Ind v. Colorado Department of Corrections et al

Filing 319

ORDER granting in part 303 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. By Judge William J. Martinez on 12/2/2014.(alowe)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Case No. 09-cv-0537-WJM-KLM
JACOB IND,
Plaintiff,
v.
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and
Costs. (ECF No. 303.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is hereby granted in
part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his pro se Complaint in this matter on March 13, 2009, alleging
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc et seq. (“RLUIPA”). (ECF No. 3.) Counsel was later appointed for Plaintiff, and
they entered their appearance on November 30, 2012. (ECF Nos. 180-82.) After the
Court held a two day bench trial on the second claim of Plaintiff’s operative Complaint,
the Court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor and awarded Plaintiff injunctive relief. (ECF Nos. 268,
269 & 300.) The Court also found that Plaintiff was the prevailing party, and invited
Plaintiff to file a motion seeking attorneys’ fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
(ECF No. 300 at 41-42.) Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and

Costs. (ECF No. 303.) Plaintiff submitted documentation showing that his counsel
incurred fees of $365,819.50 during the prosecution of his case, but, after exercising
billing judgment, he sought reimbursement for $184,371.60 in fees and $1,521.91 in
costs. (Id. at 3-4.)
Defendant’s Response argues that Plaintiff failed to apply the relevant statutory
limits on the hourly rate an attorney can charge under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (“PLRA”). (ECF No. 312 at 1.) Defendant sets forth several
additional reasons why the hours claimed by Plaintiff are unreasonable, including an
allegedly improper use of “block billing,” excessive research, unnecessary trial
preparation, duplicative work, and improperly billed clerical work. (Id.) Based on these
concerns, Defendant requests that the Court reduce Plaintiff’s award of attorneys’ fees
to $56,340.12. (Id. at 15.)
Plaintiff’s Reply acknowledges that his original fees request did not adhere to the
applicable PLRA hourly rate guidelines. (ECF No. 316 at 2.) Plaintiff, however,
disputes Defendant’s allegations of overbilling. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff’s Reply states that
counsel has “exercised reasonable billing judgment to make detailed and substantial
write-offs,” which resulted in a 36% reduction in fees from the actual number of hours
billed. (Id. at 1.) In his Reply, Plaintiff further reduces his requested fees by 20% to
compensate for possible inefficiencies. (Id.) Plaintiff ultimately seeks fees in the
amount of $114,744.14 (Id. at 15) plus costs totaling $1,521.91 (ECF No. 303 at 4)1.

1

Costs have already been taxed against the Defendant in the amount of $1,201.91.
(ECF No. 308.)

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II. LEGAL STANDARD
To determine a reasonable attorneys fee, the court must calculate a “lodestar
figure” by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the hours reasonably expended.
Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Case v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998)). Counsel should
exercise “billing judgment” prior to submitting a fee request to eliminate any needless,
excessive, or redundant hours. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Billing
judgment should also take into account the experience and relative skill of the billing
attorneys. Id. Additional factors to determine a fee’s reasonableness include “the
complexity of the case, the number of reasonable strategies pursued, . . . the responses
necessitated by the maneuvering of the other side,” any potential duplicative services,
and whether the hours would “normally be billed to a paying client.” Ramos v. Lamm,
713 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir. 1983). A court may use its discretion to fashion an award
of attorneys’ fees it deems appropriate where counsel requests payment for hours other
than those reasonably expended. Id. at 554-55.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Plaintiff’s Reasonable Hourly Rate
The PLRA permits prisoners to recover attorneys’ fees they may otherwise be

