S. v. Pueblo School District 60 et al
Filing
410
Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part Plaintiff's Motions For Attorneys' Fees And Costs, 367 , 387 , by Judge William J. Martinez on 3/22/2016.(dhans, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 09-cv-0858-WJM-MEH
EBONIE S., a child, by her mother and next friend, MARY S.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PUEBLO SCHOOL DISTRICT 60,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiff Ebonie S. (“Plaintiff”), by her mother and next friend, Mary S., brought
this action in 2009 under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“§ 504”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 794 et seq., as well as several other claims, against Defendant Pueblo School
District 60 (“Defendant”) and several individual defendants, arising out of Defendant’s
use of a restraint desk on Plaintiff at school. (ECF No. 4.) On May 3, 2011, the Court
granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in part, rejecting five of Plaintiff’s
original seven claims and dismissing all individual defendants. (ECF No. 159.) Plaintiff
filed an interlocutory appeal, and the Court’s order was affirmed. (ECF Nos. 230, 237.)
After the case was remanded to this Court, a jury trial on Plaintiff’s ADA and
§ 504 claims against Defendant commenced on March 16, 2015, and a verdict was
reached on March 24, 2015. (ECF No. 354.) The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and
awarded her damages in the amount of $2,200,000. (Id.) Final Judgment was entered
on April 24, 2015. (ECF No. 365.) On May 26, 2015, Defendant filed a Notice of
Appeal. (ECF No. 371.)
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (“Fee
Motion”) (ECF No. 367), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Review of Clerk’s Taxation of Costs
(“Cost Motion”) (ECF No. 387).1 For the reasons set forth below, both motions are
granted in part and denied in part.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“The prevailing party” in an ADA and § 504 case is entitled to recover “a
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12205; see 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b). However, a party seeking such an award must
demonstrate that the fees she seeks are reasonable, and the Court is obligated to
closely scrutinize the reasonableness of such awards. See Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d
1055, 1062 (10th Cir. 1995). Therefore, counsel must make a good faith effort to
exclude hours or expenses that are “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). “Moreover, hours that are not properly
billed to one’s client are not properly billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory
authority.” Mann, 46 F.3d at 1063 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in
original).
Generally, the starting point for any calculation of a reasonable attorneys’ fee is
the “lodestar,” that is, the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012,
1
Although filed as two separate motions, the parties have argued both motions together
in the briefing on the Fee Motion.
2
1017–18 (10th Cir. 1996). To determine the number of hours reasonably expended,
the Court reviews counsel’s billing entries to ensure that counsel exercised proper
billing judgment. Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir.
1998). Once the Court determines the lodestar, it may “adjust the lodestar upward or
downward to account for the particularities” of the work performed. Phelps v. Hamilton,
120 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 1997). T he Court is not required to reach a lodestar
determination in every instance, however, and may simply accept or reduce a fee
request within its discretion. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37.
As for the hourly rate, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that “the court must look to
‘what the evidence shows the market commands for civil rights or analogous litigation.’”
Burch v. La Petite Academy, Inc., 10 F. App’x 753, 755 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Case,
157 F.3d at 1255). The “local market rate” is usually defined by the state or city in
which the case is litigated. Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1203 (10th
Cir. 1998) (looking at “the prevailing market rates in the relevant community”); Case,
157 F.3d at 1256 (looking at fees lawyers charge in the area in which the litigation
occurs). The burden is on the party seeking fees to provide evidence of the prevailing
market rate for similar services by “lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience,
and reputation” in the relevant community. Ellis, 163 F.3d at 1203.
II. ANALYSIS2
Plaintiff’s motions seek attorneys’ fees and costs as a “prevailing party” pursuant
to federal statute. (ECF No. 367 at 8; ECF No. 387 at 2.) W hile Defendant questions
2
The Court presumes familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this
case, and will not restate it here.
3
Plaintiff’s overall degree of success in this case, Defendant does not dispute that
Plaintiff was the prevailing party. (ECF No. 395 at 3, 7.) Accordingly, the parties agree
that Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable award of fees and costs, and the Court must
determine the amount of that award.
