Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition et al v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. et al
Filing
200
ORDER. ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Entry of Injunction, and Entry of Judgment, filed April 27, 2012 162 is GRANTED. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or, In the Alternative, To Vacate August 31, 2011 Ord er 164 is DENIED. ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer before March 15, 2013, to attempt to craft an injunction/remedy that is mutually agreeable to both parties. If the parties can reach agreement on the contents of a proposed injunc tion, they shall jointly file the proposed injunction not later than April 19, 2013. If the parties are not able to reach agreement, Plaintiffs shall file a proposed injunction and Defendants shall have 15 days to respond by Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 03/07/13. (jjhsl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Senior District Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
Civil Action No. 09-cv-02757-WYD-KMT
COLORADO CROSS-DISABILITY COALITION, a Colorado non-profit corporation;
ANITA HANSEN; and
JULIE FARRAR, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH CO., et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
I.
BACKGROUND
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, Entry of Injunction, and Entry of Judgment, filed April 27, 2012 [ECF No.
162], and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment or, In the Alternative, To Vacate
August 31, 2011 Order [ECF No. 164]. The motions have been fully briefed by the
parties and the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has filed its Statement of
Interest On the Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment (“Statement of Interest”). [ECF
No. 181]. Based on these briefs and oral argument to the Court on January 24, 2013, I
grant Plaintiffs’ motion and deny Defendants’ motion as more fully set forth below.
Plaintiffs, a class of individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility,
challenge the raised porch entrances at approximately 248 Hollister brand stores
operated by Defendant Abercrombie & Fitch Stores LLC. On August 31, 2011, this
Court held that the raised porch entrances at two stores in Colorado were in violation of
section 4.1.3(8) of the 1991 Department of Justice Standards for Accessible Design
(“1991 Standards”), 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. D (2012), and therefore of Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). Colo. Cross-Disability
Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 835 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (D. Colo. 2011). [ECF
No. 109.] On April 20, 2012, this Court certified a class defined as follows:
all people with disabilities who use wheelchairs for mobility who, during the
two years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this case, were denied the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any Hollister Co. Store in the United
States on the basis of disability because of the presence of an Elevated
Entrance.
Colo. Cross-Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 2012 WL 1378531, at * 1, 7 (D.
Colo. Apr. 20, 2012). [ECF No. 161.]
Following certification of the class, Plaintiffs moved to extend the summary
judgment holding to the remainder of the Hollister stores with Raised Porch Entrances.
Defendants simultaneously moved for summary judgment and/or to vacate the Court’s
August 31, 2011 order on the grounds that they had made modifications to the
remaining open store visited by the Representative Plaintiffs, and that the stores in
question were in compliance with the 2010 DOJ Standards for Accessible Design (“2010
Standards”).1 It is these motions that are currently before the Court.
1
The 2010 Standards consist of the 2004 ADAAG, 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191,
apps. B & D, and subpart D of 28 C.F.R. pt. 36. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (definitions).
The 2010 Standards and the DOJ’s guidance thereto are published on the Department’s
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II.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Defendant Abercrombie & Fitch Co., through subsidiaries Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc., and JM Hollister, LLC, (collectively “Defendants”), operates
approximately 500 Hollister brand stores around the country. See Defs.’ Mot. for
Summ. J. or, In the Alternative, to Vacate August 31, 2011 Order [ECF No. 164 at ¶ 1].
2.
Plaintiffs Julie Farrar and Anita Hansen (the “Representative Plaintiffs”)
are individuals who live in the Denver area. Both are substantially limited in the major
life activity of walking, and both use wheelchairs for mobility.
3.
Plaintiff Colorado Cross Disability Coalition (“CCDC”) is a Colorado non-
profit that advocates for the rights of individuals with disabilities and their allies.
4.
The front areas of approximately 248 of the Hollister stores around the
country are configured similarly. They contain a raised front porch that leads to two
possible store entrances: one to the “Dudes” side, containing men’s clothing, and the
other to the “Bettys” side, containing women’s. Steps lead up to the porch from the mall
floor and then down from the porch into the two sides of the store. Decl. of Amy F.
