DISH Network Corporation et al v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company et al

Filing 190

Memorandum Order and Opinion on Remand by Judge John L. Kane on 10/22/13.(jjhsl, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge John L. Kane

Civil Action No. 09‐cv‐00447‐JLK

DISH NETWORK CORPORATION, and

DISH NETWORK LLC,

Plaintiffs,
v.

ARCH SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
ARROWOOD INDEMNITY COMPANY,
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS,
XL INSURANCE AMERICA, INC., and
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION ON REMAND
Kane, J.

This insurance coverage dispute is before me on remand from the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ reversal of my earlier opinion granting
summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Defendants again move for
summary judgment and Plaintiffs cross‐move for the same.1 At issue is
whether the Defendants, each a primary or excess insurer, owe the Plaintiffs,
DISH Network Corporation (“Dish Corp.”) and DISH Network L.L.C. (“Dish
LLC”), collectively “DISH,”2 a duty to defend or indemnify claims made against

1DISH moves for summary judgment against Arrowood and Travelers, the primary insurers only. All

Defendant Insurers move for summary judgment against DISH.

2 In an effort to avoid clumsy language, I treat DISH as singular for purposes of grammatical

construction. The Defendants are collectively referred to as “Defendants,” “Defendant Insurers,” or

1

them in an action styled Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, L.P. v. EchoStar
Communications Corp. and EchoStar Satellite L.L.C., Case No. C‐07‐03151 WDB
(N.D. Cal.) (the “Katz Action” or the “RAKTL Action”).
In my original summary judgment ruling I held that DISH’s injuries in
the Katz Action were not “advertising” injuries such that coverage would lie
per the “advertising injury” coverage provisions in the applicable insurance
policies issued by the Defendants. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed that holding, providing in pertinent part: “As regards the duty to
defend, we hold that the RAKTL complaint ‘may arguably fall within the
polic[ies]’ at issue, because it potentially alleged advertising injury arising
from Dish’s misappropriation of its advertising ideas, which Dish committed
in the course of advertising its goods, products, or services.” DISH Network
Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 659 F.3d 1010, 1028 (10th Cir. 2011)
(quotation and citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit reversed the case,
directing me to consider three issues that the Excess Umbrella Insurers had
raised both on appeal and previously at the district court level.3 Specifically,
these issues are: (a) whether the intellectual policy exclusion in Arch’s policy
precludes coverage; (b) whether the sole causation requirement in National

“Insurers,” where all Defendants are implicated, and as “Excess Insurers ” or “Umbrella Insurers” or
“Primary Insurers” as needed where a distinction between the two types of insurance is required.
3 Because the remanded issues were irrelevant to the “advertising injury” duty to defend analysis,
they were neither discussed nor decided in the first opinion, and the Tenth Circuit explicitly
“express[ed] no view on the merits” of these matters, mentioning them only by way of directing that
they be considered on remand.

2

Union’s policy precludes coverage; and (c) whether any of the Excess Insurers
have a duty to defend in the absence of a showing that DISH's primary policy
coverage has been exhausted. Id. at 1028‐29.
In the course of the instant summary judgment filings, DISH concedes
that Arch’s intellectual property exclusion bars any duty to defend Arch might
have regarding the Katz Action. Docs. 173 and 188. Accordingly, issue (a) is
resolved and summary judgment is GRANTED instanter as to Arch. As before,
however, issues (b) and (c) require first a decision that a duty to defend
would exist otherwise.
Relying on the Court of Appeals’ phrase beginning: “As regards the duty
to defend, we hold that the RAKTL complaint ‘may arguably fall within the
polic[ies]’ at issue. . .,” DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1028 (quotation omitted),
DISH posits that the Tenth Circuit has “already decided” that the claims
asserted against DISH Network in the underlying Katz Action fall potentially
within the coverage of the primary insurers commercial general liability
(“CGL”) policies. Doc. 169 at p.7.

From the fact that I let Insurers raise new defenses, however, it is clear

the duty to defend issue was not definitively closed forever and always by the
Tenth Circuit opinion. The first incarnation of this case involved determining
whether the complained of action in the underlying litigation, specifically
patent infringement of telephone technology, constituted “advertising injury”
3

such that Defendants’ various “advertising injury” exclusions would apply and
preclude Defendants having a duty to defend. Although the Tenth Circuit did
indeed settle that patent infringement for technologies capable of serving as
conduits for advertising could constitute “advertising injury,” the case as
presently postured does not seek to parse what is or is not an “advertising
injury.”
Rather, the instant summary judgment motions foremost query what
import to assign the term “broadcast” in an insurance policy, Defendants each
now invoking various Business Exclusions to negate coverage for all
advertising injuries suffered by insureds involved in the business of
broadcasting. “Although a district court is bound to follow the mandate, and
the mandate controls all matters within its scope,…a district court on remand
is free to pass upon any issue which was not expressly or impliedly disposed
of on appeal.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.
2003); Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 854
F.Supp.757, 773 (D. Kan. 1994)(“The issue presented by the Union was not
resolved by the Tenth Circuit in the prior appeal, and the court does no
violence to the mandate rule by considering the issue herein.”) Accordingly,
because the Business Exclusion argument was never before the Tenth Circuit,
it is appropriate for consideration on remand.