A.
Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiff calculates her lodestar at $1,161,111.50, based on her attorney s’ hourly
rates multiplied by their respective number of hours billed, as follows.
Timekeeper
HOLLAND & HART
Maureen Witt (partner)
Doug Abbott (of counsel)
Jill Nickerson (paralegal)
Jonathan Bender (partner)
Christina Gomez (partner)
CiCi Cheng (associate)
Clarissa Collier (associate)
Jason Crow (associate)
Anastasia Fainberg (associate)
Keeya Jeffrey (associate)
Michael Manning (associate)
Joseph Neguse (associate)
BOUZARI FIRM
Kate Gerland
Louise Bouzari
Margaret Pfleuger
Danna Martin
Desiree Vandelae
Sean Steven
Hourly Rate
No. of Hours
Total
$530
$475
$220
$425
$425
$250
$290
$295
$225
$295
$280
$285
466.3
510.2
162.7
157.2
96.5
10.1
32.9
15.6
9
10
51.9
58.2
$247,059.00
$242,345.00
$35,794.00
$66,810.00
$41,012.50
$2,525.00
$9,541.00
$4,602.00
$2,025.00
$2,950.00
$14,532.00
$16,587.00
$285
$285
$275
$150
$125
$70
1,055.50
449.90
23.10
266.10
0.3
6.90
$300,319.50
$128,221.50
$6,352.50
$39,915.00
$37.50
$483.00
(ECF No. 367 at 17–18.)
1.
Hourly Rates
While Defendant does not dispute that the Bouzari Firm’s hourly rates are
reasonable, Defendant challenges Holland & Hart attorneys’ rates, arguing that they are
unreasonably high for the type of case at issue here. (ECF No. 395 at 5–7.) Defendant
4
also challenges the $220 hourly rate of Holland & Hart’s paralegal, Jill Nickerson, as
exorbitant. (Id. at 6–7.) Defendant first proposes reducing all of Holland & Hart’s rates
to the rates of the Bouzari firm. (Id. at 6.) Defendant then proposes that, “at most,” the
Court could apply the hourly rates proposed by J. Andrew Nathan, Defendant’s
attorneys’ fees expert, whose affidavit suggested reducing Ms. Witt’s rate to $400, Mr.
Abbott’s rate to $375, Mr. Bender and Ms. Gomez to $325, and the associate attorneys
to $240. (ECF No. 395-1 at 10.) These opinions are based in part on Mr. Nathan’s
understanding from Plaintiff’s filings that neither Ms. Witt nor Mr. Abbott have civil rights
litigation experience, despite their lengthy practice as civil litigators. (Id. at 9–10.) Mr.
Nathan also opines that Ms. Nickerson should be billed at $150 per hour, the sam e as
Ms. Martin, the Bouzari Firm’s paralegal. (Id. at 10–11.)
The Court believes Holland & Hart’s hourly rates to be excessive for this type of
case, but does not believe that they should be reduced to the same rates billed by the
Bouzari Firm. Indeed, the Bouzari Firm decided to associate with Holland & Hart in the
fall of 2010 precisely because it determined that it needed the assistance of more
experienced civil litigators and greater resources to take this case to trial. (ECF No. 367
at 7.) Thus, Plaintiff benefited substantially from the experience of Holland & Hart’s
litigators, particularly Ms. Witt and Mr. Abbott, without any loss from their relative lack of
experience in disability litigation, as the Bouzari Firm remained on the case as well.
While this created some overstaffing concerns, see infra Part II.A.2, it was reasonable
for Plaintiff to seek seasoned civil litigators to take her case to trial.