Robertson in Support of Summary Judgment, Entry of Injunction, and Entry of
Judgment, Ex. 7 (“Robertson Decl.”) [ECF No. 172, 172-1 through -3], Defs.’ Combined
Opp’n to Pls’ Amd. and Supplemented Mot. for Summ. J. and Reply Brief in Supp. of
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Combined Opp’n”) at ii ¶ 2 [ECF No. 179]. These
porches, which will be referred to herein as “Raised Porch Entrances,” are accessible
website. http://www.ada.gov/2010ADAstandards_index.htm
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only by steps, and are therefore inaccessible to people who use wheelchairs.
Robertson Decl. Ex. 7; Defs.’ Combined Opp’n at iv ¶ 12.
5.
The purpose of this Raised Porch Entrance “is to give the stores the
aesthetic appearance of a Southern California surf shack . . . .” Decl. of Michael Bondy
(“Bondy Decl.”) [ECF No. 164-1] ¶ 4.2 As such, the Raised Porch Entrance “is a
significant aspect of the stores’ branding and marketing efforts.” Decl. of Adam Hill (“Hill
Decl.”) [ECF No. 93-2] ¶ 8;3 Def’s Combined Opp’n at ii, ¶ 3. The Raised Porch
Entrance was included in the design “to create . . . an entry to a house in southern
California that you would walk up onto the porch or walk down into the porch, to enter
like you would do at a beach house.” Hill Dep. 37:9 - 22; see also id. at 30:15 - 31:15;
33:19 - 34:7 (Robertson Decl. Ex. 5 [ECF No. 171-2]).
6.
The Raised Porch Entrances at Hollister stores have upholstered chairs, a
marketing image, and mannequins displaying merchandise. Bondy Dep. 54:9 - 55:3
(Robertson Decl. Ex. 4). While the furniture is not intended as seating, customers are
permitted to sit there. See id. 55:14 - 56:1. Where the porch is raised, i.e., at the
approximately 248 Hollister stores at issue here, customers in wheelchairs do not “have
the ability to touch or feel the clothes” on display there or otherwise take part in this
Hollister experience. See id. 58:19 - 59:2.
2
Michael Bondy is the Senior Project Manager in the Store Construction
Department of Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. Bondy Decl. ¶ 1.
3
Adam Hill is Abercrombie & Fitch Co.’s Vice President of Store Design.
Hill Dep. 19:21 - 20:2.
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7.
Shoppers who use wheelchairs are not able to enter the stores through
the Raised Porch Entrances. Rather, they enter through accessible doors -- on the
same level as the mall floor -- to each side of the Raised Porch Entrance. The
accessible side entrances are designed to look like French doors similar to the
inoperable French doors farther to the left and right of the accessible side entrances.
Hill Dep. 107:2 - 108:10.
8.
Overall, the visual impression is of a main, decorated, primary but
inaccessible entrance in the center, with smaller, inferior, undecorated accessible
entrances to each side.
9.
All of the Hollister stores at issue were constructed after January 26, 1993
but before September 15, 2010. Robertson Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 [ECF No. 171-2].
10.
Representative Plaintiffs have patronized the Hollister stores at the
Orchard Towne Center and Park Meadows malls in the Denver area. Both have
experienced discrimination at those stores, and both have expressed intent to return to
the Park Meadows store. See Order [ECF No. 161] at 9-10.
11.
The Orchard Towne Center Hollister store is now closed. Bondy Decl. ¶ 8.
12.
Following this Court’s decisions granting partial summary judgment to
Plaintiffs and certifying a nationwide class, Defendants made two changes to the Park
Meadows Hollister store. Signage has been added at each accessible side entrance
indicating whether it enters into the “Dudes” side of the store (displaying men’s clothing)
or the “Bettys” side of the store (displaying women’s clothing). In addition, operable
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door handles have been added (in addition to the push buttons) to each of these
accessible doors. Bondy Decl. ¶ 10.
