Paplekaj v. FCA US, LLC et al

Filing 16

ORDER Denying Motion to Remand re (Doc. No. 8 ). Signed by Judge Michael M. Anello on 01/07/2025. (mef)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12
13

GINO A. PAPLEKAJ,

Case No. 24-cv-1717-MMA-VET
Plaintiff,

14
15

v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
REMAND

16

FCA US, LLC, et al.,

[Doc. No. 8]

Defendants.

17
18
19
20
21

On November 4, 2024, Plaintiff Gino Paplekaj’s (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion to remand

22

the instant action to the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. Doc. No 8.

23

Defendant FCA US, LLC (“Defendant”) filed a response in opposition, to which Plaintiff

24

replied. Doc. Nos. 12–13. The Court found this matter suitable for determination on the

25

papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and

26

Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1, and thus took the matter under submission on December 3,

27

2024. Doc. No. 14. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to

28

remand.
-1-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

I. BACKGROUND

2

On or around February 25, 2016, Plaintiff purchased a 2016 Chrysler 300

3

automobile manufactured by Defendant. Doc. No. 1-2 at 6–151 (“Compl.”) ¶ 1. Plaintiff

4

alleges that the car, while covered by a warranty, demonstrated “[d]efects and

5

nonconformities to warranty . . . within the applicable express warranty period, including

6

but not limited to, engine defects, transmission defects, electrical defects; among other

7

defects and non-conformities.” Id. ¶ 12. These defects or nonconformities “substantially

8

impair[ed] the use, value, or safety of the vehicle[,]” leaving its value de minimis, and

9

“Defendant . . . failed to either promptly replace the [s]ubject [v]ehicle or to promptly

10

make restitution in accordance with the Song-Beverly Act.” Id. ¶¶ 13–16.

11

Plaintiff further alleges that “[a]lthough [he] presented the [v]ehicle to

12

Defendant[’s] . . . representative in this state, Defendant . . . and its representative failed

13

to commence the service or repairs within a reasonable time and failed to service or

14

repair the [v]ehicle so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days . . . .” Id.

15

¶ 42. Thus, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated of California Civil Code Section

16

1793.2 subsections (a)(3), (b), and (d), and Civil Code sections 1791.1, 1794, and 1795.5

17

(breach of the implied warranty of merchantability) (collectively, “the Song-Beverly

18

Act”). Compl. ¶¶ 35–53.

19

Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action in the Superior Court for the State of

20

California, County of San Diego. Defendant removed this action to this Court on

21

September 25, 2024. Doc. No. 1.
II. LEGAL STANDARD

22
23

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

24

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by

25

Constitution and statute.” Id. “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a

26
27
28

1

All citations to electronically filed documents refer to the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system.
-2-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated

2

Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing California ex rel. Younger v. Andrus,

3

608 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1979)). The party seeking federal jurisdiction bears the

4

burden of establishing jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citing McNutt v. Gen.

5

Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S 178, 182–83 (1936)).

6

Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1441(a) provides for removal of a civil

7

action from state to federal court if the case could have originated in federal court. The

8

removal statute is construed strictly against removal, and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be

9

rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v.

10

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co.,

11

592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)).

12

III. DISCUSSION

13

Defendant removed this action asserting that the Court has jurisdiction to hear it

14

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332, otherwise known as diversity jurisdiction. Doc. No. 1 at 2.

15

Relevant to this action, Section 1332 provides that “[t]he district courts shall have

16

original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum

17

or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of

18

different states. . .” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state.” 28

19

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(2). For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a corporation shall

20

be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been

21

incorporated and of the [s]tate or foreign state where it has its principal place of business

22

. . . .” Id. at § 1332(c). However, “[a] limited liability company ‘is a citizen of every

23

state of which its owners/members are citizens[,]’” or country in which its

24

owners/members are citizens. 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 2018)

25

(quoting Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir.

26

2006)); Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Gussi, S.A. de C.V., 92 F.4th 815, 822–23 (9th Cir.

27

2024), cert. denied, No. 23-1261, 2024 WL 4426624 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2024) (applying the

28

same principle to find that limited liability companies are citizens of every country in
-3-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

which owners/members are citizens).

2

The parties do not appear to dispute that, for the purposes of jurisdiction, they hold

3

diverse citizenships. In its notice of removal, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is domiciled

4

in, and a citizen of, the State of California. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 28. Defendant asserts itself to

5

be a limited liability company whose sole owner is a publicly traded company organized

6

under the laws of the Netherlands with its principal place of business in the United

7

Kingdom. Id. ¶ 29. Thus, the parties are sufficiently diverse under Section 1332.

