Kartiganer v. Newman et al

Filing 108

ORDER Denying 107 Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Order and Final Judgment by Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 07/14/11.(jjhsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
Civil Action No. 09-cv-00050-WYD-MEH
ADAM KARTIGANER,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRUCE NEWMAN, In his Official Capacity of Sheriff of Huerfano County, Colorado,
LARRY BALDONADO, In his Official Capacity of Police Chief of Walsenburg, Colorado,
DEREK PETERS, In his Official Capacity of Police Officer of Walsenburg, Colorado,
JOE BERNAL, In his Official Capacity of Police Officer of Walsenburg, Colorado,
Defendants.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Order and
Final Judgment, for Intrinsic Fraud, Misrepresentation or Misconduct by the Opposing
Party, or for any Other Reason that is Just [ECF No. 107]. Plaintiff moves for relief from
the order and final judgment entered on September 28, 2010 [ECF No. 106].
Because Plaintiff is pro se, I will “review his pleadings and other papers liberally and
hold them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.” Trackwell v.
United States Gov’t, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Defendants did not file a response.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action on January 5, 2009, alleging generally that he was

falsely imprisoned and maliciously prosecuted before criminal charges against him were

eventually dropped. Judge Zita L. Weinshienk entered an order partially dismissing
Plaintiff’s case and allowing it to move forward only against Defendants Newman,
Baldonado, Peters and Bernal. [ECF No. 6]. Plaintiff amended his complaint to assert
additional claims against those four defendants. Defendants then filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint, or, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment as to
Defendant Newman [ECF No. 29]. Magistrate Judge Hegarty recommended that the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part [ECF No. 39], and I
affirmed and adopted that Recommendation [ECF No. 102]. At that time, I allowed
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution and conspiracy to move forward
against Defendants Bladonado, Bernal, and Peters. All remaining § 1983 claims were
dismissed with prejudice as time-barred. Defendants then filed a Corrected Motion for
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support [ECF No. 66], which was referred to
Magistrate Judge Hegarty. I then affirmed and adopted Magistrate Judge Hegarty’s
Recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion. [ECF No. 105].
II.

ANALYSIS
Relief from a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is at the sound discretion of this

Court. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Enresco, Inc., 446 F.2d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir. 1971)
(citation omitted). Furthermore, relief under Rule 60(b) is “warranted only in exceptional
circumstances.” Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991); see
also Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir.2000). “A litigant
shows exceptional circumstances by satisfying one or more of Rule 60(b)’s six grounds
for relief from judgment.” Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243-44.
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In the pending motion, Plaintiff seeks relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(3) and (6). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) provides that a court may relieve a
party from final judgment based on “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Proof of fraud upon
the court must be by clear and convincing evidence. See United States v. Buck, 281
F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the challenged behavior must
substantially have interfered with the aggrieved party’s ability to fully and fairly prepare
for and proceed at trial.

See Zurich N. Am. v. Matrix Serv., Inc., 426 F.3d 1281, 1290

(10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Rule 60(b)(6) provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment
“[for] any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” “Rule
60(b)(6) has been described by this court as a grand reservoir of equitable power to do
justice in a particular case.” Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[A] district court may grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion only in extraordinary
circumstances and only when necessary to accomplish justice.” Cashner v. Freedom
Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1996).
Upon review of Plaintiff’s motion, I find nothing therein that would justify setting
aside the original judgment. Plaintiff first argues that the attorneys for the Defendants
committed fraud. Plaintiff contends that Defendants committed fraud by submitting the
affidavit of Paul Wiese, which Plaintiff contends contained false information. This
argument however, has already been presented and rejected by the Court. In Plaintiff’s
objection to Magistrate Judge Hegarty’s Recommendation, Plaintiff claimed that
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Magistrate Judge Hegarty erred in relying on the affidavit of Paul D. Wiese in ruling on
the motion for summary judgment. At that time, Plaintiff claimed that Mr. Wiese’s
deposition testimony demonstrated that his affidavit was false. I have already ruled that
I disagree with Plaintiff’s characterization of Mr. Wiese’s deposition testimony and
affidavit. [Order ECF No. 105]. Plaintiff has presented no information or arguments that
would justify altering my previous ruling.
Next, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was
“inadequate on its face” and that the Court erred in granting the motion given applicable
law. Plaintiff further contends that the Court erred with respect to its ruling on the
statute of limitations issue and in its rationale for dismissing defendants from this suit.
Again, Plaintiff presents no proper basis upon which relief may be granted. The
arguments presented by Plaintiff have already previously been addressed. See Van
Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243 (recognizing that revisiting issues that have been previously
addressed “is not the purpose of a motion to reconsider,” and “advanc[ing] new
arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the
original . . . motion was briefed is likewise inappropriate.”) (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff also takes issue with two discovery rulings previously made in this case.
First, Plaintiff challenges my order affirming Magistrate Judge Hegarty’s Minute Order
granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Amended Motion for a Protective Order
[ECF No. 103]. Second, Plaintiff contends that the court erred by affirming Magistrate
Judge Hegarty’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to compel. [ECF No. 104]. Plaintiff’s
arguments with respect to these rulings likewise do not provide sufficient grounds under
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Rule 60 to reconsider the judgment in this case. I note that a failure to disclose
requested discovery may constitute the necessary misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3), but
only when the failure is in direct violation of a court order. See Zurich N. Am., 426 at
1292. Here, the relevant pleadings do not indicate that this Court ever issued an order
that the Defendants deliberately violated. To the extend that Plaintiff alleges that the
information was not made available to him because Magistrate Judge Hegarty limited
the number of requests for admissions he could request, and because he denied
Plaintiff’s motion to compel, this certainly does not constitute grounds for relief under
Rule 60. As I previously held, Magistrate Judge Hegarty’s rulings were sound and not
contrary to law. I therefore find Plaintiff’s allegations and arguments to be insufficient
under Rule 60 to relieve him from the Court’s previous judgment. Plaintiff’s arguments
are, in essence, a rehashing of arguments previously advanced.
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Order and Final Judgment [ECF

No. 107] is DENIED.
Dated: July 14, 2011
BY THE COURT:

s/ Wiley Y. Daniel
Wiley Y. Daniel
Chief United States District Judge

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