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may
grant summary judgment where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184,
1190 (10th Cir. 2000). “When applying this standard, [the court] must ‘view the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.’” Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita,
226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). All doubts must be resolved in
favor of the existence of triable issues of fact. Boren v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 891,
892 (10th Cir. 1991).
B.
Standing
This Court has previously held that the Representative Plaintiffs have standing to
challenge the Raised Porch Entrances under Title III of the ADA. Order [ECF No. 94] at
5-8 (denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing); Order [ECF No. 161]
at 9-11 (holding, as part of the typicality analysis for class certification, that the
Representative Plaintiffs had standing). Defendants argue that I must now reconsider
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the Representative Plaintiffs’ standing under a summary judgment standard, based on
evidence rather than pleadings. My determination in the class certification order was,
however, based on the same evidence Defendants now submit. I reaffirm my
conclusion that the Representative Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Raised
Porch Entrances.
Defendants make two further arguments: that there is no evidence that the
Representative Plaintiffs have returned to a Hollister store since Defendants added
signage and door handles; and that Plaintiffs have not identified a Representative
Plaintiff or class member with standing as to every store with a Raised Porch Entrance.
I will address each argument in turn.
1.
Recent Changes
Defendants argue that the Representative Plaintiffs lack standing because they
have not returned to that store since the changes were made.4 However, the changes
at the Park Meadows store -- signage and door handles on the entrances to the sides of
the Raised Porch Entrances, see supra -- are not material to the discrimination alleged
or the injury suffered when the Representative Plaintiffs go to the store and encounter
the inaccessible Raised Porch Entrance. Because the Representative Plaintiffs have
encountered and will continue to encounter discrimination at the Park Meadows store,
4
Defendants argue that since the Orchard Towne Center Hollister store is
now closed, the case is moot as to that store. However characterized, any injunction
will not cover closed stores.
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they have standing regardless of whether they have attempted to visit since the recent
changes.
2.
Standing to Challenge Hollister Stores Nationwide
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs must establish individual standing with
respect to each Hollister store covered by the class definition. This is not required.
Now that the Court has certified the class, the question with respect to the remaining
stores is whether the class has standing. There is no question that it does, as it was
defined to include individuals who use wheelchairs who “were denied the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
of any Hollister Co. Store in the United States on the basis of disability because of the
presence of an Elevated Entrance.” Order [ECF No. 161] at 2. That is, the class is
precisely those individuals who have standing to challenge the steps at Hollister stores
nationwide.
“[A] certified class becomes an independent juridical entity capable of satisfying
the standing requirements of Article III.” Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590
F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2009). Once the court has determined that the
Representative Plaintiffs have individual standing and that they satisfy the commonality
and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a), the class -- once certified -- has standing to
challenge the violations encompassed within the class definition. For example, in Lucas
v. Kmart Corp., 2005 WL 1648182 (D. Colo. July 13, 2005), the plaintiffs sought
certification of a nationwide class under Title III of the ADA challenging barriers to
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wheelchair access at 1,500 Kmart stores. Judge Kane held that Kmart’s “objection
regarding representative Plaintiffs’ standing to assert claims on behalf of individuals who
patronized other Kmart stores is subsumed by my determination that the Rule 23(a)
prerequisites have been met.” Id. at *3; see also Campion v. Old Republic Home Prot.
Co., Inc., 272 F.R.D. 517, 525-26 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“Generally standing in a class action
is assessed solely with respect to class representatives, not unnamed members of the
class. It is not required that each member of a class submit evidence of personal
standing.” (internal citations omitted).)
In making this argument, Defendants cite only to non-class cases holding that
individuals or organizations were required to establish standing with respect to each
facility they challenged. However, it is precisely the fact that the class satisfies Rule
23(a) -- an element missing from all of Defendants’ cases -- that provides class standing
to challenge all of the Hollister stores within the class definition.
Were Plaintiffs required to identify a named plaintiff or class member with
standing as to each store within the class definition, this would convert the case from a
class action to a massive individual action, defeating the efficiencies of Rule 23.