4

As detailed below, I find the business in which DISH is engaged to fall
squarely within the meaning of “broadcasting,” such that coverage for
defending the Katz Action is unavailable under the policies issued to it by
Defendant Insurers. Nonetheless, per the Tenth Circuit’s express directions, I
shall also discuss National Union’s sole causation requirement and Excess
Insurers’ argument that they had no duty to defend absent DISH’s conclusive
demonstration that primary coverage had been exhausted. In addition, I will
briefly treat various other legal arguments that were similarly left open on
remand, including National Union’s so‐called Satellite Exclusion Endorsement
argument.
Summary Judgment Standard and Rules of Insurance Contract Interpretation4
I repeat the catechism that summary judgment is appropriate where
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Here, the material facts
are not in dispute and the resolutions of all the summary judgment motions
hinge upon questions of law, specifically questions of insurance contract
interpretation. That said, where legal conclusions require me to draw
inferences from the factual record, I review the record in a light most
favorable to the non‐moving party. Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983,
985 (10th Cir. 1998).

4 The jurisdiction, choice of law, and venue discussions set forth in my original opinion are here

incorporated by reference.

5

The meaning of each term in an insurance contract is to be determined
as a matter of Colorado law, with any ambiguity resolved in favor of DISH, as
the insured. See Pompa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 1139, 1141 (10th
Cir. 2008). Mere disagreement between the parties about the meaning of a
term, however, does not create ambiguity. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 661 P.2d 247, 251 (Colo.1983). One may not read an ambiguity
into a term where none exists in order then to resolve the resulting ambiguity
against the insurer. Martinez v. Hawkeye–Sec. Ins. Co., 576 P.2d 1017, 1019
(Colo. 1978) (“[C]ourts will not force an ambiguity in order to resolve it
against an insurer.”). Also, the mere fact that a term may be susceptible to
multiple interpretations, or that it may have different dictionary definitions in
different contexts, does not alone create an ambiguity. See id.; see also Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Juniel, 931 P.2d 511, 513 (Colo. App. 1996). To the contrary, and as a
matter of basic semantics, a term is only ambiguous when it is reasonably
susceptible to multiple interpretations in the context in which it is used.
Juniel, 931 P.2d at 513.

To ascertain whether a certain provision is ambiguous, “the

instrument's language must be examined and construed in harmony with the
plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed, and reference
must be made to all the provisions of the agreement.” Radiology Professional
Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 195 Colo. 253, 256, 577 P.2d 748, 750
6

(1978)(citing Christmas v. Cooley, 158 Colo. 297, 406 (1965)). Not only
should strained constructions be avoided in favor of common constructions,
but technical and legal definitions should also be avoided. In other words, the
plain meaning of the words should be employed in a lay manner consistent
with what would be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Robertson, 994 P.2d 488, 490 (Colo. App. 1999).

To determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend the insured,

Colorado courts follow the “four corners rule” or “complaint rule,” under
which the courts compare the allegations of the underlying complaint with
the applicable policy terms. DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1015. Where the
underlying complaint alleges any facts or claims that might possibly be
covered under the policy terms, the insurer must tender a defense. Cyprus
Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 301 (Colo. 2003).The
Colorado Supreme Court has explained that the four corners or complaint
rule’s purpose is to protect the insured’s ‘legitimate expectation of a
defense.’” Cotter Corp. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 814, 828
(Colo.2004)(quoting Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1089
(Colo.1991)). While the “four corners” or “complaint” rule generally bars the
admissibility of evidence extrinsic to the underlying complaint and the
relevant insuring agreements in coverage determinations, a “widely
recognized exception” to this rule allows a court to consider such evidence
7

where it is unrelated to the merits of the underlying litigation and “plainly
take[s] the case outside the policy coverage.” Pompa, 520 F.3d at 1147
(internal quotation marks omitted). While the Colorado state courts have not
as yet expressly adopted this exception, the Tenth Circuit has determined
that, in light of the “authoritative support” for this rule and supporting dicta,
the Colorado Supreme Court likely would adopt the exception. Id.5

Overall, to the extent possible, courts should “give effect to the

reasonable expectations of the insured.” DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1016
(citations omitted).
Statement of Facts6
This Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order on summary judgment
(Doc. 135) set forth the relevant facts of the underlying patent suit and the
policies issued by the Defendants. CITE Slip Op. at pp. 3‐4. Those facts
remain undisputed. The following additional facts are relevant to the present
motions:
1. The Travelers and Arrowood policies contain the following

exclusion with respect to “advertising injury” coverage:
COVERAGE B. PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY

5 While there is no authoritative state law on point, the Pompa court’s prediction of the Colorado
Supreme Court’s holding is binding here. See Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862,
866 (10th Cir. 2003)(“[W]hen a panel of this Court has rendered a decision interpreting state
law, that interpretation is binding on district courts in this circuit, and on subsequent panels of
this Court, unless an intervening decision of the state’s highest court has resolved the issue.”)
6 The majority of the facts are undisputed by the parties. Those few that are not are proven
conclusively by the exhibits such that no dispute is “genuine.”

