Squires v. Goodwin et al
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 52 Defendant Breckenridge Outdoor Education Center's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Fifth Claim for Relief in the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 13) shall proceed against Defendant Breckenridge O utdoor Education Center only on the alleged willful and wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent acts or omissions. A Telephonic Status Conference is set on Thursday December 8, 2011 at 8:30 AM in Courtroom A 402 before Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer. Counsel for the parties shall create a conference call and then telephone the court at 303-844-2117 at the scheduled time. By Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer on 11/08/2011. (cbslc1)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer
Civil Action No. 10-cv-00309-CBS-BNB
KIMBERLY N. SQUIRES, by and through her Guardian and Natural Parent, LYLE K.
JAMES MICHAEL GOODWIN, an individual,
BRECKENRIDGE OUTDOOR EDUCATION CENTER, a Colorado corporation, and
MOUNTAIN MAN, INC., a Montana corporation,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This civil action comes before the court on Defendant Breckenridge Outdoor
Education Center’s (BOEC’s) Motion for Summary Judgment (filed December 3, 2010) (Doc.
# 52). On September 16, 2010, the above-captioned case was referred to Magistrate Judge
Craig B. Shaffer to handle all dispositive matters including trial and entry of a final judgment
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, and D.C. COLO. LCivR 72.2. (See
Doc. # 42). The court has reviewed the Motion, Ms. Squires’ Response (filed January 6,
2011) (Doc. # 56), BOEC’s Reply (filed January 24, 2011) (Doc. # 61), BOEC’s Notice of
Supplemental Authority (filed April 18, 2011) (Doc. # 76), Ms. Squires’ Response to BOEC’s
Notice of Supplemental Authority (filed May 12, 2011) (Doc. # 81), Ms. Squires’ Reply
Memorandum Brief Regarding Misrepresentation (filed May 30, 2011) (Doc. # 84), BOEC’s
Surreply Brief regarding Misrepresentation (filed June 6, 20110) (Doc. # 89), the affidavit, the
exhibits, the arguments presented at the hearing held on July 20, 2011, and the entire case
file and is sufficiently advised in the premises.
Statement of the Case
Ms. Squires’ claim against BOEC arises out of a ski accident (“the Accident”) that
occurred at Breckenridge Ski Resort, Colorado on February 13, 2008. BOEC is a nonprofit
Colorado corporation that provides outdoor experiences for people with disabilities. (See
SAC (Doc. # 13) at 2-3, ¶ 6; Scheduling Order (“SO”) (Doc. # 40) at 7 of 15 (Undisputed
Facts)). At all relevant times, Ms. Squires was 17 years old, legally blind, cognitively delayed,
and physically limited by cerebral palsy. (See SAC at 1-2, ¶ 2).
BOEC employed Jennifer Phillips as a para-ski instructor at the time of the Accident.
(See SO at 7 of 15). On the morning of the Accident, Ms. Squires was paired with Ms.
Phillips and placed in a bi-ski. (See id.). The bi-ski was manufactured by Defendant
Mountain Man. (See id.). Ms. Phillips and Ms. Squires went to Peak 9 at Breckenridge Ski
Resort. (See id.). Ms. Phillips utilized tethers as a means to control the bi-ski. (See SAC at
5 of 13, ¶ 16). On their second run, Ms. Squires and Ms. Phillips skied down Cashier trail.
(See SO at 7 of 15). Defendant Goodwin was also skiing down Cashier trail. (See id.).
Defendant Goodwin lost control and skied into the tethers between Ms. Squires and Ms.
Phillips. (See Goodwin Deposition, Exhibit B to Motion (Doc. # 52-2), at 2, 3 of 3). Due to
the force of the collision with Defendant Goodwin, Ms. Phillips lost control of the tethers and
the bi-ski containing Ms. Squires continued down Cashier trail unrestrained until it collided
with a tree. (See SAC at 5 of 13, ¶ 19; BOEC’s Answer to SAC (Doc. # 27) at 2-3 of 8, ¶
12). Ms. Squires was injured when the bi-ski collided with a tree. (See SO at 7 of 15).
