Escobar v. Reid et al

Filing 312

ORDER Denying 310 Motion to Recuse Magistrate and Trial Judge. Plaintiff's filing of any further pleadings that contain disrespectful, baseless, and outlandish allegations against the judiciary will be stricken from the record, by Judge Christine M. Arguello on 4/13/11.(lsw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 06-cv-01222-CMA-KLM
JOSE MEDINA ESCOBAR,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDWARD MORA,
RENEE OLIVETT,
MARK MATTHEWS,
WILLIAM COLTON,
FRANK HAMULA, and
HARLAN WOOLFOLK,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECUSE MAGISTRATE AND TRIAL JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Recuse Magistrate and Trial Judge
filed by pro se prisoner Plaintiff, Jose Medina Escobar. (Doc. # 310.) For the following
reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
On April 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Recuse Magistrate and
Trial Judge. In support of his Motion, Plaintiff lodges numerous disrespectful, baseless,
and outlandish allegations against United States Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix.1
As examples, Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Mix “has allowed her bias and

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On August 3, 2007, Magistrate Judge Mix was assigned to this case to handle all nondispositive pre-trial matters, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and issue recommendations
on dispositive matters, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. # 42.)

prejudice, hostilities, gender and racial discrimination for Plaintiff to interfere in her
discretionary duties and has caused Plaintiff irreparable injury due to her nonfeasance
and has influenced United States District Court Trial Judge C.M. Arguello.” (Doc. # 310
at 2.) Plaintiff baselessly asserts that Magistrate Judge Mix’s bias and prejudice arise
from her “personal acquaintance[ ]” with numerous high ranking Colorado State
Penitentiary officials and have resulted in decisions issued in favor of Defendants and
against Plaintiff. (Id. at 1.) However, Plaintiff’s supposition and conclusory allegations
are insufficient bases for recusal.
Although Plaintiff fails to identify under what rule or statute he seeks recusal, the
Court will construe his Motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Title 28 U.S.C. § 144
provides a procedure whereby a party to a proceeding may request the judge before
whom the matter is pending to recuse himself or herself based upon personal bias or
prejudice either against the moving party or in favor of any adverse party. Section 144
requires the moving party to submit a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias and
prejudice. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997). “The affidavit
must state with required particularity the identifying facts of time, place, persons,
occasion, and circumstances.” Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
Although the Court must accept the facts alleged in the supporting affidavit under § 144
as true, the affidavit is construed strictly against the moving party. See Glass v. Pfeffer,
849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). The moving party has a substantial burden “to

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demonstrate that the judge is not impartial.” United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065,
1070 (10th Cir. 1997).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” and § 455(b)(1)
provides that a judge shall also disqualify himself where “he has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party[.]” The goal of this provision is to avoid even the
appearance of partiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,
860 (1988). Pursuant to § 455, the Court is not required to accept all factual allegations
as true “and the test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts,
would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” Glass, 849 F.2d 1268 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The standard is completely objective and the inquiry is
limited to outward manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. See
United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993).
In the instant case, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion fails under both §§ 144
and 455. With respect to § 144, Plaintiff has failed to identify any facts concerning
Magistrate Judge Mix’s or the undersigned’s bias with particularity. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has failed to meet his substantial burden to demonstrate the impartiality of Magistrate
Judge Mix and/or the undersigned. With respect to § 455, the Court finds that no
reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts (i.e., Plaintiff’s disrespectful, baseless,
and outlandish allegations of bias and prejudice) would harbor doubts about either
judge’s impartiality. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff’s Motion arises from certain

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decisions Plaintiff deems unfavorable, such unfavorable decisions are not sufficient to
demonstrate that disqualification is appropriate pursuant to either § 144 or § 455(a)
because “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Accordingly, the
Court finds that denial of Plaintiff’s Motion is warranted.
Lastly, the Court notes that throughout the course of this litigation, Plaintiff has
repeatedly lodged disrespectful, baseless, and outlandish allegations of bias and
prejudice against Magistrate Judge Mix. Most recently, Plaintiff lodged nearly identical
allegations in support of “Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Magistrates Mix [sic] Denial
of His Motion for All Legal Mail at Court Expense, Sent to Him from 12-24-10 to 1-19-11
Which the Facility CCF Refused to Furnish Him With” (Doc. #2 94). At all times during
the course of this matter, the undersigned has found that Magistrate Judge Mix’s rulings
are adequately supported by the law and her analysis is thorough, correct, and
impartial. The Court admonishes Plaintiff for his incessant practice of insulting the
judiciary and making a mockery of these judicial proceedings. This behavior will
no longer be tolerated. Plaintiff’s conduct has interfered with “one of the principal
purposes of our court systems – to provide safe, effective forum for resolving disputes
that is characterized by civility.” Lynn v. Roberts, No. 01-3422, 2006 WL 2850273,
at *7 (D. Kan. Oct. 4, 2006) (unpublished). Plaintiff is warned that any future filings
that contain disrespectful, baseless, and outlandish allegations against the judiciary will
result in such pleadings being stricken from the record.

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1)

Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse Magistrate and Trial Judge (Doc. # 310) is
DENIED; and

(2)

Plaintiff’s filing of any further pleadings that contain disrespectful,
baseless, and outlandish allegations against the judiciary will result in such
pleadings being stricken from the record.

DATED: April

13

, 2011
BY THE COURT:

________________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge

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