8

…2. Exclusions.
This insurance does not apply to:
…b. “Advertising injury” arising out of:
. . . (4) An offense committed by an insured whose business is
advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting.
Travelers’ Policy, Ex. D1 to Doc. 166 at pp. 10, 18.; Arrowood’s
Policy, Ex. E‐4 to Doc. 168 at DN 00035‐36.
2. The National Union policy contains the following exclusion with

respect to “advertising injury” coverage:
V. Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
… L Advertising Injury arising out of:
… (4) An offense committed by an Insured whose business is
advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting.

National Union’s Policy, Ex. A‐3 to Doc. 167 at NU00023.

3. The Arch Policy also contains an exclusion concerning advertising

injury:
This insurance does not apply to, and [Arch] ha[s] no
obligation to investigate, settle or defend, or pay the cost
of defending, any claim or “suit” for:

9

“Personal and advertising injury” ... [c]omitted by an
insured whose business is [a]dvertising, broadcasting,
publishing, or telecasting; [or a]n Internet search, access,
content or service provider.
Ex. B‐2 to Doc. 170 at ¶ 2.a(10)(a), (c).
4. The Annual Report of EchoStar Communications Corporation (the

predecessor to DISH) for the year ended 12/31/03 contains an
S.E.C. form 10‐K/A (Exhibit D2 hereto) states, inter alia, that DISH
“…provides a direct broadcast satellite subscription television
service. . .”. Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added).
5. The Articles of Incorporation of EchoStar Satellite Corporation

(which became DISH) describe its business operations in relevant
part as follows:
… To engage in the business of satellite
communications, including but not limited to Direct
Broadcast Satellite communications: to . . . operate
transmission and receiving stations and any
connection between any such stations, and to
transmit signals, and all matter and things of any
kind, nature, and description whatsoever that may
be transmitted.
10

Articles of Incorporation, Exhibit D4 to Doc. 166 at p. 1(emphasis
added).
6. DISH’s website refers to what it does as broadcasting. For example,

the “milestones” page of its website refers to making its “first
broadcast to customers” in March 1996 and to doubling its
“broadcasting capacity” in 1998. Doc. 175 at p. 7 & Doc. 185 at p.4
(emphasis added).
7. In a recent lawsuit in which DISH was a Plaintiff, DISH states the

following in its Complaint:
… 9. DISH Network is a multi‐channel video provider that
delivers video, audio, and data services via a direct broadcast
satellite system to more than 14 million subscribers.
10. DISH Network uses high‐powered satellites to broadcast,
among other things, movies, sports and general entertainment
services to consumers . . .
Complaint, Case No. CV11‐07376, United States District Court for
the Central District of California, Western Div., Dish Network, LLC et
al vs. Terrazas, Exhibit D6 to Doc. 166 at p. 3 (emphasis added).
8. Beginning at least with its May 3, 2001 “Risk Management

Solutions” proposal, DISH’s insurance broker, The Lockton
Companies, advised DISH of the availability of “Broadcasters Errors
11

& Omissions Coverage, ” which coverage the broker said “would
benefit [DISH] in the event of a claim.” Ex. E‐14 to Doc. 168,
EchoStar Risk Management Solutions, at DN 04036.
9. Lockton’s “Insurance Program Proposal” for EchoStar

Communications Corporation, dated July 26, 2001, listed “Personal
Injury and Advertising Injury Coverage” for “[a]ny offense if the
insured is in the business of advertising, broadcasting, or
telecasting” as one of several “MAJOR EXCLUSIONS” in EchoStar’s
commercial general liability coverage. Ex. E‐15 to Doc. 168,
EchoStar Insurance Program Proposal 8/1/2001 ‐ 8/1/2002, at DN
04105.
10. The same document listed “Broadcasters Errors and Omissions”

coverage as one of a number of “Items to Discuss” with EchoStar. Id.
at DN 04181.
11. Lockton’s “Insurance Proposal,” dated July 16, 2002, similarly

described EchoStar Communications Corporation’s “advertising,
broadcasting, or telecasting” exclusion as being a “MAJOR
EXCLUSION[]” and an “ITEM TO DISCUSS[].” Ex. E‐16 to Doc. 168,
Insurance Proposal for EchoStar 8/1/2002 ‐ 8/1/2003, at DN
05468, 05489‐90.

12

12. On October 30, 2002, Lockton provided Jennifer Palasz, DISH’s

Treasury Manager and Director of Treasury and Risk, with a similar
“Insurance Summary,” dated October 25, 2002, also explicitly listing
broadcasting and telecasting coverage as a “MAJOR EXCLUSION.”
Ex. E‐17 to Doc. 168, 10/30/02 Letter and Insurance Summary for
EchoStar Communications Corporation, at DN 05396.
Discussion
The Business Exclusion for Broadcasting Precludes Coverage

The policies issued by Travelers and Arrowood use standard primary

CGL coverage forms promulgated by the Insurance Service Office, Inc., or
“ISO.” These coverage forms reflect that though commercial insureds
generally can obtain “advertising injury” coverage for their business
operations, insurers generally do not afford such coverage to insureds in the
business of advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting. As set forth
above, the pertinent provision reads:
This insurance does not apply to:
…b. “Advertising injury” arising out of:
.

. . (4) An offense committed by an insured whose business is
advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting.