8

The parties’ disagreement instead involves whether this case satisfies Section

9

1332’s amount in controversy requirement. Under Section 1332(a), an amount greater

10

than $75,000 must be in dispute for the Court to have diversity jurisdiction over an

11

action. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Section 1332(a)’s amount-in-controversy requirement

12

excludes only ‘interest and costs’” and therefore “includes attorneys’ fees.” Guglielmino

13

v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 2007); but see Ronquillo v. BMW of

14

N. Am., LLC, No. 3:20-CV-1413-W-WVG, 2020 WL 6741317 *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17,

15

2020) (Due to the Song-Beverly Act’s statutory scheme, “[t]he Court is persuaded by

16

Plaintiff’s argument that attorney[s’] fees are part of costs within the Song-Beverly Act”).

17

“[W]here it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint whether the

18

requisite amount in controversy is pled,” a defendant must establish by a preponderance

19

of the evidence—that it is more likely than not—that the amount in controversy exceeds

20

$75,000. Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699 (citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102

21

F.3d 989, 404 (9th Cir. 1996)).

22

The parties appear to agree that here, Defendant bears the burden to prove by a

23

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is satisfied. Doc. No. 8-1

24

at 12–13; Doc No. 12 at 11. In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks “general, special, and

25

actual damages,” “restitution,” “consequential and incidental damages,” “civil penalt[ies]

26

in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages. . ,” “prejudgment interest,” “costs .

27

. . and attorneys’ fees,” and “such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.”

28

Compl. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that he “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in
-4-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

an amount that is not less than $35,001.00.” Compl. ¶ 21. In his motion to remand, he

2

asserts that the $35,001.00 amount is intended to represent the total of all damages

3

sought. Doc. No. 8-1 at 13.

4

In its notice of removal, Defendant puts forth several different calculations that it

5

argues demonstrate that the amount in controversy greater than $75,000. In summary,

6

Defendant argues that “[a]s a preliminary matter, Plaintiff alleges that they seek at least

7

$35,000 in actual damages, plus a civil penalty of two times that amount ($70,000), plus

8

incidental damages and attorneys’ fees,” in sum greater than $75,000. Doc. No. 1 at 5.

9

Looking “[b]eyond the face of the [c]omplaint,” to Plaintiff’s claims under the Song-

10

Beverly Act, Defendant also argues that the restitution Plaintiff seeks totals at minimum

11

$29,861.75, and that including civil penalties based upon that restitution amount,

12

Plaintiff’s claims amount to over $89,000. Id. at 5–6. Defendant’s supports its assertions

13

through reference to its counsel’s declaration in the notice of removal, which attaches the

14

purported express warranty and original contract for the vehicle in question, among other

15

documents. Doc. No. 1-2. Counsel declares that “[b]ased upon [his] experience and

16

knowledge of litigating these cases involving claimed violations of the Song-Beverly Act,

17

the amount in controversy in this case is more likely than not to exceed $75,000.00,” and

18

attaches a motion for attorneys’ fees filed in another case by the attorneys now

19

representing Plaintiff. Doc. No. 1-2 at 1–3 (“Skanes Decl.”) ¶ 13; Doc. No. 1-2 at 81–99.

20

A.

21

Restitution
Defendant, both in its notice of removal and subsequent response in opposition to

22

Plaintiff’s motion to remand, calculates the restitution Plaintiff seeks in the amount of

23

$29,861.75. Doc. No. 1 at 5–6; Doc No. 12 at 11.

24
25
26
27
28

In the case of restitution, the manufacturer shall make restitution in an amount
equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer, including any charges
for transportation and manufacturer-installed options, but excluding
nonmanufacturer items installed by a dealer or the buyer, and including any
collateral charges such as sales or use tax, license fees, registration fees, and
-5-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1
2
3
4

other official fees, plus any incidental damages to which the buyer is entitled
under Section 1794, including, but not limited to, reasonable repair, towing,
and rental car costs actually incurred by the buyer.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B).

