Saadat Nejad v. United States of America et al

Filing 11

ORDER: (1) Granting Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2 );(2) Dismissing Action Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); and(3) Terminating As Moot Ex Parte Applications (ECF Nos. 5 , 6 , 7 ). Signed by Judge Cynthia Bashant on 09/25/2024. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(mjw)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

SHAHROKH SAADAT NEJAD,

14
15
16

ORDER:

Plaintiff,

12
13

Case No. 24-cv-01519-BAS-KSC
(1) GRANTING MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS
(ECF No. 2);

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
et al.,
Defendants.

(2) DISMISSING ACTION
UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); AND

17

(3) TERMINATING AS MOOT
EX PARTE APPLICATIONS
(ECF Nos. 5, 6, 7)

18
19
20
21

Plaintiff Shahrokh Saadat Nejad is proceeding pro se—without an attorney.

22

He filed a complaint on August 27, 2024, against: (1) numerous state and federal

23

entities, including the United States of America, the State of California, the Central

24

Intelligence Agency, the Superior Court of California, the County of San Diego, and

25

the City of Saratoga; (2) several corporations including Walmart and AT&T;

26

(3) about a dozen named individuals; and (4) Does 1 through 50,000. (Compl. 1–2.)

27

Plaintiff filed a Motion Seeking Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

28

(“IFP”)—without prepaying court fees or costs. (ECF No. 2.) A few weeks later,
–1–

24cv1519

1

Plaintiff also filed three Ex Parte Applications. First, Plaintiff asks the Court to order

2

the Department of Justice to investigate his Complaint’s allegations. (ECF No. 5.)

3

Second, Plaintiff requests an order requiring the DOJ to document and preserve

4

evidence mentioned in the Complaint. (ECF No. 6.) Third, Plaintiff seeks service of

5

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshals. (ECF No. 7.)

6

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

7

IFP, DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE his Complaint, and TERMINATES AS

8

MOOT Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Applications.

9

I.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP

10

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a litigant who because of indigency is unable to pay

11

the required fees or security to commence a legal action may petition the court to

12

proceed without making such payment. The determination of indigency falls within

13

the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th

14

Cir. 1991) (holding that “Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to

15

exercise its sound discretion in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the

16

statute’s requirement of indigency”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993).

17

It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins

18

v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). To satisfy the

19

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which

20

states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for costs . . . and

21

still be able to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339.

22

At the same time, however, “the same even-handed care must be employed to assure

23

that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense . . . the

24

remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull

25

his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984).

26

District courts, therefore, tend to reject IFP applications where the applicant

27

can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to other expenses. See, e.g., Stehouwer

28

v. Hennessey, 841 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding that the district court
–2–

24cv1519

1

did not abuse its discretion in requiring a partial fee payment from a prisoner who

2

had a $14.61 monthly salary and who received $110 per month from family), vacated

3

in part on other grounds by Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109 (9th Cir. 1995).

4

Moreover, “in forma pauperis status may be acquired and lost during the course of

5

litigation.” Wilson v. Dir. of Div. of Adult Insts., No. CIV S-06-0791, 2009 WL

6

311150, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2009) (citing Stehouwer, 841 F. Supp. at 321); see

7

also Allen v. Kelly, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1995) (holding that

8

a plaintiff who was initially permitted to proceed in forma pauperis should be

9

required to pay his $120 filing fee out of a $900 settlement). Finally, the facts as to

10

the affiant’s poverty must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness, and

11

certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981).

12

Having read and considered Plaintiff’s application, the Court finds that

13

Plaintiff meets the requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for IFP status. Plaintiff is

14

unemployed and relies on support from others to survive. (IFP Mot. ¶¶ 1–2.) He

15

lists no employment history for the past two years and identifies only $300.00 in his

16

financial accounts. (Id. ¶ 4.) His expenses approximate or exceed his minimal

17

income. (Id. ¶ 8.) Under these circumstances, the Court finds that requiring Plaintiff

18

to pay the court filing fee would impair his ability to obtain the necessities of life.

19

See Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339.
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to

20
21

Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2).

22

II.

SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

23

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the court must dismiss an action where

24

the plaintiff is proceeding IFP if the court determines that the action “is frivolous or

25

malicious.” An IFP complaint “is frivolous if it has ‘no arguable basis in fact or

26

law.’” O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Franklin v.

27

Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984)). This standard grants the court “the

28

unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss
–3–

24cv1519

1

those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams,

2

490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Consequently, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when

3

making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the

4

truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

5

Clearly baseless factual allegations include those “that are ‘fanciful,’

6

‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33 (quoting Neitzke v.

7

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327, 328 (1989)). Accordingly, “a finding of factual

8

frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational

9

or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available

10

to contradict them.” Id. at 33. These outlandish claims are those “with which federal

11

district judges are all too familiar.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. Thus, district courts

12

have dismissed as frivolous an assortment of complaints containing clearly baseless

13

factual allegations. See, e.g., Frost v. Vasan, No. 16-cv-05883 NC, 2017 WL

14

2081094, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017) (secret conspiracy involving a U.S. Senator,

15

a university, and the CIA); Suess v. Obama, No. CV 17-01184-JAK (DTB), 2017

16

WL 1371289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) (conspiracy involving former President

17

Barack Obama, the CIA, and the FBI); Demos v. United States, 2010 WL 4007527,

18

at *2 (D. Ore. Oct. 8, 2010) (kidnapping involving law enforcement officers

19

disguised as pirates).

20

Here, Plaintiff’s 164-page Complaint seeks redress against the CIA, state and

21

local governments, several major corporations, and about a dozen individual

22

defendants. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges the neighborhood surrounding his

23

residence “is part of a secret U.S. government and/or a U.S. military program.”

24

(Compl. ¶ 64.) Plaintiff has allegedly been subjected to various instances of nudity

25

and indecent exposure in the vicinity. (Id.) His residence is also allegedly besieged

26

by sound equipment that is “used to, but not limited to, harass, annoy, threaten,

27

manipulate, intimidate, inflict sleep deprivation, and incite violence.” (Id. ¶ 73.) In

28

Plaintiff’s view, “white noise has been weaponized,” and law enforcement has
–4–

24cv1519

1

misused equipment “and/or gadgets to penetrate, but not limited to, Plaintiff’s smart

2

devices, phones and/or Plaintiff’s laptop computers.” (Id. ¶ 79.)

3

Having reviewed the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and its attached

4

exhibits, the Court concludes they are fantastical and clearly baseless. See Neitzke,

5

490 U.S. at 325; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); DeRock v. Sprint-Nextel, 603

6

F. App’x 556, 558 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of nine actions as either

7

frivolous or failing to state a claim because the plaintiff alleged “unsupported legal

8

conclusions and fanciful factual allegations”). In addition, because the Complaint is

9

frivolous, the Court does not grant Plaintiff leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

10

F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or

11

malicious, there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason

12

to grant leave to amend.”).

13

III.

14

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed
Further, the Court DISMISSES WITH

15

In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2).

16

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

17

Finally, because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court also

18

TERMINATES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s three pending Ex Parte Applications (ECF

19

Nos. 5, 6, 7). The Court of Court shall enter judgment and close this case.

20

IT IS SO ORDERED.

21
22

DATED: September 25, 2024

23
24
25
26
27
28
–5–

24cv1519