Travelers’ policy, Ex. D1 to Doc. 166 at pp. 10, 18.; Arrowood’s Policy, Ex. E‐4
to Doc. 168 at DN 00035‐36.
13

The Insurers assert that because DISH is a direct satellite broadcaster,

it is primarily in the business of broadcasting7, and therefore not covered for
advertising injuries. DISH argues that the satellite television programming it
provides should not be considered “broadcasting” because it is a subscription
service not available to the “indiscriminate public” or the “public generally.”
DISH defends this position by cherry‐picking dictionary definitions of
“broadcast” that include a public component8 and relying on narrow,
technical definitions contained in the Federal Communications Act of 1934.
DISH’s arguments fail for several reasons.
First, the common understanding of “broadcasting” is synonymous
with “transmission.” National Ass'n for Better Broad. (NABB) v. FCC, 849 F.2d
665, 669 (D.C.Cir.1988). There is no question that DISH transmits, via
broadcast satellites, television programming to its subscribers. One never
hears a conversation around the water cooler in which a person states that he
could not possibly have watched a broadcast because he only watches cable
television or has a satellite television subscription. Courts also routinely
employ the verb “broadcast” to describe what a for‐pay television provider

7 No Insurer’s policy defines the terms “broadcasting” or “telecasting.” Accordingly, as explained infra
at p. 6‐7, I apply general contract principles and avoid strained and technical interpretations to
accord the terms in question their plain and ordinary meanings. See Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768
P.2d 678, 680 (Colo. 1989); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Robertson, 994 P.2d 488, 490 (Colo. App. 1999)(in
determining meaning of provision denying coverage for liability involving boats with over “50 or
more total horsepower,” court looked to what horsepower the boat was represented to have, not the
specialty industry custom of measuring output at the propeller)
8 For example, DISH cites to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 280 (2002) to offer that

“broadcast” means to be “made public by means of radio or television.”

14

does and the noun “broadcaster” to describe what the for‐pay television
provider is. See Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 19 S.W.3d 413, 420
(Tex.2000)(repeatedly stating that premium television channel HBO
“broadcast” the film at issue in defamation suit and that HBO is a
“broadcaster”); Orth‐O‐Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office (HBO), 474 F.Supp. 672,
675 (S.D.N.Y.1979)(concluding that HBO is a “broadcaster” by reasoning that
even though HBO transmissions are not freely available to the general public,
they are broadcasts because they are capable of reaching any member of the
general public willing to pay a fee, similar to conventional broadcast fare, and
intended to appeal to a mass audience). Nothing in the case law or the
common usage of the term “broadcasting” requires that every member of the
public actually see what is broadcast or have access to the broadcast for free
before the broadcast will be considered directed toward the “public at large.”
It is enough for the broadcast or telecast to be readily available to the public
at large, and certainly DISH strives for universal access.9 Accordingly, I hold
that the plain meaning of broadcasting includes the business of providing
satellite television programming, in which DISH is primarily engaged.10

9 In its 2001 Form 10‐K filed with the SEC, DISH reported that its goal was “maximizing future

revenue by selling DISH Network programming to the largest possible subscriber base and rapidly
increasing the size of that subscriber base.” Ex. E‐19 to Doc. 175 at p. 4.
10As DISH’s subscription television service business accounted for between 90 and 94 percent of its
overall revenue throughout the period of policy coverage at issue, see Ex. E‐8 to Doc. 168, DISH 2003
10‐K at DN 06451), it is indisputable that DISH is “primarily” engaged in broadcasting.

15

I furthermore reject DISH’s argument that because a federal court

upheld a statutory interpretation of the term “broadcasting” that takes
subscription television providers outside of the FCC’s regulatory purview, the
plain, ordinary meaning of the term “broadcasting” cannot apply to
subscription television providers. The fact that subscription television is
classified as a non‐broadcast service for purposes of the Federal
Communications Act says nothing about the plain, ordinary meaning of the
term “broadcasting” in general. Colorado law dictates that terms be
interpreted according to the understanding of the average purchaser of
insurance, and it is irrelevant that “broadcasting” has a statutory definition in
a regulatory scheme that excludes satellite television providers. I hold that
the average purchaser of insurance would consider DISH engaged primarily
in the business of broadcasting.
Second, DISH’s own characterization of its subscription business is that
of and involving “broadcasting.” DISH, inter alia, represents its business as
providing a “direct broadcast satellite subscription television service.” DISH’s
website refers to its first transmission of television programming to
customers in March of 1996 as being its “first broadcast to customers” and
describes its purchase of a “satellite broadcasting joint venture” as “doubling
its “broadcasting capacity.” For DISH to hold itself out to the public and the
courts as a “broadcaster” but then deny the same to avoid its insurers’
16

broadcasting exclusion, smacks of hypocrisy and not common sense or
understanding.
Third, DISH’s attempt to draw a distinction between subscription and
non‐subscription television fails because it makes no sense in the context of
the Business Exclusion. The reason for an insurance policy to include an
exclusion for insureds in the businesses of “advertising, broadcasting,
publishing or telecasting” is to limit the insurer’s exposure to mass media‐
type injuries. 11 The extent of that risk is a function of how many people have
access to the media, not whether they pay for it. Both PBS and DISH are mass
media businesses,12 and whether it is PBS broadcasting a slanderous
statement or DISH broadcasting a slanderous statement, each entity presents
a risky enterprise for purposes of advertising coverage.13
This context also gives reason to reject DISH’s reliance on its dictionary
definitions. I concede that the dictionary definitions DISH proffers include a
public dissemination requirement in their composition of the meaning of
broadcasting. But as the Insurers equally submit many dictionary definitions