Ms. Squires filed her initial Complaint on February 12, 2010, alleging five claims for
relief against Defendants Goodwin and BOEC based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
(See Doc. # 1). She filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on April 15, 2010, alleging
nine claims for relief against Defendants Goodwin, BOEC, and Mountain Man, Inc.
(“Mountain Man”). (See Doc. # 5). Ms. Squires refiled her First Amended Complaint on April
19, 2010 pursuant to a request from the Clerk of the Court. (See Doc. # 11). Ms. Squires
filed her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), the current operative pleading, on June 2,
2011, alleging nine claims against Defendants Goodwin, BOEC, and Mountain Man. (See
Doc. # 13). Ms. Squires’ First, Second, Third, and Fourth Claims for Relief allege negligence
per se under the Ski Safety Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-44-109(2) and common law negligence
against Defendant Goodwin. (See Doc. # 13 at 6-7 of 13). Ms. Squires’ Fifth Claim for Relief
alleges negligence, willful and wanton, reckless, and/or gross negligence against Defendant
BOEC. (See id. at 8-9 of 13). The court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant
Mountain Man on Ms. Squires’ Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Claims for Relief for strict
products liability, breach of implied warranty of fitness and/or merchantability, common law
negligence, and breach of express warranty. (See id. at 9-12 of 13; “Order on Pending
Motions” (Doc. # 119)).
Defendant BOEC moves for summary judgment on the Fifth Claim for Relief in the
SAC on the grounds that Ms. Squires is prevented from bringing the claim by a valid release
Standard of Review
“Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may grant
summary judgment where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and the . . . moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Montgomery v. Board of County Commissioners of Douglas County, Colorado, 637 F. Supp.
2d 934, 939 (D. Colo. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When applying
this standard, the court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Id. “All doubts must be
resolved in favor of the existence of triable issues of fact.” Id. However, if a party fails to
properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of
fact, “the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motions and supporting materials –
including the facts considered undisputed – show that the moving party is entitled to it.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Release of Negligence Claim under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-107
Prior to the Accident, on January 13, 2008, Ms. Squires and her mother, Mrs. Squires,
signed an “Acknowledgement [sic] of Risk and Release of Liability” (“Release”). In Colorado,
the parent of a child may, on behalf of the child, release or waive the child’s prospective
claim for negligence. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-107. The statute requires that such a
decision be “voluntary and informed.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-107(1)(a)(V).
(1)(a) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares it is the
public policy of this state that:
(I) Children of this state should have the maximum opportunity to participate in
sporting, recreational, educational, and other activities where certain risks may
(II) Public, private, and non-profit entities providing these essential activities to
children in Colorado need a measure of protection against lawsuits, and without
the measure of protection these entities may be unwilling or unable to provide
(III) Parents have a fundamental right and responsibility to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. The law has long
presumed that parents act in the best interest of their children.
(IV) Parents make conscious choices every day on behalf of their children
concerning the risks and benefits of participation in activities that may involve
(V) These are proper parental choices on behalf of children that should not be
ignored. So long as the decision is voluntary and informed, the decision should
be given the same dignity as decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment,
and religious education; and
(VI) It is the intent of the general assembly to encourage the affordability and
availability of youth activities in this state by permitting a parent of a child to
release a prospective negligence claim of the child against certain persons and
entities involved in providing the opportunity to participate in the activities.
(3) A parent of a child may, on behalf of the child, release or waive the child's
prospective claim for negligence.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a parent acting on behalf
of his or her child to waive the child's prospective claim against a person or
entity for a willful and wanton act or omission, a reckless act or omission, or a
grossly negligent act or omission.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-107.
“Because waiver is an affirmative defense, the Defendant has the burden to prove
waiver.” Wycoff v. Grace Community Church of the Assemblies of God, 251 P.3d 1260,
1277 (Colo. App. 2010) (Furman, J, dissenting) (citing C.R.C.P. 8(c)). Ms. Squires argues
that BOEC is not entitled to summary judgment on the Fifth Claim for Relief based on the
Release because her mother’s decision to sign the Release was not informed.1 Relying on
Wycoff, 251 P.3d at 1260, Ms. Squires argues that the decision was not informed because
the Release did not inform Mrs. Squires of the risks associated with BOEC’s winter program,
Ms. Squires concedes that Mrs. Squires signed the Release voluntarily. (See, e.g.,
Doc. # 84-4 at 6 of 7).
failing to “mention skiing, skis, ski slopes, ski lifts, or anything at all specific to skiing.” (See
Response (Doc. # 56) at 9 of 19).