5

In its notice of removal, Defendant relies on what it purports to be the Retail

6

Installment Contract for the vehicle to calculate the restitution available to Plaintiff. Doc

7

No. 1-2 at 77–79 (“Installment Contract”). Defendant calculates that amount as follows:

8

“total amount paid for the vehicle []$52,050.79 . . . finance charges ($7,837.46), less theft

9

deterrent device ($1,299) . . . less surface protection product ($1,250) . . . less optional

10

service contract ($3,500) . . . less a rebate ($3,500[)] . . . .” Doc. No. 1 at 5; Doc No. 12

11

at 6. The contract supports this calculation. Installment Contract at 1–2 . However,

12

Defendant appears to exclude other charges, such as sales tax, registration tax, and

13

licensing fees, which may also be included in calculating restitution. Cal. Civ. Code

14

§ 1793.2(d(2)(B). Including just the sales tax (which appears to be $3,708.04), licensing

15

fee ($283.00), and registration fees ($98), the amount of available restitution would

16

increase by $4,089.04, indicating that the total amount of restitution likely recoverable is

17

higher than Defendant’s calculation. Installment Contract at 2.

18

Plaintiff cites several cases for the proposition that “Defendant cannot merely point

19

to the [Installment Contract] price of the [v]ehicle to establish the amount of actual

20

damages in controversy. Rather, Defendant must also provide and consider essential

21

facts about the purchase price and use of the [vehicle], which Defendant has failed to

22

adequately do . . . .” Doc. No. 8-1 at 14. Because Defendant does not include, for

23

example, any payments actually made by Plaintiff or precise data on Plaintiff’s usage,

24

Plaintiff argues the evidence is insufficient to prove the amount in controversy by

25

preponderance of the evidence. Id. However, in the cases Plaintiff cites, unlike

26

Defendant here, the respective defendants failed to prove the amount in controversy

27

because they merely pointed to the purchase price of the car without considering any

28

relevant charges, contract line items, or mileage deductions. See, e.g., Savall v. FCA US
-6-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

LLC, No. 21CV195 JM (KSC), 2021 WL 1661051 *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021); Jackson

2

v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 5:20-CV-01681-DOC-KK, 2020 WL 7090839 *2–3

3

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2020); Echemendia v. Subaru of Am., Inc., No.

4

220CV09243MCSJEM, 2020 WL 7311348 *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (“Subaru

5

inexplicably cites the $36,141.68 purchase price as Plaintiff's actual damages without

6

accounting for finance charges, evidence concerning when repairs were made, or

7

anything else that could allow the Court to reliably estimate actual damages”); Steeg,

8

2020 WL 2121508 a *4; Chajon v. Ford Motor Co., No. 218CV10533RGKRAOX, 2019

9

WL 994019 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019) (“Here, Defendants acknowledge that no sales

10

contract has been located, and offer only the MSRP.”); Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., No.

11

CV1605852BROPLAX, 2016 WL 6583585 *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016). Here,

12

Defendant does not merely offer the purchase price or market estimate price for the

13

vehicle without any further calculations or explanations. Instead, Defendant cites line

14

items in the Installment Contract, provides a copy for the Court and Plaintiff to review,

15

and includes a mileage deduction, which the Court discusses below. Courts in this

16

district have allowed defendants to establish a baseline for amounts in controversy with

17

considerably less evidence. See, e.g., McDonald v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 3:17-CV-

18

2011-CAB-BLM, 2017 WL 5843385 *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (“Just as BMW

19

multiplied the purchase price by three to argue in the notice of removal that Plaintiff is

20

seeking a minimum of $314,164.50, it could have multiplied . . . [the damages alleged]

21

by three to determine that Plaintiff seeks . . . in excess of $75,000 . . . .”); Baumanns v.

22

FCA US LLC, No. 21-CV-1054 JLS (MSB), 2021 WL 5564497 *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29,

23

2021). Likewise, Defendant needs only to prove the amount in controversy is more likely

24

than not to exceed $75,000, not that it is a legal certainty that it will exceed that value.

25

Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699.

26

Defendant also subtracts $20,477.50 as a “reasonable allowance for use,” citing

27

Cal. Civ. Code section 1793.2. Doc. No. 1 at 5–6. Defendant asserts that it “is not aware

28
-7-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

of any repairs being performed during the relevant warranty periods. Assuming, however,

2

Plaintiff’s vehicle was subject to repair shortly before the expiration of the powertrain

3

warranty at 60,000 miles, the mileage offset would equal $20,477.50.2 Doc No. 12 at 6.

4

Plaintiff takes issue with this allowance, asserting that the 60,000-mile estimate is

5

arbitrary and thus cannot support Defendant’s calculations. Doc. No. 8-1 at 15–18 (citing

6

Gutierrez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 221CV05679MCSJPR, 2021 WL 4399517 (C.D. Cal.