11 Shaun McParland Baldwin et al. explain the risk and the rationale for the exclusion in Commercial

General Liability Coverages‐An Overview, 707 PLI/Lit 83, 188 (2004):

The insureds in [the advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting] line of
business should procure media, broacasters or publishers liability policies to cover
their enhanced risk in the media‐related marketplace…This addition recognizes that
these types of insureds also present a heightened risk of “person and advertising
injury,” which should be addressed by separate insurance products.

(emphasis added.)
12 DISH has over nine million subscribers. See Doc. 175 at p. 6.
13 Indeed, DISH customers who subscribe to a local channels package can receive PBS transmissions
over their DISH satellite.

17

that do not include that component14, I do not here find dictionaries
particularly helpful. Dictionary definitions can certainly provide
interpretative guidance for a term, and I freely admit to have turned to them
in the past, but it is important to remember that the dictionary definitions
provide just that, guidance. “Dictionary definitions are acontextual, whereas
the meaning of sentences depends critically on context, including all sorts of
background understandings.” United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043
(7th Cir.2012).
Pompa is illustrative. That case involved an insurer that refused to
defend or indemnify its insured, David Pompa, for claims arising out of an
altercation in which another man was killed. Pompa pleaded guilty to
criminally negligent homicide in relation to that death, and the insurer
invoked an exclusion barring claims arising from criminal acts for which the
insured was “convicted.” 520 F.3d at 1141. Pompa filed an action for breach
of contract and bad faith in Colorado state court, which the insurer removed
to this District. Id. In resisting the insurer’s motion for summary judgment,
Pompa maintained that the word “convicted” was ambiguous because it was
susceptible to two definitions: It could refer to a “conviction” obtained
through trial or to a “conviction” obtained by plea. Id. at 1143.
Notwithstanding that Pompa and the insurer each cited various editions of

14 For example, Insurers cite The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, New College

Ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. (1976) as defining “broadcast” as “‐‐ intr. To broadcast by television…
‐‐ tr. To broadcast (a program) by television.”

18

Black’s Law Dictionary for conflicting definitions of the same word, the
district court declined to find any ambiguity in the term “convicted” as it was
used in context within the policy exclusion, granting summary judgment to
the insurer. Id. at 1142‐43.
In affirming, the Tenth Circuit observed that “[a] word may take on a
variety of meanings in different contexts,” but that the mere existence of
multiple definitions does not render a term ambiguous if its meaning is
otherwise clear in the context in which it is used within an insurance policy.
Id. at 1143. Quoting the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Sprangers v. Greatway
Insurance Co., the Pompa court observed:
The mere fact that a word has more than one dictionary
meaning, or that the parties disagree about the meaning,
does not necessarily make the word ambiguous if the court
concludes that only one meaning applies in the context and
comports with the parties’ objectively reasonable
expectations. . . . Thus it is inappropriate to create ambiguity
by simply finding two different dictionary definitions . . .
Dictionary definitions can shed only partial light on the
reasonable understanding of an insured with regard to
words in the context of a particular insurance policy.

Pompa, 520 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Sprangers, 514 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Wis. 1994)).
Rather than finding an ambiguity based on the conflicting dictionary
definitions offered by the parties, the Tenth Circuit looked to the policy
purpose for the exclusion at issue ‐ to bar coverage for criminal acts – in
determining that the word “convicted” remained unambiguous. According to
the Pompa court, there was no policy reason for limiting the exclusion to acts
19

for which a trial had been had, or for it not to apply to acts for which a guilty
plea had been tendered. Id. at 1143‐44. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the term was unambiguous and was not reasonably susceptible to Pompa’s
preferred interpretation that being “convicted” required a trial and verdict. Id.
To the extent that DISH maintains that the word “broadcasting” is
susceptible to an interpretation that would distinguish traditional television
transmission from subscription‐ or satellite‐based television transmission, I
reject that interpretation because the distinction is not supported by the
underlying risk.
Additionally, I note Insurers advance documentation of their broker’s
advice, which explicitly warned DISH that it would not be covered for many
injuries because of the Broadcasting Exclusion. DISH argues that this
extrinsic evidence is inappropriate for consideration because of Colorado’s
“four corners” or “complaint” rule. That rule, however, is about where courts
should look to ascertain the facts potentially giving rise to a duty to defend; it
is not about how to define the terms of a policy, which remains a question of
law appropriate for determination on summary judgment.