In Wycoff, a 17-year old minor attending a church-sponsored event was injured when
she was riding on an inner-tube towed by an ATV on a frozen lake. Wycoff, 251 P.3d at
1263. The minor and her mother had signed the registration and information form that
contained a release. Id. While the minor was aware that riding on an inner-tube towed by an
ATV on a frozen lake would be an activity at the event, her mother was not. Wycoff, 251
P.3d at 1263. The court in Wycoff interpreted § 13-22-107(3) to require that a parent’s
decision to release a child’s prospective claims be “voluntary and informed.” Id. Although
the court noted the standard for informed consent to a medical procedure, it did not adopt
that standard for a parental release of claim. Wycoff, 251 P.3d at 1264. Without setting forth
precisely how much information is required for a parental release to be “voluntary and
informed,” the court held that a one-page “registration and information” form, which
happened to contain one sentence in the last paragraph stating, “I will not hold Grace
Community Church or it’s [sic] participants responsible for any liability which may result from
participation,” was legally insufficient to release a child’s negligence claim. Id. at 1265. The
court agreed that “[a] release need not contain any magic words to be valid,” but recognized
that “in every Colorado Supreme Court case upholding an exculpatory clause, the clause
contained some reference to waiving personal injury claims based on the activity being
engaged in.” Wycoff, 251 P.3d at 1265. The “registration and information” form held
inadequate in Wycoff made no reference to the subject activity or to waiving personal injury
claims, nor did it provide parents with information allowing them to assess the degree of risk
and the extent of possible injuries from any activity. Id.
The Release here provides in pertinent part:
In consideration of being allowed to participate in any way in Breckenridge
Outdoor Education Center (BOEC) programs, and related events and activities.
. . I, and/or the minor student, and/or the person for which I am legal guardian,
Understand that although the BOEC has taken precautions to provide
proper organization, supervision, instruction and equipment for each course, it
is impossible for the BOEC to guarantee absolute safety. Also, I understand
that I share the responsibility for safety during all activities, and I assume that
responsibility. . . .
Understand that risks during outdoor programs include but are not
limited to loss or damage to personal property, injury, permanent disability,
fatality, exposure to inclement weather, slipping, falling, insect or animal bites,
being struck by falling objects, immersion in cold water, hypothermia (cold
exposure), hyperthermia (heat exposure), and severe social or economic losses
that may result from any such incident. I also understand that such accidents or
illnesses may occur in remote areas without easy access to medical facilities or
while traveling to and form the activity sites. Further, there may be other risks
not known to me or not reasonably foreseeable at this time.
Agree that prior to participation, I will inspect, to the best of my ability,
the facilities and equipment to be used. If I believe anything is unsafe, I will
immediately advise the BOEC staff present of such condition and refuse to
Assume all the foregoing risks and accept personal responsibility for the
damages due to such injury, permanent disability or death resulting from
participating in any BOEC activity.
I hereby release the BOEC, its successors, representatives, assigns, and
employees from any and all claims, demands, and causes of action, whether
resulting from negligence or otherwise, of every nature and in conjunction with
a BOEC activity.
(See Exhibit A to Motion (Doc. # 52-1)). On the other side of the Release was a letter of
explanation (“Greetings Letter”) that the court may consider as evidence of whether the
decision to sign the Release was informed. (See id. at 4 of 5; Deposition of Sara Squires,
Appendix 4 to Ms. Squires’ Reply (Doc. # 84-4) at 3 of 7). See Wycoff, 251 P.3d at 1264
(“We will assume for purposes of this case that a facially deficient exculpatory contract could
be cured by extrinsic evidence.”); Glover v. Innis, 252 P.3d 1204, 1209 (Colo. App. 2011)
(extrinsic evidence permitted not to contradict or vary terms of an agreement, but to show
waiver of a provision of the agreement). The Greetings Letter stated in pertinent part:
Your ski lesson or course will involve risk, which may be greater than most
people encounter in their daily lives. Providing high quality programs in a
risk-managed environment is a priority at the BOEC. It is, however, impossible
to eliminate all risks. It is very important that you follow all directions given by
staff and that you ask questions whenever a procedure or activity is unclear to
While the BOEC maintains rigorous standards, it is in everyone’s best interest
that risks are disclosed, understood, and assumed prior to participation. After
you have reviewed the acknowledgement of risk and waiver of liability on the
reverse side of this letter and if you understand and agree with its contents,
please sign in the appropriate places. If you are the parent or legal guardian of
a student, please read both sides of this document to the student, and if you
both agree and understand their content, place YOUR signature in the three
(See Doc. # 61-1 at 4 of 5).