7

Sept. 27, 2021)).

8

When restitution is made . . . the amount to be paid by the manufacturer to the
buyer may be reduced by the manufacturer by that amount directly attributable
to use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the
manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized service and repair facility for
correction of the problem that gave rise to the nonconformity. The amount
directly attributable to use by the buyer shall be determined by multiplying
the actual price of the new motor vehicle paid or payable by the buyer,
including any charges for transportation and manufacturer-installed options,
by a fraction having as its denominator 120,000 and having as its numerator
the number of miles traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to the time the
buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its
authorized service and repair facility for correction of the problem that gave
rise to the nonconformity.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).

19

Reviewing the exhibits attached to the notice of removal, Defendant’s rationale is

20

apparent: according to Exhibit A to the complaint, “[t]he Powertrain Limited Warranty

21

lasts for up to 5 years or 60,000 miles on the odometer, whichever occurs first, calculated

22

from the start date of the Basic Limited Warranty . . . .” Doc. No 1-2 at 28. The Court

23

concludes Defendant’s calculation reflects the maximum number of miles Plaintiff could

24

have driven while still covered by the Powertrain Warranty, thus generating the largest

25
26
27
28

2

60,000 miles/120,000 * $40,955 purchase price.
-8-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

deduction that could be attributed to usage. 3 This methodology drives the restitution

2

amount to the lowest possible value, demonstrating that Defendant can meet the amount

3

in controversy even under the facts most favorable to Plaintiff. This calculation is

4

convincing, given that restitution under section 1793.2 is based upon existence of an

5

express warranty, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1793.2(d)(2), 1793(d)(2)(C), and the warranty cited

6

appears to be the one that covers the defects of which Plaintiff complains.

7

Finally, some courts within the Ninth Circuit have gone so far as to hold that the

8

mileage offset, for which Defendant accounts here, should “not impact the amount in

9

controversy, which assumes that the jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all

10

causes of action . . . .” Baumanns 2021 WL 5564497 at *4 (collecting cases and refusing

11

to incorporate offsets into calculating the amount in controversy). Considering

12

Defendant’s conservative calculation method and relevant law, the Court finds that it is

13

more likely than not that the potential restitution is, at minimum, the $29,861.75 that

14

Defendant asserts, and that indeed, the amount is likely greater.

15

B.

Civil Penalties

16

The Court next considers civil penalties Plaintiff requests as separate from the

17

$35,001.00 that Plaintiff asserts includes all damages, as courts have traditionally treated

18

such penalties as their own, unique form of remedy separate from damages. See

19

Baumanns, 2021 WL 5564497 at *4 (collecting cases); Zeto v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No.

20

20-CV-1380-GPC-KSC, 2020 WL 6708061 *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2020) (“[C]ivil

21

penalties are not speculative and should be included. In fact, the amount of controversy

22

analysis may include civil penalty damages as long as they are recoverable under state

23

law.”); but see Millan v. FCA US LLC, No. 20CV328 JM (MDD), 2020 WL 3604132 *2

24

(S.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2020) (collecting cases), Savall v. FCA US LLC, No. 21CV195 JM

25
26
27
28

3

This warranty covers the Gasoline Engine, Transmission, and Drivetrain. Doc. No. 1-2 at 28–29;
Compl. ¶ 12 (alleging the defects include “engine defects, transmission defects, electrical defects;
among other defects and non-conformities”).
-9-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

(KSC), 2021 WL 1661051 *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021) (explaining that civil penalties

2

should not be included unless a defendant can prove “likelihood that a civil penalty based

3

on its willfulness would actually be awarded in this case, [and/or] that the full civil

4

penalty would be awarded”); Echemendia, 2020 WL 7311348 *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11,

5

2020).

6

Plaintiff argues that “Defendant . . . has proffered no evidence whatsoever that

7

Plaintiff will receive the maximum amount of civil penalties—or, indeed, any penalties at

8

all. Rather, Defendant merely assumes a civil penalty award.” Doc. No. 8-1 at 25.

