Tyler v. C-Yard Sgt Banulos

Filing 7

ORDER Dismissing Complaint for Failing to State a Claim Pursuant to 28 U.S.C 1915A(b) (ECF No. #1 ). Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint due by 03/25/2024. Signed by Judge Cynthia Bashant on 02/07/2024.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(mjw)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CLAUDIE TYLER,
CDCR #K-19763,
Plaintiff,

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C-YARD SGT BANULOS,
Defendants.

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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)
(ECF No. 1)

vs.

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Case No.: 23-cv-02278-BAS-MMP

Plaintiff Claudie Tyler (“Plaintiff” or “Tyler”), proceeding pro se, is currently
incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego,
California, and has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See
“Compl,” ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has paid the initial civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1914(a). (ECF No. 6.)
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) SCREENING
A.

Standard of Review
The Court must conduct an initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a), because he is a prisoner and seeks “redress from a governmental entity
or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Section
1915A(a) “mandates early review— ‘before docketing [ ] or [ ] as soon as practicable after
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docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental

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entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d

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1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016), as amended on reh’g (Apr. 15, 2016). The mandatory

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screening provisions of § 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who sue

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a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

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446–47 (9th Cir. 2000).

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“On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

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complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may

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be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

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Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28

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U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar

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standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

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B.

Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

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Plaintiff’s Complaint contains factual allegations that are difficult to discern. On

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August 15, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that he was working as a porter on the RJD C-yard when

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he noticed that Correctional Officer Rios “was in pain.” (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff claims

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that he knew Rios “was in pain [because] he [slept] the wrong way and had a crick in his

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neck.” (Id.) Plaintiff approached Rios and told him to “relax” while he put his hands on

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Rios to “crack[] his neck.” (Id.) Rios “went to the desk and started sorting mail” while

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Plaintiff “kept doing his [] porter duties.” (Id.) A sergeant and another correctional officer

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“came from the program office and put [Plaintiff] in handcuffs.” (Id.) Plaintiff was placed

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in administrative segregation because of his interaction and claims another correctional

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officer took a video of the incident and posted it to social media. (See id.) Plaintiff alleges

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he was “put in the hole for helping someone.” (See id. at 4.)

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Plaintiff seeks $25,000,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000,000 in punitive
damages. (See id. at 7.)

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C.

Discussion

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1. Due Process Claims

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To the best the Court can determine, it appears that Plaintiff is claiming that his due

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process rights were violated when he apparently was charged with a disciplinary violation

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because of his interaction with Correctional Officer Rios. The Fourteenth Amendment

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provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

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due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1-Citizens. “To state a procedural due

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process claim, [a plaintiff] must allege ‘(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the

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Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; (and) (3) lack of

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process.’” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Portman v. Cnty.

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of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993).

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However, the Complaint does not contain facts which plausibly allege Plaintiff was

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denied due process. “Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a prisoner

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is entitled to certain due process protections when he is charged with a disciplinary

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violation.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Wolff v.

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McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564–571 (1974). A federally protected liberty interest arises

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where a sentence is exceeded in “an unexpected manner” or where an inmate is subject to

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restrictions that impose “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

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ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). When a

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protected liberty interest arises, due process requires prisoners be provided: (1) 24-hour

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advanced written notice of the charges, (2) a written statement from the factfinder

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identifying the evidence relied on and the reasons for the action taken, (3) an opportunity

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“to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him

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to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals,”

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(4) assistance at the hearing if he is illiterate or the matter is complex, and (5) a “sufficiently

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impartial” factfinder. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564–71.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint is far from clear, but he appears to challenge his disciplinary

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hearing by claiming he was trying to “help someone” and therefore, no charges should have
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been brought against him. (See Compl. at 6.) As currently drafted, the Complaint does not

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plausibly allege a protected liberty interest was at stake in the disciplinary proceedings as

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necessary to give rise to the Wolff procedural protections because Plaintiff fails to identify

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any “atypical and significant” hardships imposed on him.

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For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A.

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2. Personal Causation

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Plaintiff names Sergeant Banulos as the sole named Defendant but he does not allege

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any specific factual allegations as to this Defendant in the body of the Complaint. Plaintiff

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references an unnamed sergeant in the factual allegations, but he fails to make clear

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whether this sergeant is Defendant Banulos.

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against this Defendant, Plaintiff must allege

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facts sufficient to show that this Defendant individually participated in causing a

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constitutional violation.

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defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.”

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009) (rejecting argument that “a supervisor’s

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mere knowledge of his subordinate’s [unconstitutional actions] amounts to the supervisor’s

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violating the Constitution.”) “A supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 only

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‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,

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or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

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constitutional violation.’” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2018),

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quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). “In a section 1983 claim, a

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supervisor is liable for the acts of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or

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directed the violations, or knew of the violations of subordinates and failed to act to prevent

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them.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

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omitted).

“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

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Plaintiff must set forth factual allegations identifying individual acts or omissions

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by each person related to his claims which resulted in a constitutional violation. See Leer
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v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be

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individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant

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whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”) He has

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failed to do so as to Defendant Banulos.

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Accordingly, the Court sua sponte dismisses the Complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

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1)

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint sua sponte and with leave to amend in its

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entirety based on his failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

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2)

GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days from the date of this Order in which

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to file a First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies of pleading noted in this Order.

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Forty-five days from today is Monday, March 25, 2024. 1 Plaintiff’s First Amended

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Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original Complaint.

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Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in this First Amended Complaint will

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be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

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Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes

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the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that

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claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading

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may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

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If Plaintiff fails to timely file a First Amended Complaint, the Court will enter a final

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Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon

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which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to

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prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427

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F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity

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Forty-five days from this day falls on a Saturday, so the deadline instead falls on the next court day:
Monday, March 25, 2024.
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to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into

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dismissal of the entire action.”)

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: February 7, 2024

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