Nevertheless, the Court finds some of Holland & Hart’s rates to be well above
average based on the Court’s own experience and understanding of the Denver market,
5
and deems it reasonable to reduce these rates in accordance with the market for
litigating disability cases. Accordingly, the Court will reduce Ms. Witt’s billing rate to
$475 and Mr. Abbott’s to $425, the rate f or Mr. Bender and Ms. Gomez will be reduced
to $400, the rates for associates Ms. Collier, Mr. Crow, and Ms. Jeffrey will be reduced
to $265, and the rates for associates Mr. Manning and Mr. Neguse will be $260. The
Court also agrees that a billing rate of $220 is excessive for a paralegal, even a very
experienced one, and will reduce Ms. Nickerson’s rate to $190.
Applying these rates to the number of hours Plaintiff has billed results in a
reduced lodestar of $1,095,226. 3 As Defendant also challenges the number of hours
Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably expended, the Court will proceed to considering that issue.
2.
Number of Hours
Defendant makes several arguments that the number of hours Plaintiff’s
attorneys expended were unreasonable, the first of which is a “prevailing party”
argument. Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff originally brought seven claims in
this case, she only prevailed at trial on two claims, because the Court granted summary
judgment on the other five claims. (See ECF No. 395 at 7 (citing ECF No. 159).)
Defendant suggests that, as a result, Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees should be reduced by
29%, or two sevenths. (Id.) Defendant proposes that this is warranted because the
Court can reduce fee awards based on the degree of success. (Id. at 8.) The Court
rejects this argument out of hand. Defendant fails to cite any case in which a prevailing
3
In performing this calculation, the Court noticed a multiplication error in Plaintiff’s
calculation of the fees for Kate Gerland; $285 times 1,055.5 hours is $300,817.50, not
$300,319.50. (Contra ECF No. 367 at 18.) The Court has corrected this error in its
calculations.
6
party at trial had her fees reduced because some claims were lost years earlier on
summary judgment, rather than because the party only prevailed on some claims at
trial. (Cf. id. (citing Vialpando v. Johanns, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1128 (D. Colo.
2008)).) The Court therefore declines to follow Defendant’s novel suggestion.
However, Defendant raises other, more specific, challenges to Plaintiff’s billed
hours, several of which merit reductions in hours when calculating Plaintiff’s fee award.
Defendant largely relies on the opinions of Mr. Nathan and Lisa Mancini Saunders, who
performed an audit of Plaintiff’s billing invoices. (ECF No. 395-4.)
Based on these expert opinions, Defendant challenges certain time entries that
are “block billed.” (ECF No. 395 at 10–11.) “So-called block billing consists of
attorneys recording large blocks of time for tasks without separating the tasks into
individual blocks or elaborating on the amount of time each task took. Use of this rather
imprecise practice may be strong evidence that a claimed amount of fees is excessive.”
Flying J Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., 322 F. App’x 610, 617 (10th Cir. 2009).
However, the determination of whether a fee is excessive remains in the Court’s
discretion. Id. Ms. Saunders opined that “block billing” affected 1,029.5 hours, such
that she could not determine whether those hours might have been excessive. (ECF
No. 395-4 at 4.) She proposed that these tasks be reduced by 20–30%. (ECF No.
395-5 at 4.) Mr. Nathan also stated an opinion about block billing , opining that
“Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees should be reduced by between 20 and 30 percent
for block billing alone.” (ECF No. 395-1 at 7.) However, Mr. Nathan does not identify
the specific time entries he believes are block billed, and the Court is not persuaded
that an overall reduction is warranted on that basis.
7
Block billing is not impermissible, but it makes it more difficult to determine
whether the billed hours are reasonable. Cf. Flying J Inc., 322 F. App’x at 617 (10th
Cir. 2009) (holding that “the decision whether block billing indicates an unreasonable
claim should remain with the district court who should be allowed to exercise its
discretion accordingly”). The Court has reviewed the relevant entries, and agrees that
their lack of precision warrants a reduction of hours. Applying the Court’s reduced fee
rates to the 1,029.5 hours Ms. Saunders identif ied as block billed, these tasks account
for $309,880 in fees. Reducing this amount by 20%, which is at the low end of the
range of fee reduction called for by both of Defendant’s experts, amounts to a reduction
of $61,976 from the aggregate sum of block billed fees. This in turn results in a total
reduced fee for these tasks of $247,904, which the Court finds is reasonable.