9

However, while the Court recognizes that district courts take competing approaches in

10

assessing what level of certainty of success is necessary to include civil penalties, the

11

amount in controversy encompasses “all relief a court may grant on that complaint if the

12

plaintiff is victorious.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 414–15 (9th

13

Cir. 2018). It “is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a prospective

14

assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Communs., Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400

15

(9th Cir. 2010). “In measuring the amount in controversy, a court must assume that the

16

allegations of the complaint are true and that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff

17

on all claims made in the complaint.” Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d

18

1199, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Likewise, by seeking civil penalties, Plaintiff necessarily

19

puts them into controversy. Here, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendant’s

20

“failure to comply with its obligations under Civil Code [S]ection 1793.2, subdivision (d)

21

was willful,” and pleads that it is entitled to penalties under Civil Code Section 1794

22

Sections (c) and (e). Compl. ¶¶ 38–40. Thus, the Court determines this sufficient to

23

include those sought penalties in calculating the amount in controversy. See, e.g.,

24

Baumanns, 2021 WL 5564497 at *4–5.

25

The section of the Song-Beverly Act under which Plaintiff seeks civil penalties

26

provides that “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful, the

27

judgment may include, in addition to the amounts recovered under subdivision (a), a civil

28

penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages.” Cal. Civ. Code
-10-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1

§ 1794(c). The Song-Beverly Act also provides that “the buyer. . . may recover a civil

2

penalty of up to two times the amount of damages” should the buyer establish a violation

3

under the provision allowing it to seek replacement or restitution after the manufacturer is

4

unable to repair their motor vehicle pursuant to Civil Code Section 1793.2(d)(2). Cal.

5

Civ. Code § 1794(e). Penalties under subsections (c) and (e) may be sought only in the

6

alternative

7

to one another. Id. at (e)(5).

8

The language Plaintiff uses in his prayer for relief causes substantial difficulty in

9

determining what value the civil penalties hold. See, e.g., Baumanns, 2021 WL 5564497

10

at *4. For example, subsection (c) provides for only double the actual damages sought,

11

not the total damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). Thus, when Plaintiffs seek multiple

12

types of damages, but merely numerate the “damages” to which they are entitled without

13

“an adjective” to determine whether that signifies total damages (including incidental,

14

consequential, and other damages) or merely actual damages, Defendant is without

15

sufficient basis to establish the amount in controversy is met simply by multiplying the

16

“damages” by three (damages plus twice damages in civil penalties). Baumanns, 2021

17

WL 5564497 at *4; but see, e.g., McDonald, 2017 WL 5843385 at *2. Therefore, merely

18

multiplying Plaintiff’s $35,001.00 damages figure by three to include civil penalties will

19

not suffice to prove that it is more likely than not that the amount in controversy will

20

exceed $75,000. Baumanns, 2021 WL 5564497 at *4.

21

Assessing damages utilizing the calculated restitution amount, however, provides a

22

clearer path. Using that amount, Plaintiff would be entitled to recover $29,861.75 in

23

restitution plus $59,723.50 in civil penalties, 4 for a total amount in controversy of

24

$89,585.25. See id.; see also, e.g. McDonald, 2017 WL 5843385 at *2. This exceeds the

25

$75,000 benchmark and therefore satisfies the amount in controversy requirement.

26
27
28

4

$29,861.75 * 2.
-11-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET

1
2

C.

Attorneys’ Fees

3

Defendant argues that the Court should base its calculation of attorneys’ fees upon

4

the assertion that such fees “commonly exceed $25,000 in Song[-]Beverly cases . . .” and

5

that “counsel representing Plaintiff in this matter . . . recently sought over $100,000 in

6

attorneys’ fees in a similar matter, even before the matter went to trial.” Doc. No. 1 at 6

7

(citing Skanes Decl. ¶ 12); Doc No. 12 at 11. However, this argument misses the mark.

8

Regardless of what is “common” in cases of this type, Defendant provides no facts to

9

suggest that costs may actually rise to or exceed $25,000 in this case. See Conrad

10

Assocs. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1196, 1199–1200 (N.D. Cal. 1998).

11

While a case that reaches dispositive motions may indeed run above $100,000 in

12

attorneys’ fees, a case that settles at an Early Neutral Evaluation may not. Defendant

13

provides no basis on which to determine what attorneys’ fees may amount to in this

14

matter—even so much as its own counsel’s billing rate and the amount expended thus far.

15

See id. at 1200. Thus, Defendant fails to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, what

16

attorneys’ fees may amount to in this matter.

17

Regardless, Defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that even

18

without attorneys’ fees the restitution and civil penalties sought bring the amount in

19

controversy over the $75,000. Thus, the Court has jurisdiction over the case.

20

IV. CONCLUSION

21

Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand.

22

IT IS SO ORDERED.

23
24
25

Dated: January 7, 2025

_____________________________
HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO
United States District Judge

26
27
28
-12-

24-cv-1717-MMA-VET