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frightful. The video confirms

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sad and her voice quivered. However, the video also appears to show that O.D. quickly

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regained her composure and

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generally unemotional and matter of fact, with no indication of sadness or fright.

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Moreover, aside from a few relatively short periods of sadness, the video reveals that for

she was credible because she appeared sad and
O.D. appeared
-up questions were

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most of the interview (before and after describing the alleged abuse), O.D. was calm,

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affable and at times joked with the Deputy and laughed. Also relevant, O.D. appeared to

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become defensive when her younger sister began to tell the Deputy that she saw O.D.

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ard Pizzo yelling at O.D. to take your nails out of my arm.

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s labile demeanor, there is no dispute that some of her

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s were inconsistent. Most significantly,

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explanation of why she ran away changed after being warned by the Deputy. Initially,

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O.D. twice stated that she simply went for a walk because her parents told her to.

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Immediately after the Deputy warned O.D. that she would be taken back to the hospital

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and placed on a hold if she ran away again, O.D. alleged she left because Dalton abused

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her. Another example is O.D. denial that she du

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not only contradicted by

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heard Pizzo yelling at O.D. to take your nails out of my arm.

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, but by

m, which was
statement that she

-cause argument relies, in part, on the
contention that O.D. appeared credible because she was sad and frightful. The video,

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r was labile, often changing in an instant or in

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immediate response to a question. It further confirms that for most of the interview, O.D.

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was calm and affable, and at times joked with the Deputy and laughed. Additionally,

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there is no dispute there were i
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investigation was made even more difficult because Dalton quickly became agitated and

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failed to cooperate. Additionally, the lack of a mental-health expert likely placed the

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Deputy in a more difficult situation

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having a mental-health crises.

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Nevertheless, none of the facts Deputy Collins was aware of at the time of the

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arrest

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15 or 16 CPS cases was suspicious, under the circumstances they warranted further

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investigation. For all these reasons, the Court finds Defendants have failed to establish

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b)

Was the law clearly established?

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Reese
v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1080, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018). In evaluating whether a

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Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. In determining whether a right is clearly established, courts

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Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 2005);
Sorrels v. McKee, 290

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Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct.

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immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to

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Anderson v.

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Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). This is particularly true in the Fourth Amendment

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depression, who was not current on her medication, and had pulled a knife on her parents

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and run away. Additionally, the alleged perpetrator of the child abuse Dalton quickly

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became agitated and

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Court has not found a case that would have provided notice to Deputy Collins that

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probable cause was lacking at the time of the arrest and additional investigation was

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necessary, Deputy Collins is entitled to qualified immunity.

gation. Because the

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2.

Pizzo
a)

Was there a constitutional violation?

Pizzo contends she was unlawfully detained by Deputy Collins. The undisputed
facts do not support her claim.

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or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of movement. Brendlin v.

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California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007). An officer has restrained the liberty of the citizen

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if, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police

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conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to

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U.S. v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d

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1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). A

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interference, however

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United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 114 n.5 (1984). If a consensual encounter has ripened into an investigatory

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Heien v. North Carolina, 574
U.S. 54, 60 (2014). The appropriate inquiry is whether the

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liberty such that a reasonable person under the

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circumstances would not have felt free to disregard the order. U.S. v. Enslin, 327 F.3d

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788, 795 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Here, there is no dispute that Deputy Collins never told Pizzo she was detained.
Instead, Plaintiffs argue Pizzo believed she was not free to leave because:
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D.

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Defendants also seek summary adjudication of Plaintiffs

Punitive Damages.

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As set forth in their motion, punitive damages are only available where a

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conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent or involves reckless or callous indifference

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to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).

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Reckless or callous indifference has been described as a defendant engaging in conduct

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Fair

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Hous. Ctr. of Washington v. Breier-Scheetz Properties, LLC, 743 F. App'x 116, 118 (9th

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Cir. 2018).

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opposition argues the following Ninth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction
applies to their request for punitive damages:

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that harmed the plaintiff was malicious, oppressive or in reckless disregard of the

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Conduct is malicious if it is accompanied by ill will, or spite, or if it is for the
purpose of injuring the plaintiff.

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he circumstances,

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defendant acts in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate the

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An act or omission is oppressive if the defendant injures or damages or otherwise
violates the rights of the plaintiff with unnecessary harshness or severity, such as
by misusing or abusing authority or power or by taking advantage of some
.

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(

at 19:24

following undisputed facts support an award of punitive damages: (1) Deputy Collins was
aggravated at not being notified that O.D. had returned; (2) he was aggravated at being
ignored by Dalton; (3)

; and (4) the Deputy

said if he returned
Id. at 20:9 15.) The argument lacks merit.
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As an initial matter, because summary adjudication is appropriate as to all of

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Thus,
request for punitive damages is at issue.

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ages, two of the facts Plaintiffs
cite above i.e.,

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occurred after Dalton was arrested
and, therefore, are not relevant to whether Deputy Coll

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Accordingly

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(1) not being
notified that O.D. returned home and (2) Dalton ignoring him.

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As an initial matter, Plaintiffs have not cited and the Court is unaware of any case
where punitive damages have been awarded because law enforcement appeared

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argument.

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It establishes that throughout

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Collins was calm, polite, never used threatening language and was focused on attempting

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Even assuming for the sake of argument the Deputy was

interaction with Pizzo and Dalton, Deputy

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frustrated with Plaintiffs

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failure to cooperate with his investigation, the Court finds it did not rise to the level of

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tutional rights. Thus,
summary adjudication is required.

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V.

CONCLUSION & ORDER
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to seal [Doc. 27],

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GRANTS the joint motion to authenticate documents [Doc. 40] and GRANTS IN

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PART and DENIES IN PART the summary-judgment motion [Doc. 29] as follows:

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Summary adjudication is granted in favor of Defendants as to
claims for relief.

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Section
1983 Claim, Bane Act Claim and request for punitive damages.

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Negligence Claim based on his

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unreasonable seizure.

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Plaintiffs shall file a copy of their exhibits in support of the opposition (i.e.,

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MSJ 001 MSJ 197) within one week of the date of this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: March 27, 2024

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