See 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 2:3 (5th ed.) (“[I]f class members other than the
named plaintiffs were required to submit evidence of their standing, then the core
function of class actions, wherein named plaintiffs represent a passive group of class
members, would be significantly compromised.”). It would also significantly undermine
Rule 23(b)(2)’s historic function as a tool to challenge discrimination that affects a class
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of people in the same way. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614
(1997) (“Civil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based
discrimination are prime examples” of Rule 23(b)(2) classes (quoting Adv. Comm.
Notes, 28 U.S.C. App., at 697)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558
(2011) (Rule 23(b)(2) “reflects a series of decisions involving challenges to racial
segregation -- conduct that was remedied by a single classwide order”).
C.
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by those who
own or operate places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). In enacting the
ADA, Congress found that “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). The ADA’s legislative history
states that “[i]ntegration is fundamental to the purposes of the ADA. Provision of
segregated accommodations and services relegate persons with disabilities to
second-class citizen status.” H. Rep. 101-485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess, at 56,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 479. “‘[T]he goal [is to] eradicat[e] the “invisibility of
the handicapped.”’ Separate-but-equal services do not accomplish this central goal and
should be rejected.” Id. at 50, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 473. The ADA provides a “broad
mandate” to “eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them
‘into the economic and social mainstream of American life.’” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,
532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, p. 50 (1990), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332).
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This integration mandate is found in two sections of the statute. Title III makes it
discriminatory to provide individuals with disabilities “with a good, service,
facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate from that
provided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary” to provide facilities,
accommodations and the like that are as effective as those provided others. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii). It also requires that “[g]oods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in
the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.”
Id., § 12182(b)(1)(B).
Section 303 of the ADA required that all facilities designed and constructed after
January 26, 1993 must be “readily accessible to and useable by” individuals with
disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). The statute further instructed the DOJ to adopt
implementing standards and regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). On July 26, 1991, the
DOJ adopted the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines as the 1991
Standards. 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a) (1991). The 1991 Standards are now published as
Appendix D to title 28, part 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations. On September 15,
2010, the DOJ amended its regulations and adopted the 2010 Standards.
See supra n. 1.
Because the stores at issue in this case were constructed after January 26, 1993
but before September 15, 2010, they are required to comply with the 1991 Standards.
28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a)(1) (2012). The only exception to this requirement is that, if the
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2010 Standards “reduce the technical requirements or the number of required
accessible elements below the number required by the 1991 Standards,” the newer
standards apply. 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(c) (2012).
1.
The 1991 Standards
The 1991 Standards required that at least 50% of all public entrances be
accessible and that, “[w]here feasible, accessible entrances shall be the entrances used
by the majority of people visiting or working in the building.” Id. § 4.1.3(8)(a). This
Court has previously held that, by requiring individuals with disabilities to enter through
the side entrances, the Raised Porch Entrances violated this provision and therefore
Title III of the ADA. Colo. Cross-Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 835 F.
Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (D. Colo. 2011) [ECF. No. 109]. The combination of the
inaccessible Raised Porch Entrance and the side accessible entrances also violates
sections 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 12182(b)(1)(B), because it provides separate facilities
and does not provide an integrated setting for people with disabilities.
2.
The 2010 Standards
The 2010 Standards require that 60% of all public entrances be accessible. Id.
§ 206.4.1. This section -- unlike the 1991 Standards’ section governing the percentage
of entrances required to be accessible -- does not contain the “majority of the people”
language. Defendants argue that this therefore “reduce[s] the technical requirements”
of the 1991 Standards so that, by operation of 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(c), Hollister stores
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need only comply with the 2010 Standards. Defendants further argue that they comply
with the 2010 Standards. The Court will examine each of those arguments in turn.
a.
The 1991 and 2010 Standards Governing Entrances
While Defendants are correct that the “majority of the people” language from
section 4.1.3(8)(a) of the 1991 Standards is not present in the 2010 Standards, see id.