Defendant next argues that the overstaffing of this case resulted in unnecessary
duplication of work, and meetings and conferences to update all of the different
attorneys working on the case. (ECF No. 395 at 12–13.) In Ms. Saunders’ report, she
identifies $28,067 worth of duplicative review of documents by multiple attorneys at the
same professional level, and $81,507.50 worth of communications among Holland &
Hart personnel, and between Holland & Hart and the Bouzari Firm (both amounts
calculated using Holland & Hart’s original hourly rates). (ECF No. 295-5 at 3.)
The Court has reviewed the time entries Ms. Saunders identified, and disagrees
that all of these time entries are superfluous. A natural consequence of co-counseling
relationships is the need to communicate and conference between co-counsel, and the
Court has already found that Plaintiff reasonably benefited from the use of co-counsel
here. Furthermore, most of the time entries that Ms. Saunders found to be duplicative
8
are not clearly so; for instance, several entries of both Ms. Bouzari and Ms. Gerland
that read “edited federal complaint” or “revised mediation statement” with some
intervening communications or research appear to reflect edits based on new
information or strategy decisions. (See, e.g., ECF No. 395–5 at 10–11, 14–15; see
also ECF No. 395-6 at 14–15, 22, 24, 36–38, 53, 65–67.) How ever, a few of these
duplicate entries appear without any intervening event or other apparent reason, and
the Court agrees that some such entries are duplicative and unnecessary for purposes
of the instant Fee Motion, including entries in which multiple attorneys attended a
conference and each billed for it as well as time spent conferring afterward. (See ECF
No. 395–5 at 16, 26, 35, 51–52, 54; ECF No. 395-6 at 19–20, 25–26, 33–35, 40–41.)
Accordingly, the Court will reduce the hours billed by Ms. Gerland, Ms. Bouzari, Ms.
Witt, Mr. Bender, and Ms. Gomez by 10 hours each to generally account for this
duplication. At these attorneys’ reduced billing rates, this amounts to a reduction of
$18,450.
Defendant argues that Ms. Nickerson’s assistance at trial, which amounted to
63.7 hours, was unnecessary and should be eliminated from the fee award. (ECF No.
395 at 14.) The Court disagrees. Ms. Nickerson was the only paralegal who billed on
this case during the trial phase, and she assisted trial counsel throughout the trial. The
Court declines to eliminate Ms. Nickerson’s trial hours.
Defendant also argues that a number of hours should be eliminated because
they dealt with elements of the case that were unsuccessful on summary judgment.
(ECF No. 395 at 14–16.) These include a large number of hours spent researching
Equal Protection and drafting the response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.)
9
The Court also declines to eliminate these hours from the fee award. Plaintiff’s claims,
though unsuccessful, were plausibly pled, and her complete and fully researched
response to Defendant’s arguments on summary judgment was reasonably warranted.
However, the Court is more sympathetic to Defendant’s argument that certain
tasks were repeated in Plaintiff’s pre-appeal and post-appeal phases of this case which
should not have required billing similar numbers of hours for both phases. (See id. at
16–17.) For example, drafting the pretrial order in Phase I took 24.9 hours, and 22.4
hours in Phase II; drafting motions in limine in Phase I took 20.3 hours, and 67.1 hours
in Phase II; drafting and revising jury instructions in Phase I took 15 hours, while in
Phase II—with significantly reduced numbers of claims—Plaintiff billed 15.4 hours.
(See ECF No. 395–4 at 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel argue that they exercised billing judgment
in this case to eliminate as much as possible duplication of tasks to compensate for
these two phases and to eliminate time spent on the unsuccessful appeal. (ECF No.