entitled to as long as “the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving” the
plaintiff’s rights were violated, and the fee is proportionate to the relief obtained. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A)-(B)(I). However, attorneys’ fees obtained under the PLRA are
subject to a capped rate dictated by 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, which is 150% of the allowable
rate for court-appointed counsel. Id. at §1997e(d)(3). As of March 1, 2014, the Tenth
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Circuit has adopted an hourly rate of $126.00 for court-appointed attorneys (“the CJA
rate”). CJA Rates, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO,
http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/AttorneyInformation/CJAInfo/CJARates.aspx (last visited
Nov. 25, 2014). Thus, at a maximum, Plaintiff may receive 150% of the current CJA
rate, or $189.00 per hour.
Hourly rates should be tailored to an attorney’s experience in the subject matter
of the litigation. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555. Attorneys practicing “outside their fields of
expertise may deserve an hourly fee lower than their normal billing rate because of their
lack of experience.” Id. Thus, to determine a reasonable rate in this case, the Court
considers Plaintiff’s counsel’s “skill and experience in civil rights or analogous litigation.”
Id.
The bulk of hours expended on this case were billed by attorneys Sudee Wright
and Carrie Claiborne. (ECF No. 316-1.) Ms. Wright’s legal background is
predominantly based in general business litigation. (See ECF No. 303-2.) While Ms.
Claiborne does have some civil rights litigation experience, she has only been licensed
to practice law since 2010. (ECF No. 303-3.) Moreover, neither Ms. Wright nor Ms.
Claiborne appear to have had any experience involving prisoner civil rights or RLUIPA
prior to handling this matter. This Court finds that Plaintiff’s limited background in
RLUIPA claims, and civil rights law generally, warrants reduction from the maximum
allowable rate.
However, the Court also acknowledges that the “quality of the lawyer’s
performance in the case should also be considered in placing a value on his or her
services,” and that many civil rights cases can be adequately handled even by those not
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specializing in the field. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555. Plaintiff’s counsel competently and
effectively presented their client’s case to this Court, which resulted in a favorable
judgment. It is also appropriate to note that the Plaintiff may have gone without any
counsel had Ms. Wright and Ms. Claiborne not volunteered to take this case. The Court
strongly believes that, where possible, the prosecution of civil rights violations should be
incentivized. Id. at 552. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s counsel should be
subject to only a minor hourly reduction, and that 125% of the current CJA rate, or
$157.50 per hour (1.25 x $126.00), is a reasonable rate in this case.
B.

The Reasonableness of Counsel’s Billable Hours
Parties seeking fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 must submit “meticulous,

contemporaneous time records.” Ramos, 713 F.2d at 553. The records should reveal
the time counsel spent on specific tasks, such as research, drafting, and client
meetings. Id. Proper records should also allow the court to differentiate between the
total “raw” hours expended and those reasonably expended. Id. Fees requested under
fee-shifting statutes are subject to “close scrutiny.” Praseuth, 406 F.3d at 1257 (citing
Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055, 1062 (10th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff’s counsel submitted detailed billing records that allow the Court to
engage in the “close scrutiny” mandated by this Circuit. Nearly all entries are
accompanied by a clear description of the task conducted and the time expended on
that task. (ECF No. 316-1.) Although the Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s use of “block
billing,” it submits no authority that the use of such billing is per se unreasonable. (ECF
No. 312 at 5.) Indeed, the Tenth Circuit “has not established a rule mandating reduction
or denial of a fee request if the prevailing party submits attorney-records which reflect
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block billing.” Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1215 (10th Cir. 2000).
Defendant makes several other objections to the number of hours expended by
Plaintiff, including excessive work, duplicative work, and improperly billed clerical work.
(ECF No. 312.) The Court has reviewed the bills and considered these arguments, but
cannot say counsel spent an inordinate amount of time on any particular task. Plaintiff’s
Reply effectively refutes Defendant’s assertions regarding duplicative work by stating
that “undersigned counsel worked on different tasks and/or worked on different parts of
the same task.” (ECF No. 316 at 11.) This assertion is supported by the record. (ECF
No. 316-1.) Plaintiff’s Reply also eliminates all hours spent on clerical work from his
request, and therefore moots Defendant’s concerns on that issue. (ECF No. 316 at 1415.)
With regard to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s counsel did excessive work,
the Court finds that the reductions voluntarily undertaken are substantial and adequately
address this objection. Counsel wrote off whole categories of time, including the hours
spent by several other attorneys on staff, all internal meetings, and travel time to and
from Limon Correctional Facility. (ECF No. 303-1 at 4-5.) Counsel then subtracted an
additional 20% from the remainder “in an abundance of caution . . . to account for
possible inefficiencies and to avoid any appearance of inappropriate fees.” (Id. at 6.)
These reductions demonstrate that counsel exercised appropriate billing judgment prior
to submitting their fee request, which, coupled with counsel’s detailed billings, allows the
Court to determine what hours were reasonably expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

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A review of counsel’s bill persuades the Court that the total of 657.1 hours2 expended is
reasonable.
C.

Lodestar Amount
The Court has found that $157.50 is a reasonable hourly rate, and that Plaintiff’s

request for 657.1 hours of work on this case is reasonable. Multiplying the figures
results in an attorneys’ fees award of $103,493.25, which the Court finds is reasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees and Costs (ECF No. 303) is GRANTED IN PART and Plaintiff is awarded
$103,493.25 in attorneys’ fees. As Plaintiff has already been awarded costs by the
Court (ECF No. 308), this aspect of the Motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

Dated this 2nd day of December, 2014.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

2

This figure constitutes a 20% reduction to the 821.4 hours billed by counsel after all of
their write-offs.

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