Wally v. Kijakazi

Filing 13

ORDER Granting 11 Motion for Attorney's Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Signed by Judge Thomas J. Whelan on 3/10/2025. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(exs)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JUSTIN WALLY,

Case No.: 23-CV-0769 W (BLM)
Plaintiff,

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v.

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LELAND DUDEK, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER 42
U.S.C. § 406(b) [DOC. 11]

Defendant.

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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel, Martha Yancey of Yancey Law, PC

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(“Counsel”), motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Counsel requests

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$9,150.00 in fees, representing 15.3% of her client’s past due benefits. On February 24,

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2025, Defendant filed a response taking no position on the request. (See Def’s Response

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[Doc. 12].)

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The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted, and without oral argument.

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See Civ.L.R. 7.1.d. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion [Doc. 11].

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23-CV-0769 W (BLM)

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I.

DISCUSSION

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Section 406(b) provides, in relevant part:

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Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits
to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .

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Id. “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

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the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not

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responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.2009) (en

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banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802, (2002)). “The goal of fee awards

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under section 460(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent claimants while

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ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted.”

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Thomas v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1529331, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Cotter v. Bowen, 879

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F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807).

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In evaluating an attorney’s fee request, courts “must respect ‘the primacy of lawful

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attorney-client fee arrangements,’ . . . ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then

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testing for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gilbrecht, 535 U.S. at

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793, 808). Factors courts may consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the attorney

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fee award are: (1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved; (3) whether

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the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison

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to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours

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worked and counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. Thomas,

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2015 WL 1529331, *2 (citing Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148).

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Here, Plaintiff entered into a contingency-fee agreement (the “Agreement”) with

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Counsel. (See Agreement [Doc. 11-2].) The Agreement provides that Plaintiff agrees

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“that my attorney shall charge and receive as the fee an amount equal to twenty-five

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23-CV-0769 W (BLM)

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percent (25%) of the past-due benefits that are awarded . . . .” Despite being entitled to

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25%, Counsel’s requested attorney fee amounts to 15.3% of Plaintiff’s award.

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There is also no dispute that Counsel was successful in obtaining a favorable result

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for Plaintiff in this case by securing a remand to the Commissioner to hold a new hearing

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and issue a new decision. (Order [Doc. 9] 1:25–2:3.) On remand, the Commissioner

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granted Plaintiff’s application for benefits and awarded him $59,099.00 in past-due

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benefits. (Notice of Award [Doc. 11-1] at p.3.) Based on these facts, there is no indication

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of substandard performance or dilatory conduct by counsel. Additionally, Counsel has

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persuasively argued that her de facto hourly rate of $1,326, while on the high end,

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nevertheless compares favorably with rates awarded by other courts in this District. See

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Watkins v. O'Malley, 2024 WL 2702444, * 2 (S.D. Cal., May 24, 2024) (approving

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effective hourly rate of $1,566.00 and noting that “several cases have found rates of

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$1300 - $1600 to be appropriate, including cases in this district. [Citations omitted.]”).

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For all these reasons, the Court will grant the motion.

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II.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

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For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner Martha Yancey’s

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motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) [Doc. 11]. Defendant is ORDERED

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to pay $9,150.00 directly to Martha Yancey, Yancey Law, PC within 90 days from the

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date of this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 10, 2025

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