Schwartz et al v. Booker et al
Filing
84
ORDER granting 76 Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiffs Complaint; Plaintiffs proposed Amended Complaint 82 is accepted as filed; denying as moot 41 Defendants Motion for Reconsideration ; Not later than June 29, 2011, the parties are to jointly contact Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoyas chambers regarding the prompt setting of a scheduling conference. by Judge William J. Martinez on 6/28/2011.(erv, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 09-cv-00915-WJM-KMT
MELISSA R. SCHWARTZ, as Personal Representative and Administrator of the Estate
of CHANDLER GRAFNER, deceased;
CHRISTINA GRAFNER; and
JOSHUA NORRIS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARGARET BOOKER, in her Individual Capacity; and
MARY PEAGLER, in her Individual Capacity,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO AMEND AND DENYING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO RECONSIDER AS MOOT
In this civil rights case, Plaintiffs Melissa Schwartz, as personal representative
and administrator of the estate of Chandler Grafner, Christina Grafner, and Joshua
Norris (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring claims arising out of the death of Chandler Grafner
while in foster care against Defendants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler in their
individual capacities.1
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Plaintiffs originally brought claims against Peagler and Booker in their official
capacities as well as claims against Jefferson County Department of Human Services and
Denver County Department of Human Services. The Court dismissed these claims based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF No. 71.)
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 29, 2009. (ECF No. 1.) On May 21, 2009,
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that Plaintiffs’ Complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted or, in the alternative, that Defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiffs responded that they could not
oppose the Motion to Dismiss without some discovery. (ECF No. 15.) The Court
agreed and allowed Plaintiffs to conduct discovery limited to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. (ECF No. 35.) The Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss without
prejudice to refiling after the limited discovery was complete. All other discovery was
stayed; no scheduling order has entered in this case. (ECF No. 28.)
On April 15, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Reconsider the denial of their
Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 41.) Defendants argued that their Motion to Dismiss did
not involve Eleventh Amendment immunity2 so should not have been denied pending
discovery. After some delay, the Court held oral argument on the Motion to Reconsider
and ordered Plaintiffs to file a substantive response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 74.) Plaintiffs’ response was filed on May 25, 2011 along with a Motion to
Amend seeking leave to amend their Complaint to address the arguments raised in the
Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 75 & 76.)
Before the Court are: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider the denial of their
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 41); and (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend (ECF No. 76).
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The now-dismissed County Defendants had both filed Motions to Dismiss in which the
central issue was whether they were entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
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I. MOTION TO AMEND
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that, after a responsive pleading
has been served, a party may amend its pleading “only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party.” The Rule specifies that “leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.” The purpose of the Rule is to provide litigants “the maximum
opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural
niceties.” Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 456 (10th Cir. 1982).
In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), the Supreme Court held:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a
plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be
afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the
absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the
rules require, be “freely given.”
Id. at 182 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)); see also Duncan v. Manager, Dept. of Safety,
397 F.3d 1300, 1315 (10th Cir. 2005); Frank v. U.S. West, 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir.
1993).
Defendants oppose the Motion to Amend arguing that Plaintiffs waited over two
years before seeking leave to amend and therefore any amendment would be untimely
and is sought in bad faith. (ECF No. 81.) Defendants also argue that amendment
would be futile because the proposed Amended Complaint contains the same seventythree “Factual Allegations” as appear in the original Complaint. (Id. at 4-5.)
The Court acknowledges that this case has been pending for over two years and
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that Plaintiffs have only recently moved to amend their pleading. However, with the
exception of discovery limited to Eleventh Amendment immunity issues—which are not
relevant to the remaining Defendants—there has been no activity in this case. The
case is in its infancy procedurally and, despite the passage of time, Defendants cannot
show any prejudice that would result from allowing amendment of the complaint.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking leave to amend their claims is not
the result of undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive. Rather, Plaintiffs seek to amend
their claims to include additional factual allegations in response to the arguments raised
in the Motion to Dismiss. Though the proposed Amended Complaint contains the same
seventy-three “Factual Allegations” as appeared in the original Complaint, other
portions of the Amended Complaint allege more detailed facts regarding actions taken
(or not taken) by Defendants Booker and Peagler. (See ECF No. 82 ¶¶ 118-291.)
These factual allegations address a number of arguments raised by Defendants in the
Motion to Dismiss and respond to concerns expressed by the Court at oral argument.
Therefore, the Court finds that amendment of the complaint serves a legitimate purpose
and would not be futile.
Given the liberal policy in favor of amendment and the absence of prejudice to
Defendants in this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs should be given leave to amend
their claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiffs’ Complaint is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint (ECF No. 82) is accepted as filed.
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II. MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider argues that the Court’s denial of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss was in error. Defendants Motion to Dismiss argued that Plaintiffs’
original Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it
lacked sufficient factual allegations regarding Defendants’ role in the alleged
constitutional violations. (ECF No. 13.)
The Court has now granted Plaintiffs’ request for leave to file an Amended
Complaint. This Amended Complaint supercedes the original Complaint and is now the
operative pleading in the case. See Mohammed v. Holder, 2009 WL 529549, *3 (D.
Colo. March 2, 2009) (amended complaint supercedes original complaint for purposes
of consideration of motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). Because the Motion to
Dismiss is mooted by the filing of the Amended Complaint, see Howeth v. Aramark
Corp., 2011 WL 1428087, *2 (D. Utah April 13, 2011) (motion to dismiss pursuant to
12(b)(6) is moot when complaint has been amended), the Court finds that the Motion to
Reconsider is now similarly moot with the filing of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS the following:
1.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF No. 76) is
GRANTED;
2.
Plaintiffs’ proposed Amended Complaint (ECF No. 82) is accepted as filed
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as of the date of this Order;
3.
Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint on or before July 18, 2011;
3.
Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider (ECF No. 41) is DENIED as moot; and
4.
Not later than June 29, 2011, the parties are to jointly contact Magistrate
Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya’s chambers regarding the prompt setting of a
scheduling conference.
Dated this 28th day of June, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge
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