Bonilla v. Judges et al
Filing
3
ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION for Failure to Pay Filing Fee Required By 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 1/7/2025. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service) (maq)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10
11
12
13
14
STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA,
CDCR #J-48500,
Case No.: 24-cv-02356-AJB-BJC
vs.
20
JUDGES JUDITH McCONNELL; JOAN
K. IRON; TRUST DO; KELETY;
JUDITH WALLER; MARTIN
BUCHANAN; RICHARD D. HUFFMAN;
JERRY BYRON O’ROURKE;
S. CASTILLO; DAVID M. RUBIN;
WILLIAM S. DATO; MANUEL G.
RAMIREZ; JULIA CRAIG; JOHN DOE
1-1000,
21
Defendants.
15
16
17
18
19
ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL
ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY
FILING FEE REQUIRED BY
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)
Plaintiff,
22
23
Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and currently
24
incarcerated at California Medical Facility, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to
25
42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Request for Judicial Notice. See ECF Nos. 1, 2. Plaintiff
26
has not filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, nor has he paid
27
the initial civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). For the reasons explained below,
28
the Court DISMISSES the case and DENIES the request for judicial notice as moot.
1
3:24-cv-02356-AJB-BJC
1
I.
FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS
2
Any person filing a civil case such as this one must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28
3
U.S.C. § 1914(a). 1 The case may only go forward without the plaintiff paying the entire
4
filing fee if the court grants him permission to proceed IFP—which means as a person
5
without the money or resources to afford it. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047,
6
1052 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir.
7
2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed
8
unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid.”).
9
The statute that sets out the rules for this is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a)(2)
10
requires all persons who want to pursue a case without paying the filing fee to file an
11
affidavit that includes a statement of all assets, or things of value, the plaintiff possesses,
12
and demonstrates his inability to pay the filing fee. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d
13
1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015).
14
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) also requires prisoners to submit a
15
certified copy of their trust fund account statement, or an institutional equivalent, for the
16
6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C.
17
§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). “While the previous
18
version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive fees for any person ‘unable
19
to pay[,]’ . . . the PLRA amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under
20
the current version of the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal
21
in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’”
22
Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a
23
structured timeline for collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)).
24
///
25
26
27
28
1
In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil plaintiffs must pay an additional administrative fee of $55.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14
(eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. Id.
2
3:24-cv-02356-AJB-BJC
1
Plaintiff has not paid the $405 filing and administrative fee required. He has also
2
failed to file a properly supported motion to proceed IFP. See Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234.
3
Therefore, his case cannot continue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1051.
4
II.
5
6
LEAVE TO PROCEED IFP
Even if the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a motion to proceed IFP, however, it
finds he is not entitled to that privilege for the reasons set out below.
7
A.
8
“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty.
9
Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners, like Plaintiff, however, “face
10
an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a
11
filing fee” in installments for the suits or appeals they launch, see Bruce v. Samuels, 577
12
U.S. 82, 85 (2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)), Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182,
13
1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the PLRA also amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to
14
proceed IFP:
15
16
17
18
Standard of Review
. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United
States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
19
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This subdivision is commonly known as the “PLRA’s ‘three strikes’
20
rule.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir.
21
2016). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.”
22
Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. The PLRA furthers “the congressional goal of reducing
23
frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th
24
Cir. 1997).
25
“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which
26
were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,”
27
Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court
28
styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without
3
3:24-cv-02356-AJB-BJC
1
prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008).
2
When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the
3
dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether
4
the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El-
5
Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738
6
F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).
7
Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g)
8
from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is facing
9
“imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493
10
F.3d at 1051?52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a
11
plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at
12
the time of filing”). In addition to being “imminent,” that danger must also be “both fairly
13
traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in [the] complaint and redressable by the court.” Ray
14
v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2022).
15
B.
16
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds it fails to contain any
17
“plausible allegations” to suggest that he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical
18
injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).
19
Rather, Plaintiff alleges he was arrested based on a fraudulent arrest warrant affidavit, and
20
is the victim of a conspiratorial and discriminatory Alameda County criminal prosecution.
21
See ECF No. 1 at 2?3. He seeks to sue a host of San Diego Superior Court Judges for
22
subsequently refusing to “void” his judgment of conviction. Id. at 3.
Discussion
23
Thus, while Plaintiff has not moved to proceed IFP in this case, it would be futile
24
for him to do so. Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence
25
demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119.
26
However, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that []
27
prior dismissal[s] satisf[y] at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g)” and therefore count
28
as strikes against him. Id. at 1120. That is true here.
4
3:24-cv-02356-AJB-BJC
1
Based on the dockets of many court proceedings available on PACER, 2 this Court
2
finds that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while
3
incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds
4
that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
5
granted. See In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11–6306 CW (PR), C 11–6307 CW (PR), C 12–
6
0026 CW (PR), C 12–0027 CW (PR), C 12–0206 CW (PR), 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D.
7
Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of
8
California, including the dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and
9
October 31, 2011 alone, which were dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints
10
d[id] not state a claim for relief under § 1983”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are
11
DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon
12
which relief may be granted: Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306;
13
Bonilla v. Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California
14
Supreme Court, C 12-0026; Bonilla v. Cullen, C 12-0027; Bonilla v. California Supreme
15
Court, C 12-0206.”); id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in
16
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis
17
in any civil rights action.”) (citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C11-3180, et seq. CW (PR),
18
Order of Dismissal at 6:23-7:19)).
19
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than
20
the three strikes permitted by Section 1915(g), and he fails to make any plausible allegation
21
that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed this case, he
22
is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055;
23
Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
24
25
26
27
28
2
See Kim v. Allison, 87 F.4th 994, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria
Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)) (noting courts “may take notice of
proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have
a direct relation to matters at issue”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting
that courts may take judicial notice of undisputed “matters of public record”)).
5
3:24-cv-02356-AJB-BJC
1
“does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with
2
a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP
3
status”). When a prisoner-litigant “has accumulated three prior dismissals on statutorily
4
enumerated grounds[,] . . . a court may not afford him in forma pauperis status with respect
5
to his additional civil actions.” Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015). This is
6
because “court permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”
7
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984).
8
III.
CONCLUSION
9
Accordingly, the Court:
10
(1)
11
DISMISSES this case based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay the civil filing fee
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);
12
(2)
DENIES Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice (ECF No. 2) as moot; and
13
(3)
DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal, close
14
the file, and accept no further documents for filing in this matter except a timely Notice of
15
Appeal, which the Court CERTIFIES would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28
16
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
17
18
IT IS SO ORDERED.
19
20
Dated: January 7, 2025
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
3:24-cv-02356-AJB-BJC
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?