367 at 12–15.) Indeed, counsel specif ically refers to the jury instructions, noting that “a
larger proportion of Phase I time has been excluded because the original jury
instructions also pertained to the dismissed claims.” (Id. at 15.) However, counsel also
admits that Plaintiff “entered Phase II with [] nearly final exhibits, jury instructions on the
remaining claims, . . . and motions in limine.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel does not explain
how, then, they were still required to spend 67.1 hours on the “nearly final” motions in
limine in Phase II.
The Court agrees that, given Plaintiff’s admission that these documents were
nearly complete, these hours are duplicative, and will therefore reduce the number of
10
hours by 40 hours at Ms. Gerland’s rate for the pretrial order and motions in limine, and
15 hours at Mr. Abbott’s rate for the jury instructions.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s use of a trial consultant which
performed a mock trial and consulted on jury selection was unnecessary and
duplicative. (ECF No. 395 at 17–18.) Defendant argues that this case was not so
complex as to require a consultant, and that in any event, Holland & Hart was brought
onto the case by the Bouzari Firm precisely for its trial experience such that working
with such additional personnel was unnecessary and merely for counsel’s convenience.
(Id.) The Court disagrees that the trial consultant was completely unnecessary and
duplicative, but finds that the 90.4 attorney hours billed by Holland & Hart for working
with the consultant is similar to the above examples of duplicative billing. That is, if trial
consultants are like additional attorneys who specialize in trials, Holland & Hart should
not be fully compensated both for the expense of those additional personnel as well as
for their own time in consulting with them. The Court concludes that the attorney time
spent working with the trial consultant should be reduced by half, and will therefore
subtract 45 hours at Mr. Abbott’s rate from the lodestar, in the amount of $19,125.
3.
Summary
For the reasons articulated above, the Court has reduced both Plaintiff’s
attorneys’ hourly rates and the number of hours billed to them. The resulting amount is
$977,900, which the Court deems a reasonable fee for this case.
B.
Costs
In addition to the $5,836.65 in costs already taxed by the Clerk of Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (ECF No. 385), Plaintiff’s Cost Motion seeks reimbursement of
11
additional expenses in the amount of $157,751.34 pursuant to the provisions of the
ADA and § 504. 4 (ECF No. 387.) Defendant agrees that a reasonable award of
expenses beyond the taxable costs under § 1920 is within the Court’s discretion. (ECF
No. 395 at 19.) However, Defendant challenges several of the particular expenses
Plaintiff seeks. (Id. at 19–25.)
Defendant again cites the Affidavit of Ms. Saunders, who opined that Plaintiff’s
expenses should be reduced by a minimum of $20,478.55 because “those charges do
not fall within generally accepted billing practices.” (ECF No. 395-4 at 2–3.) As part of
this proposed reduction, Ms. Saunders recommends eliminating $20,201.84 in Westlaw
expense charges, which she opines should be considered overhead of the firm and
should be eliminated in their entirety. (ECF No. 395-5 at 4.) Plaintiff disputes this
number, stating that the Westlaw expenses for which reimbursement is requested
totalled only $16,265.32, as Plaintiff exercised billing judgment and reduced her total
legal research costs by half to address redundancies between the two phases of this
case. (ECF No. 398 at 9.)
While the case law is inconsistent on whether legal research should be
considered overhead or may be billed in its entirety, the Court follows the Tenth
Circuit’s admonition in Case that research expenses intended “to familiarize the
4
Plaintiff’s briefing on this issue in the Fee Motion requests a total of $163,658.98 in
costs, but cites only Plaintiff’s Proposed Bill of Costs in support of this number. (ECF No. 367
at 20 (citing ECF No. 366).) The Proposed Bill of Costs requests $70.99 less than the number
in the Fee Motion, for a total of $163,587.99. (ECF No. 366 at 1.) Plaintiff’s Cost Motion does
not explicitly adopt either of these numbers, and just refers to “approximately $163,000.” (ECF
No. 387 at 1.) Because Plaintiff has not identified the source of the additional $70.99 expense,
the Court has used the lower number provided in the Proposed Bill of Costs.