§ 206.4.1, that difference does not thereby “reduce the technical requirements” of the
1991 Standards governing entrances. The DOJ commentary to section 206.4.1 states
that that section was designed to clarify the number of required accessible entrances,
and was “intended to achieve the same result as the 1991 Standards.” Analysis and
Commentary on the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app.
B at 824 (2012). As the DOJ explained in its Statement of Interest:
Defendants’ argument [that their raised porches comply with the 2010
Standards] is misplaced. Many changes were made in the 2010
Standards after a section by section review of the 1991 Standards. The
changes clarified and simplified the 2010 Standards as compared to the
1991 Standards. One of the significant goals of the changes was to
eliminate duplication or overlap in Federal accessibility guidelines, as well
as to harmonize the 2010 Standards with model codes that are the basis
of many State and local building codes. See Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial
Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,245-46 (Sept. 15, 2010).
The Department of Justice’s interpretive guidance accompanying
the 2010 Standards specifically states that the revision regarding
accessible public entrances is intended to achieve the same result as the
1991 Standards. Consequently, this Court’s holding that the raised
porches failed to comply with the 1991 Standards compels the conclusion
that they also violate the 2010 Standards.
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Id. at 2-3. This guidance is entitled to deference because it represents the DOJ’s
authoritative interpretation of its own regulations. As the Supreme Court has held, an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (citation
omitted); accord Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011); Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give substantial
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”).
The Raised Porch Entrances continue to violate the 2010 Standards governing
entrances.5 This interpretation is not only consistent with the agency’s interpretation of
its own regulations, it is consistent with the fundamental purpose and explicit language
of the ADA requiring integration and prohibiting separate-but-equal facilities. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2); 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B). “[A] regulation must be interpreted
in such a way as to not conflict with the objective of its organic statute.” Time Warner
Entm’t Co. v. Everest Midwest Licensee, LLC, 381 F.3d 1039, 1050 (10th Cir. 2004).6
5
Because the 2010 Standards governing entrances do not “reduce the
technical requirements or number of required accessible elements below the number
required by the 1991 Standards,” section 36.211(c) of the regulations does not apply,
and there is no reason to consider the 2010 Standards in evaluating liability. However,
because any remedial work will have to comply with the currently-applicable 2010
Standards, I evaluate those Standards as well.
6
Defendants argue that this Court’s references to the governing statute
suggest that the Court is requiring a facility that complies with the Standards to meet a
higher standard of nondiscrimination under the language of the statute. Not so.
References to the statutory language demonstrate that this Court’s (and the DOJ’s)
interpretation of the regulation is consistent with the language and purpose of the
statute. As the First Circuit stated, in interpreting and applying requirements of the 1991
Standards, “the statute as a whole remains highly relevant. It provides the purpose and
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Defendants also argue, with respect to both the 1991 and 2010 Standards, that
the Raised Porch Entrances and the accessible entrances to each side constitute a
single entrance. Defendants further argue that the entrances -- construed as a single
entrance -- comply with section 206.5.1 of the 2010 Standards, which requires that
“[e]ach entrance to a building or facility required to comply with 206.4 shall have at least
one [accessible] door.” While this might permit, say, a bank of nearly identical doors to
contain only one accessible door, the language and purpose of the statute do not permit
an interpretation that allows a door that is qualitatively different or superior to remain
inaccessible while inferior side doors are the only accessible entrances. Furthermore,
as noted in this Court’s order granting partial summary judgment, it is the position of the
DOJ that, because the doors at Defendants’ stores are on different elevations, the
definition of “entrance” in section 3.5 of the 1991 Standards precludes them from being
considered a single entrance. See Order [ECF No. 109] at 8 n. 7; see also The United
States of America’s Statement of Interest on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [ECF No. 97] at 7 n.9. The definition of “entrance” in the 2010 Standards is
materially identical to that of the 1991 Standards, compare 1991 Standards § 3.5 with
2010 Standards § 106.5. The Court agrees with the DOJ’s reasoning: the Raised
Porch Entrances and the accessible side entrances cannot be considered a single
entrance.
general objectives that cast light on the meaning of the regulation at issue.” United
States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 566 (1st Cir. 2004).