The broker’s advice is admissible under an exception to the four

corners rule. The Tenth Circuit has explicitly held that an exception would be
recognized where it would (1) not “undercut the purposes” underlying the
rule and (2) be supported by sufficient authority. Pompa, 520 F.3d at 1147;
20

AIMCO, 593 F.3d at 1194. Extrinsic evidence constituting “an indisputable
fact that is not an element of either the cause of action or a defense in the
underlying litigation” is admissible. Pompa, 520 F.3d at 1147. Here, as no
party disputes the veracity of the broker’s statements, there is no reason to
doubt that they constitute “sufficient authority.” Also, neither the elements of
the charges brought in the underlying patent infringement complaint nor
DISH’s defenses have anything to do with whether DISH is in the business of
broadcasting. Finally, application of the rule to exclude the broker’s advice
would defeat the Colorado Supreme Court’s very object in creating the rule.
As DISH itself highlights in its briefing, the rule exists to “protect[] the
insured’s ‘legitimate expectation of a defense.’” Cotter, 90 P.3d at 829
(quoting Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1090). How can DISH assert it had a “legitimate”
expectation of a defense when it was literally instructed not to expect a
defense? All together, these facts make the broker’s advice admissible.
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit in this very dispute has cited approvingly to
Pompa and stated that “a Colorado court might well consider the substance”
of the extrinsic evidence that is the content of the Katz Action patent claims
not at issue in the underlying suit. DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1016. Admitting
the broker’s advice is merely following the Tenth Circuit’s suggestion with
respect to a different category of evidence that was not before the Tenth
Circuit. The evidence shows that DISH was informed unequivocally that the
21

Insurers believed the Broadcasting Exclusion applicable. If DISH disagreed, it
was then that it should have raised the issue. DISH could have purchased
additional coverage, but it chose not to. DISH should not get the benefits of a
product it did not purchase. “Courts may neither add provisions to extend
coverage beyond that contracted for, nor delete them to limit coverage.”
Cyprus, 74 P.3d at 299. Here, I would be adding coverage were I to rule in
DISH’s favor.
It also bears repeating that an insurance policy is a contract, and is
generally subject to the standard rules of contract interpretation. Cyprus, 74
P.3d at 299. Accordingly, one may properly consider extrinsic evidence in
determining whether an ambiguity exists. Level 3 Communications, LLC v.
Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir.2008). As such, even were I not to hold
that the plain meaning of “broadcasting” unambiguously refers to what
business DISH is engaged, I would consider the broker’s advice to conclude
that the parties expected the Business Exclusion to apply, which
consideration would not violate the four corners rule as described above.
The Business Exclusion for Telecasting Precludes Coverage

Even were DISH’s business to be construed as ambiguous or something

other than “broadcasting,” it continues to be excluded from Advertising Injury
coverage under the Business Exclusion as an “insured whose business is . . .
telecasting.” The incorporation of the term “telecasting” – in addition to the
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broader and partially overlapping term “broadcasting” –reflects the insurer’s
ceaseless quest to draft language definite enough to satisfy the pro‐insured
tilt of the law. The term “telecasting” is included to make clear that
businesses involving the transmission of television programming (as opposed
to only radio broadcasting, for example) to viewers are excluded from
advertising injury coverage.

DISH fails to account for the inclusion of this specific additional

term within the Business Exclusion, attempting instead to persuade
that it is subsumed within the “broadcasting” portion of the exclusion.
DISH defines “telecasting” only by reference to broadcasting,
specifically maintaining that it means no more than “to broadcast by
television.” Doc. 169 at p.19. Equating the two terms to this extent,
however, would nullify the inclusion of “telecasting” as an additional
term, effectively reading it out of the Business Exclusion. This
interpretative approach is inconsistent with the basic rule of contract
construction that each term in the policy should be read to have
independent meaning. See Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Hartford

Underwriters Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 470, 474 (Colo. App. 2006) (“We also
read the provisions of the policy as a whole and construe it so that all
provisions are harmonious and none is rendered meaningless.”) Thus,
to the extent the Insurers offer a competing interpretation of these
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terms that gives each independent meaning, it must be adopted and
DISH’s redundant interpretation must be rejected.
National Union and XL’s Duties as Secondary Insurers

Unlike Arrowood and Travelers, National Union and XL do not insure

DISH under a primary CGL policy. Instead, National Union and XL serve as
DISH’s umbrella insurers. An umbrella insurance policy is a distinct type of
policy in which an insurer has a duty to defend where (1) the applicable limits
of insurance of the underlying policies have been exhausted by payments of
claims to which the umbrella policy applies; or (2) damages are sought that
are covered by the umbrella policy but not covered by any other underlying
insurance. See Apodaca v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1099, 1103 (Colo. 2011).
The Katz Action satisfies neither scenario under either National Union’s or
XL’s policy.
As to the limit exhaustion requirement, DISH concedes that the CGL
insurance policies issued by Travelers and Arrowood have not been
exhausted by payments of claims to which the National Union and XL policies
apply. Doc. 173 at p.50. As to the other coverage requirement, National
Union and XL have no duty to defend because their policies, like those of the
primary insurers, contain exclusions for advertising injuries where the
insurer is engaged in the business of “broadcasting.” National Union’s policy
contains the exclusion explicitly and XL’s policy contains the exclusion by
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reference. That is, regardless of whether the applicable limits of the
underlying policies have been exhausted, the National Union and XL Policies
themselves do not cover defense costs for the injuries alleged in the
underlying litigation. Furthermore, National Union’s policy contains a “sole”
causation requirement, discussed immediately below, that negates coverage.
Lastly, and though ultimately irrelevant to this matter’s disposition, National
Union’s Satellite Exclusion and XL’s “as warranted” provision also fails to
provide coverage.
The Katz Action Complaint Fails to Meet National union’s Sole
Causation Requirement
The relevant policy language regarding National Union’s Sole Causation
requirement is as follows:
A. Advertising Injury means injury arising solely out of
your advertising activities as a result of one or more of
the following offenses:
1. Oral or written publication of material that
slanders or libels a person or organization or
disparages a person's or organization's goods,
products or services;
2. Oral or written publication of material that
violates a person's right of privacy;
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3. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of
doing business; or
4. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan.
* * *
H. Occurrence means:
* * *
3. As respects Advertising Injury, an offense
committed in the course of advertising your
goods, products and services that results in
Advertising Injury. All damages that arise
from the same or related injurious material or act
shall be considered as arising out of one
Occurrence, regardless of the frequency or
repetition thereof, the number and kind of media
used and the number of claimants.