12
attorney with the area of law would normally be absorbed into a firm’s overhead and
that, therefore, attempting to charge an adversary with time spent conducting
background research is presumptively unreasonable.” Case, 157 F.3d at 1253. In this
case, the Westlaw expenses for both firms note the date and price but do not indicate
the individual conducting the research or the subject, and only some of these entries
can be cross-referenced to attorney time entries noting the subject of the research.
Because of the ambiguity of these entries, the Court cannot determine whether many of
them were merely “background research,” or whether the subject matter was related to
the prevailing claims in this case as opposed to those claims not ultimately tried. See
id. at 1258 (affirming trial court’s reduction by half of Westlaw expenses in civil rights
case, where billing statements failed to separate research related to prevailing claims
from research related to claims lost).
The Court therefore concludes that it is reasonable to reduce Plaintif f’s
reimbursement for Westlaw expenses. Because Defendant relied on a calculation of
these expenses that totaled $20,478.55, the Court will award half of that amount, or
$10,239.28.
Defendant challenges numerous other billed expenses, including $100 for
service of summons and complaint on an individual defendant who was dismissed on
summary judgment; $1,724.95 for transcripts from two hearings regarding Defendant’s
expert testimony; $1,212.41 for exemplification and copies of documents; and
$5,104.50 for preparation of trial graphics. (ECF No. 395 at 19–22.) The Court finds
that each of these amounts is compensable because each was reasonably necessary
to litigate this case and prepare for trial.
13
However, Defendant points to several other expenses sought by Plaintiff that the
Court agrees are not compensable. Plaintiff seeks $549.40 in witness fees and
mileage for three witnesses who were listed on Plaintiff’s “may call” list but were not
called, and $4,335.80 for fees paid to, and a deposition of, an expert on Plaintiff’s
broken arm who was not called at trial because Plaintiff elected not to introduce
evidence of the broken arm. These witnesses were not called because of Plaintiff’s
strategic or tactical decisions, not because of prior rulings made by the Court, and the
Court declines to award these expenses. However, the Court will reimburse Plaintiff for
the deposition costs and expert fees for other witnesses, even where they were not
called at trial. Plaintiff’s investigation into these witnesses’ knowledge was reasonably
necessary to support the claims that went to trial, and Defendant does not claim that
these witnesses were irrelevant or that their depositions were otherwise unnecessary.
The Court also agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff should not recover her
portion of fees for a mediation, which the parties previously agreed to split. (See ECF
No. 395 at 24–25.) Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s characterization of this
mediation. Accordingly, the Court declines to award the $553.13 Plaintiff expended
there. (See ECF No. 366-15 at 3.) However, the remaining “miscellaneous” costs
(postage, courier, and supplies) of $209.01 will be awarded, as will the $975.70 in travel
and lodging costs for depositions and $140 for service of process, as these were all
reasonably necessary in taking this case to trial.
Finally, Defendant disputes the $45,653.50 in expenses for trial consultants and
mock trial, arguing that this amount is duplicative of the time Plaintiff’s attorneys billed
for the same preparation. The Court discussed this issue above in reducing Plaintiff’s
14
attorneys’ billable time for working with these trial consultants, and agrees that
Defendant’s arguments have merit. As this case was already well-staffed for Plaintiff,
the Court finds the amount spent for costs and expenses related to trial consultants to
be excessive. Accordingly, as the Court did with the billed time Plaintiff’s attorneys
spent on trial consulting and the mock trial, the Court will reduce the requested amount
by half and will reimburse $22,826.75.
In total, and after considering the $5,836.65 in costs already taxed, Plaintiff shall
be awarded an additional $123,460.22 in expenses.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (ECF No. 367) and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Review of Clerk’s Action on Taxation of Costs (ECF No. 387) are each
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
2.
Plaintiff is AWARDED attorneys’ fees in the amount of $977,900.00 and
reimbursement of additional expenses in the amount of $123,460.22. The Clerk
shall enter judgment accordingly.
Dated this 22nd day of March, 2016.
BY THE COURT:
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge
15
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