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b.
The 2010 Standards Governing Accessible Spaces
As the DOJ points out, “where a space contains more than one use, ‘each
portion shall comply with the applicable requirements for that use.’” DOJ Statement of
Interest at 10 (quoting 2010 Standards, § 201.2). Here, the Raised Porch Entrances
must comply with the standards governing entrances, which, as explained above, they
do not. In addition, because each Raised Porch Entrance is also a space in the
Hollister store that Defendants make available to individuals who do not require
wheelchairs for mobility, they must comply with regulations governing circulation paths
and accessible routes to accessible spaces. Again, they fail to comply with these
regulations.
The 2010 Standards require that -- unless covered by an exception -- if
nondisabled customers can get to a space, customers who use wheelchairs have to be
able to get to that space as well. “At least one accessible route shall connect
accessible building or facility entrances with all accessible spaces and elements within
the building or facility which are otherwise connected by a circulation path,” unless
exempted by an applicable exception. 2010 Standards § 206.2.4. A circulation path is
defined as “way of passage provided for pedestrian travel, including . . . stairways, and
landings.” Id. § 106.5. Because the porches are connected to mall and store entrances
by a circulation path -- the steps -- pursuant to section 206.2.4, they must be on an
accessible route. This is in keeping with the broad scoping requirement of the 2010
Standards, which mandates that “[a]ll areas of newly designed and newly constructed
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buildings and facilities and altered portions of existing buildings and facilities shall
comply with these requirements.” Id. § 201.1. The upshot of section 206.2.4 is that -unless covered by an exception -- if you can walk to a space, you must be able to roll to
it.
The exceptions to 206.2.4 are narrow and specific, including, for example, certain
areas of detention facilities, residential facilities, transient lodging, and air traffic control
towers, as well as areas of courtrooms, portions of assembly areas that do not include
accessible seating, and mezzanines7 in single-story buildings. §§ 206.2.3, Exceptions
3-6; 206.2.4, Exceptions 1-3. There is no exception for porches or raised areas of retail
spaces. Indeed, the Advisory to section 206.2.4 states, “[a]ccessible routes must
connect all spaces and elements required to be accessible including, but not limited to,
raised areas and speaker platforms.” And although the 2010 Standards specifically
except certain “raised areas,” this exception does not include a raised portion of a retail
store. Id. § 203.3 (“[a]reas raised primarily for purposes of security, life safety, or fire
safety, including but not limited to, observation or lookout galleries, prison guard towers,
fire towers, or life guard stands shall not be required to comply with these requirements
or to be on an accessible route.”) Hollister’s Raised Porch Entrances are not covered
by any applicable exception and therefore, pursuant to section 206.2.4, must be on an
accessible route.
7
The porches are not mezzanines. By definition, “[m]ezzanines have
sufficient elevation that space for human occupancy can be provided on the floor
below.” 2010 Standards § 106.5. There is no space for human occupancy beneath the
porches.
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The DOJ’s Statement of Interest summarizes the situation:
[T]he raised porches at issue in this case function not only as entrances;
they also are part of the public retail space of the store. As such, they are
required to be accessible, under both the 1991 and 2010 Standards.
Throughout this litigation, Defendants have emphasized the importance of
the “in-store experience” for the Hollister brand. Defendants have
indicated that the unique Hollister store design -- including its raised
porches, which are covered by a roof, feature a wooden floor, and include
furniture and “props” such as lamps, plants, and oars -- is at the core of
creating this experience. Because the raised porches including these
special features and attributes are used as both public retail spaces and
public entrances, they must meet the requirements under the ADA for both
uses.
Id. [ECF No. 181] at 3.
Defendant argues that the Raised Porch Entrances “are designed to provide a
visual experience to shoppers, and plaintiffs have not been deprived of that experience.”
