Genosa v. Global K9 Protection Group, LLC

Filing 28

ORDER: (1) Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant on Claims 1 And 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint; (2) Declining to Exercise Jurisdiction over the Remaining State Claims and Counterclaim; (3) Denying as Moot all other pending Motions; and (4) Closing Case. (Doc. Nos. 12 , 19 , 26 ). Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 3/10/2025. (maq)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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VINCENT GENOSA, an individual,

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(1) GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANT ON CLAIMS 1 AND 2
OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT;

v.
GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP,
LLC, an Alabama Limited Liability
Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10,

(2) DECLINING TO EXERCISE
JURISDICTION OVER THE
REMAINING STATE CLAIMS AND
COUNTERCLAIM;

Defendant.
GLOBAL K9 PROTECTION GROUP,
LLC, an Alabama Limited Liability
Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10,

(3) DENYING AS MOOT ALL
OTHER PENDING MOTIONS; and

Counterclaim Plaintiff,

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ORDER:

Plaintiff,

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Case No.: 3:24-cv-00063-AJB-BLM

(4) CLOSING CASE.

v.

(Doc. Nos. 12, 19, 26)

VINCENT GENOSA, an individual,
Counterclaim Defendant.

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Before the Court are Global K9 Protection Group, LLC’s (“Defendant”) and Vincent

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Genosa’s (“Plaintiff”) cross-motions for summary judgment in this employment action.

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(Doc. Nos. 12, 19.) The parties have filed their respective oppositions and replies. (Doc.

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Nos. 22, 23, 24, 25.) Also pending is an ex parte application to file a sur-reply and a

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response thereto. (Doc. Nos. 26, 27.) The Court finds the matters suitable for determination

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on the papers and without oral argument, and hereby VACATES the previously scheduled

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motion hearing on April 10, 2025. See Local Civ. R. 7.1.d.1

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For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary

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judgment on Claims 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint, declines to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over, and thereby DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE, the remaining

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state claims and counterclaim, and DENIES AS MOOT all other pending motions.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff worked for Defendant from November 2018 to February 2021. At the time

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of his employment, Plaintiff served in the California Army National Guard and requested

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military leaves of absence to fulfill his service. Defendant granted all of Plaintiff’s requests

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for military leave. And contrary to its written policy that military leaves of absence are

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unpaid, Defendant compensated Plaintiff during such leave. When Defendant realized its

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error in 2020, it informed Plaintiff of the overpayment and sought to recoup it. Defendant

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asked Plaintiff to sign a Voluntary Payroll Deduction Authorization Form by a deadline

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and informed him that he would be terminated if he did not sign the form. Plaintiff sent

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Defendant a resignation letter two days before the deadline.

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On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this federal court pleading

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federal-question jurisdiction and the following causes of action: (1) discrimination in

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violation of California Military and Veterans Code § 389; (2) discrimination in violation

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of 38 U.S.C. § 4311; (3) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5; and (4)

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wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 1, 3–7.)

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Defendant thereafter filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint, asserting a state

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counterclaim for “Common Count: Money Had and Received.” (Doc. No. 6 at 8–9.) The

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instant cross-motions for summary judgment follows.

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II.

DISCUSSION

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Defendant moved for summary judgment on all four of Plaintiff’s causes of action,

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arguing that he cannot establish the elements of his claims. Pertinent here, Plaintiff’s

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opposition focused solely on his state retaliation and wrongful termination claims and

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unequivocally stated that “[he] does not oppose Defendant’s motion as to his first two

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claims for violations of the California Military Veteran’s Code, or 38 U.S.C. § 4311” (Doc.

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No 22 at 4.) As Plaintiff concedes to Defendant’s request for dismissal of his discrimination

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claims under California and federal law as without merit, the Court dismisses those claims

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with prejudice and grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this respect.

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There being only state-law claims and counterclaim remaining in this suit, the Court

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considers whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them. “A court

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may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has

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‘dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817,

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826 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). The court’s decision to decline to

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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is

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informed by “values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian

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Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated, and the Ninth Circuit has repeated, that “in the

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usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors

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will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”

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Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (alterations

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omitted).

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Having dismissed Plaintiff’s cause of action under 38 U.S.C. § 4311—the only claim

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arising out of federal law—the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

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the remaining state-law claims and counterclaim. 1 As noted, the Court may dismiss pendent

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state-law claims if, as here, all federal claims are dismissed before trial. See

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Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Moreover, the Court has not expended

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significant judicial resources on this matter beyond resolving the threshold concessions in

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the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Little substantive activity concerning

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the state-law claims and counterclaim have occurred, and the parties may refile in state

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court the same pleadings and briefs they have filed here. See Artis v. D.C., 583 U.S. 71, 75

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(2018) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) and holding that the statute pauses the clock on a

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statute of limitations until 30 days after the state law claim is dismissed by the federal

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court). Lastly, as a matter of comity, this Court is a court of limited jurisdiction that should

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defer to the state court on the labor and employment issues that are clearly within that

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court’s jurisdiction and expertise.

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Thus, in the exercise of its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), this Court

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declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims for

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retaliation and wrongful termination and Defendant’s state-law counterclaim for common

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count. Accordingly, the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice to refiling in the

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appropriate state forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

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The Court notes that as Plaintiff has elected to abandon his claim under 38 U.S.C. § 4311, he has, in
effect, withdrawn it from the operative complaint. In a recent case, Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.
Wullschleger, the Supreme Court explained that regardless of whether a case was removed or originally
filed in federal court, “the plaintiff’s excision of [his] federal-law claims deprives the district court of its
authority to decide the state-law claims remaining.” 604 U.S. 22, 43 (2025). The case involved a plaintiff
who amended her complaint to delete all the federal law claims and left nothing but state-law claims
behind. Id. at 25. Here, because Plaintiff’s withdrawal of his federal claim effectively amends the
complaint and leaves nothing but state-law claims behind, he has arguably divested the Court of its
authority to hear the remaining claims and counterclaim. See id. at 36 (“If a plaintiff files a suit in federal
court based on federal claims and later scraps those claims, the federal court cannot go forward with a
now all-state-claim suit.”). The Court need not, and will not, decide this issue, however, as it dismisses
the remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
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III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby orders:
• Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART.

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(Doc. No. 12). The Court enters summary judgment in favor of

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Defendant and against Plaintiff on his discrimination claims under

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California Military and Veterans Code § 389 (Claim 1) and under 38

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U.S.C. § 4311 (Claim 2). These claims are DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE.

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• Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court DECLINES to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims for

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retaliation (Claim 3) and wrongful termination (Claim 4) and

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counterclaim for common count. These claims are DISMISSED

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WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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• All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, (Doc. Nos. 19,

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26), and all upcoming hearings or deadlines in this matter are

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VACATED.

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• The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and
close this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 10, 2025

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