* * *
This insurance does not apply to ...
L. Advertising Injury arising out of. ..
4. An offense committed by an Insured whose
business is advertising, broadcasting,
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publishing, or telecasting ...
Commercial Umbrella Policy Form 57697 (6/93) at NU00059, NU00061, and
NU00064.)
As indicated above, National Union’s policy language states that its
Advertising Injury coverage is available only for underlying litigation "arising
solely out of' the Dish parties' advertising activities as the result of an
enumerated Advertising Injury offense. Commercial Umbrella Policy Form
57697 (6/93) at NU00059 and NU00061. The complaint filed in the Katz
Action does not allege injury "arising solely out of” the Dish parties'
advertising activities, however; rather, the injuries include all of DISH’s “use”
of the underlying technology (which use encompasses, for example, the
transactions of pay‐per‐view movies and performing customer service
functions) and DISH itself concedes that the allegedly infringing telephone
systems do not solely involve advertising activities by acknowledging these
other activities that have nothing to do with promoting products for sale to
the public. (Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment, Doc. 111 (2/01/10) at 57.)
Although DISH acknowledges National Union’s sole causation
requirement and concedes its Katz Action complaint alleges injuries outside
of advertising, it nonetheless argues that the sole causation requirement
conflicts with the requirement in the definition of Occurrence that provides
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that the offense must be committed in the course of advertising the named
insured's goods, products, or services. DISH is mistaken.
As explained above, a policy is not ambiguous merely because a party
develops an unreasonable or strained interpretation of the language. Pub.
Servo Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 939 (Colo. 1999). Contrary to
the Dish parties' assertion, National Union's policy provisions are in harmony
with one another. The arising "solely out of advertising activities"
requirement contained in the definition of Advertising Injury modifies the
injury. To constitute Advertising Injury, as the National Union Umbrella
Policy defines that term, the injury must arise solely out of a named insured's
advertising activities. (NUSMJ, Doc. 167‐3 (09/14/12) at NU00059.) In
contrast, the "committed in the course of advertising" requirement in the
definition of “Occurrence” modifies the offense.
To constitute an Occurrence for purposes of Advertising Injury
coverage, the offense must be committed in the course of advertising the
named insured's goods, products and services. (Id. at NU00061.) Together,
the provisions complement each other and ensure that National Union's
Advertising Injury coverage is not expanded to encompass exposures only
tangentially related to advertising. Because the policy's terms can be
harmonized, there is no ambiguity. Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Colo.,
831 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Colo. 1992)(“Policy provisions should be read to avoid
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ambiguities if possible, and the language should not be tortured to create
ambiguities.”)(internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, because the complained of activity does not arise solely
out of advertising activity and because I find the sole causation requirement
does not conflict with the definition of Occurrence, National Union has no
duty to defend.
National Union’s Satellite Exclusion Does Not Apply
The National Union Umbrella Policy also contains a Satellite Exclusion
endorsement, which provides as follows:
This insurance does not apply to Bodily Injury, Property
Damage, Personal Injury or Advertising Injury arising out
of the ownership, operation or use of any satellite.
Commercial Umbrella Policy Form 57697 (6/93) at NU00047.)
National Union argues that as DISH owns, operates and uses satellites,
it has no duty to defend the advertising injuries DISH complains of. I
disagree. Although my disagreement does not change the outcome for
National Union—the inapplicability of this exclusion does not return
coverage when I have determined that the Business Exclusion applies—I note
the argument almost as a curiosity.

DISH points out that upholding the Satellite Exclusion in the manner

urged by National Union would render coverage illegally illusory by way of a
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hypothetical showing the absurdity of National Union’s argument: “Under
National Union’s interpretation, the Satellite Exclusion would be applicable to
a bodily injury due to a slip and fall on DISH Network’s premises simply
because DISH Network is in the subscription satellite television business.”
Doc. 173 at p.41.