[ECF No. 179] at 7-8 (emphasis in original). This argument overlooks the reality that
shoppers without mobility impairments may step up onto the Raised Porch Entrance,
examine the displayed merchandise from all angles, sit in the chairs, and generally have
the intended experience of entering a California beach shack by walking up onto the
porch. Because these uses of the space are denied to shoppers who use wheelchairs,
the Raised Porch Entrances are in violation of section 206.2.4.8
***
8
The Raised Porch Entrances also violate the analogous provision of the
1991 Standards. See § 4.1.3(1) (requiring that an accessible route “shall connect
accessible building or facility entrances with all accessible spaces and elements within
the building or facility.”); see also Statement of Interest [ECF No. 181] at 11 n.9.
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For the reasons set forth above, the Raised Porch Entrances at those Hollister
stores that contain them violate both the 1991 and 2010 Standards. Because all of the
Hollister stores at issue were built after January 26, 1993, these stores thus violate the
new construction provisions of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1).
D.
Injunctive Relief
The only remedy for violation of Title III of the ADA is injunctive; the statute has
no damages remedy for private plaintiffs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a). Furthermore,
because the Hollister stores with Raised Porch Entrances are in violation of section
12183(a), an injunction is mandatory to remedy the violation, which injunction “shall
include an order to alter [the] facilities” to bring them into compliance. Id. § 12188(a)(2);
see also, e.g., Moreno v. La Curacao, 463 Fed. Appx. 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The
district court having determined that certain barriers at Defendant’s establishment
violated the ADA and that removal of these barriers was ‘readily achievable,’ see 42
U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv),[9] Plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief . . .”).
Plaintiffs are not required to show irreparable harm to obtain an injunction for
violation of section 12183(a), nor is a balance-of-harms test appropriate once such a
violation is shown. “‘[W]hen the evidence shows that the defendants are engaged in, or
about to be engaged in, the act or practices prohibited by a statute which provides for
injunctive relief to prevent such violations, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs need not be
shown.’” Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Sam’s East, Inc., 362 F.3d 639, 651 (10th Cir. 2004)
9
Section 12188(a)(2) mandates injunctive relief for violations of both
sections 12183(a) (at issue here) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (at issue in Moreno).
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(internal citations omitted). “‘[I]t is not the role of the courts to balance the equities
between the parties [where] Congress has already balanced the equities and has
determined that, as a matter of public policy, an injunction should issue where the
defendant is engaged in . . . any activity which the statute prohibits.’” Id. at 652 (citing
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bair, 957 F.2d 599, 601 (8th Cir. 1992)); see also United
States v. Morris, 2011 WL 588060, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2011) (“[B]ecause [the
statute] sets forth the criteria necessary for injunctive relief, the traditional equitable
factors, including a showing of irreparable harm, need not be proved,” citing Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1981)).
At the January 24, 2013 hearing, I noted that while I concluded that Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment and request for entry of an injunction should be granted,
the actual injunction will be issued in a future order of the Court. Thus, for reasons
stated on the record at the January 24, 2013 hearing, this Order will not impose the
actual injunction as “I need for the parties to meet and confer, give me their input and if
necessary [I] may need a hearing if there [are] disputes.” (Unofficial Bridge Tr. at
11:25:18-11:26:36).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Entry of Injunction, and
Entry of Judgment, filed April 27, 2012 [ECF No. 162] is GRANTED. Defendants’
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Motion for Summary Judgment or, In the Alternative, To Vacate August 31, 2011 Order
[ECF No. 164] is DENIED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer before March 15,
2013, to attempt to craft an injunction/remedy that is mutually agreeable to both parties.
If the parties can reach agreement on the contents of a proposed injunction, they shall
jointly file the proposed injunction not later than April 19, 2013. If the parties are not
able to reach agreement, Plaintiffs shall file a proposed injunction and Defendants shall
have 15 days to respond.
Dated: March 7, 2013
BY THE COURT:
s/ Wiley Y. Daniel
WILEY Y. DANIEL,
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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