Miranda v. Astrue

Filing 21

ORDER. Determination that plaintiff is not disabled is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, by Judge William J. Martinez on 4/18/11. (gmssl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 09-cv-02297-WJM
REBECCA MIRANDA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Defendant.

ORDER REVERSING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION
AND REMANDING CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

This is a social security benefits appeal brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Plaintiff Rebecca Miranda (“Plaintiff”) challenges the final decision of Defendant, the
Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant or Commissioner), denying her
applications for social security disability benefits and supplemental security income.
The denial was affirmed by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who ruled Plaintiff was
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (Act).
I. BACKGROUND
In 2006, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income, alleging disability as of November 25, 2006, when she
was 41 years old.1 She claimed disability due to herniated discs, knee problems, and

1

(Administrative Record “R.” at 101-111.)

degenerative disc disease.2 Plaintiff has a high school equivalency GED3 and has
worked in the past as a housekeeping cleaner and head or supervisory housekeeper.4
Plaintiff’s applications were denied on June 5, 2007.5 Her claim was heard by an
ALJ on August 20, 2008.6 Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE), Marin L. Rauer,
testified at the hearing.
On December 23, 2008, the ALJ issued a written decision in accordance with the
Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation process.7 At step one, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 25, 2006.
At step two, he found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, and obesity. At step three, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s impairments, while severe, did not meet any of the impairments listed in the
social security regulations. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual

2

(Id. at 73-78.)

3

(Id. at 68, 137.)

4

(Id. at 68, 132, 150.)

5

(Id. at 75-78.)

6

(Id. at 33, 40-72)

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The five-step process requires the ALJ consider whether a claimant: (1) engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment;
(3) had a condition which met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could return to
her past relevant work; and, if not, (5) could perform other work in the national economy. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir.
1988.) The claimant has the burden of proof through steps one to four; the Social Security
Administration has the burden of proof at step five. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th
Cir. 2007).

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functional capacity (RFC) to perform “light work” as defined in the regulations, except
she could lift 15 pounds frequently and 25 pounds occasionally and would need to
change positions approximately every two hours. Given this RFC, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a housekeeping cleaner and
supervisory housekeeper.8 Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Act and, thus, not entitled to benefits. The Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review on May 7, 2009.9 Plaintiff then filed this action
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision.
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether substantial

evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). Evidence is not
substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record. Grogan v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 1257, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision,
the Court may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the

8

(R. at 36-38.)

9

(Id. at 31-33.)

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agency. Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 2006) “On the other hand, if
the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a
lack of substantial evidence.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir.
1993).
B.

Analysis
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred: (1) by failing to properly evaluate the opinions of

Plaintiff’s treating physicians; (2) by not finding that Plaintiff's bilateral patellofemoral
syndrome was a severe impairment; (3) by failing to properly assess Plaintiff’s
credibility, i.e., in discrediting Plaintiff’s complaints of pain and fatigue; and (4) by failing
to properly assess Plaintiff’s RFC.
Plaintiff’s treating physicians were Doctors Suzanne and Jay Ciotti. They treated
Plaintiff at Cottonwood Holistic Family Health in Durango, Colorado, from 2003 through
November 2006.10 The record reflects that at various times in 2006, including on
November 20–just five days before the alleged onset date–these doctors imposed work
restrictions on Plaintiff, and in particular, that she not lift more than five pounds and that
she avoid stooping and bending.11
These restrictions should have been discussed in the ALJ’s assessment of
Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ, however, failed to do that. Indeed, the ALJ condensed
Plaintiff’s relationship with these doctors to thirty-two words: “During the relevant period

10

(R. at 134, 204-245.)

11

(R. at 206, 240-244.)

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the various conservative measures were provided. Generally unremarkable findings
were reflected in the treatment notes; occasional tenderness was noted but no deficits
in range or motion were apparent.”12 That will not do. The Court cannot tell whether the
ALJ overlooked these restrictions, ignored them altogether, or what weight, if any, he
gave them. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 2003); see also SSR
96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (July 2, 1996) (the ALJ’s decision must be sufficiently
specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewer the weight that was given to a
medical opinion).
Moreover, given the RFC, it appears the ALJ rejected these restrictions.
Whereas these two treating physicians restricted Plaintiff to lifting only five pounds, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff could lift 15 pounds frequently and 25 pounds
occasionally.13 The ALJ is required to give specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting a
treating doctor’s opinion. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301. Here, the ALJ gave none, and
this omission is particularly problematic given the degree to which the ALJ’s RFC
determination conflicted with the medical opinion of physicians who had treated Plaintiff
for a period of more than three years.
Defendant, for his part, does give reasons for the ALJ’s implicit rejection of these
restrictions. He suggests, for example, that the ALJ properly rejected these restrictions

12

(R. at 37.)

13

(R. at 206, 240-244.)

5

because the restrictions were temporary.14 That may be true. 15 That, however, does
not excuse ignoring them. See id. Moreover, Defendant is engaging in the type of posthoc rationalization for an ALJ’s decision that the Tenth Circuit eschews. Grogan v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005) (“the district court may not create
post-hoc rationalizations to explain the Commissioner’s treatment of evidence when that
treatment is not apparent from the Commissioner’s decision itself.”).
Given the ALJ’s lack of analysis, the Court cannot meaningfully review the ALJ’s
decision. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed and remanded. On
remand, the ALJ is directed to properly address the opinions and findings of Plaintiff’s
treating physicians in accordance with the framework described in Watkins v. Barnhart,
350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927.
If necessary, the ALJ should recontact these physicians and supplement the
record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e); see also McGoffin v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248,
1252 (10th Cir. 2002). Doing so would provide an opportunity for the ALJ to reassess
the totality of evidence in connection with Plaintiff’s claims. In light of this possibility, the
Court will not address Plaintiff’s remaining contentions, i.e., that the ALJ failed to
consider Plaintiff’s bilateral patellofemoral syndrome, failed to properly account for all of
Plaintiff’s limitations when calculating Plaintiff’s RFC, and improperly assessed Plaintiff's
credibility. Cf. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1299 (“We will not reach the remaining issues

14

(ECF No. 13 at 17.)

15

(See e.g., R. at 206.)

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raised by appellant because they may be affected by the ALJ’s treatment of this case on
remand.”).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on its review of the record in this case, the Court finds that the ALJ erred
by not properly addressing the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. Accordingly,
the determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is REVERSED and this matter is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Dated this 18th day of April, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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