I, too, can envision no scenario in which the exclusion would not apply
under National Union’s logic. (Perhaps neither can National Union, for its
Reply did not offer a theory discarding the exception as illusory.) Colorado
law will not enforce insurance policies that violate public policy by providing
illusory coverage and neither will I. See Pompa, 520 F.3d at 1145; O'Connor v.
Proprietors Insurance Co., 696 P.2d 282, 283 (Colo.1985) (coverage is illusory
where, insurer receives premiums “when realistically it is not incurring any
risk of liability”). Fortunately for National Union, however, it has another,
legally sound exclusion that removes its duty to defend, the Business
Exclusion discussed herein.
The XL Policy Does Not Supply Coverage

The XL Policy has two distinct coverage parts. The XL Policy provides

both excess (Coverage A) and umbrella (Coverage B) coverage. Coverage A
provides excess coverage for injuries already covered by the underlying
policies, in this case the Arrowood policy (if it were found to apply), and any
other available primary insurance. Coverage A of the XL Policy follows form
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to the Arrowood policy, unless the terms, conditions and exclusions of the XL
Policy provide otherwise.
By way of contrast, Coverage B operates to provide “drop‐down”
primary coverage for injuries not covered by the underlying policy (the
Arrowood policy) or any other insurance. Unlike Coverage A, Coverage B does
not incorporate the exclusions contained in the underlying policies, and is
excess to a self‐insured retention. However, by endorsement, the XL Policy
does follow form to the underlying Arrowood Policy with respect to
“advertising injury”. Accordingly, if there is no “advertising injury” coverage
under the Arrowood Policy, there is no coverage under XL’s Coverage B. As
explained above, I hold that the Primary Insurers, Arrowood included, did not
improperly withhold coverage. Therefore, there is no coverage under XL’s
Coverage B.
For purposes of discussing the unique “as warranted” policy language
found in Coverage A of the XL Policy, however, I assume arguendo that it was
wrong for Defendant Arrowood to deny coverage. The pertinent XL Policy
provision reads:
With respect to any loss covered by the terms and
conditions of this policy, but not covered as warranted by
the underlying policies listed on Schedule A, or any other
underlying insurance, we will pay on your behalf for loss
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caused by an “occurrence” which is in excess of the
“retained limit” for liability imposed on you by law or
assumed by you under contract for “bodily injury”,
“personal injury”, “property damage” or “advertising
injury.”
This insurance applies only to “bodily injury”, “personal
injury”, “property damage” or “advertising injury” which
occurs during the policy period.
Doc. 171‐1, Ex. C‐1. (emphasis added). The addition of “as warranted” as a
modifier to “not covered” obliges XL to drop down and provide coverage for
occurrences even when its underlying insurer wrongfully denies coverage.
Hocker v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 1476, 1482 (10th Cir. 1991).
Arrowood is the listed underlying insurer to the XL Policy.
Because, however, the XL Policy has another provision that expressly
excludes coverage for “[a]ny defense, investigation, settlement or legal
expense covered by underlying insurance, “ XL Policy, Ex. C‐1 to Doc. p. 10,
Exclusion O. [Ex. C‐1]), to the extent the claim is covered by underlying
primary insurance, the XL Policy cannot be implicated as it carves out
insuring any defense covered by underlying insurance. Thus, the XL Policy is
not required to drop down and provide primary coverage even if Arrowood’s
denial of coverage was wrongful, which, of course, I have already determined
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it not to have been.
Insurers Did Not Act in Bad Faith
As DISH’s breach of contract claims against Insurers fail, so too must its
“bad faith” claims. “The issue of coverage is a central predicate to any claim of
bad faith breach of the insurance contract.” Cary v. United of Omaha Life Ins.
Co., 91 P.3d 425, 427 (Colo. App. 2003), rev’d other grounds 108 P.3d 288, 290
(Colo. 2005); Jarnagin v. Banker's Life and Cas. Co., 824 P.2d 11, 15 (Colo. App.
1991) (judicial determination of no coverage renders attendant bad faith
claim either moot or without merit as a matter of law); Weitz Co., LLC v. Mid‐
Century Ins. Co., 181 P.3d 309, 315 (Colo. App. 2007) (finding of no duty to
defend properly sustained summary judgment on bad faith claim). DISH will
not be awarded any general and consequential damages.
Conclusion
Simply put, DISH provides television programming to a vast population
and is therefore a broadcaster15. DISH implicitly agrees through its history of
calling itself a broadcaster. It now deems it expedient to plump up its
definition by reminding the Court (and in some instances, adding altogether)
that it is a “direct satellite broadcaster”, but it is a self‐proclaimed broadcaster
nonetheless. Accordingly, the Insurers’ Business Exclusions negate any duty
to defend DISH’s advertising injuries. Explicitly, I find that the only

15 And, for that matter, a “telecaster,” see supra at p.22‐24.

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reasonable interpretation of the Business Exclusion is that it applies to direct
satellite broadcasters, that the allegations set forth in the underlying Katz
Action complaint are “solely and entirely” within the Business Exclusion, and
that therefore the Insurers have met their “heavy burden” of proving that the
underlying claim cannot fall within the policy coverage. See Compass Ins. Co. v.
City of Littleton, 984 P.2d 606, 614 (Colo.1999). As there is no duty to defend
for any insurer, there is likewise no duty to indemnify. No Insurer acted in
bad faith and DISH is not entitled to any damages. The Summary Judgment
motions of Arch, Arrowood, Traveler’s, National Union, and XL, are GRANTED.
The Partial Summary Judgment motion of DISH is DENIED.

DATED:

October 22, 2013

BY THE COURT:

s/John L. Kane
John L. Kane, U.S. Senior District Judge

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