A finding that Mrs. Squires’ decision to sign the Release was informed is not
inconsistent with the analysis in Wycoff, 251 P.3d at 1260. First, the release in Wycoff was
one sentence that “state[d] only that plaintiff will not hold Grace ‘responsible for any liability
which may result from participation,’ ” surrounded by sentences addressing different topics.
Here, the Release was clearly entitled at the top “Acknowledgement [sic] of Risk and
Release of Liability,” in large, italicized letters. (See Doc. # 52-1). The first sentence again
states, “ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RISK AND RELEASE OF LIABILITY (REQUIRED)” in
capital letters and underlined. Id. The Release signed by Ms. Squires was clearly identified
as a waiver and release of liability.
Second, the Release includes one full page that explains in detail the degree of risk
involved with BOEC outdoor programs, events, activities, and/or courses; the extent of
possible injuries from any activity, including injury, permanent disability, fatality, and other
risks not known or not reasonably foreseeable; participation in activities and the use of
equipment; and the release of BOEC from any all and claims, whether resulting from
negligence or otherwise. (See Doc. # 52-1). Ms. Squires was a participant in a BOEC winter
outdoor program that included skiing. The Release refers to outdoor programs and sets forth
a detailed explanation of the possible risks of injury to property and person. (See id.).
It is conceded that when she signed the Release, Mrs. Squires knew that her daughter
would be skiing during her trip to Colorado. (See Doc. # 56 at 10 of 19). Nevertheless, Ms.
Squires argues that the Release did not provide any, much less adequate, information
regarding the inherent risks of skiing or describe the particular risks of the sit-down ski that
she used and that it would be controlled by her instructor with tethers. Ms. Squires provides
an affidavit from Mrs. Squires stating that, in response to her telephone inquiry, a BOEC
employee instructed her to mark “Sit-Down” and “Bi-Ski” on the “Wilderness/Ski Group
Information” Form, and that no one from BOEC explained to her what a “Sit-Down” or “Bi-Ski”
was. (See Affidavit of Sara A. Squires, Exhibit 1 to Response (Doc. # 56-1); Doc. # 84-4 at 5
Mr. and Mrs. Squires were provided the BOEC forms and applications to be
completed in advance of the trip, including the Release, by Andrea Breier, Director of the
Adventure Fitness Program at Camp Fire USA at the time, the group that organized the ski
trip that Ms. Squires attended. (See Affidavit of Andrea Breier, Exhibit D to Reply (Doc. # 611) at 1-2 of 5). Mrs. Squires had opportunities to ask questions about the ski trip and the
forms before her daughter’s trip to Colorado. (See id. at 2 of 5). Ms. Breier specifically
recalls explaining to Mrs. Squires that Ms. Squires would be seated when skiing, that BOEC
uses sleeping bags to pad the bucket seat, that students in wheelchairs have two assistants
helping them, and that the instructor uses guide ropes to steer the ski down the mountain.
(See id.). Mrs. Squires knew that her daughter would be using some form of sit-down ski on
this trip because her primary means of mobility was by wheelchair and she would not have
been able to ski down the mountain standing up. (See id.). Mrs. Squires completed the
BOEC application and Release and provided Ms. Breier a typewritten summary that
explained Ms. Squires’ conditions, limitations, and medical needs. (See Doc. # 61-1 at 2 of
5, ¶ 11). Mrs. Squires also wrote a detailed letter to BOEC, stating in pertinent part:
Sometimes during activities such as skiing, kids who have an implanted
baclofen pump can experience withdrawal.2 If she is in a “bucket”/“basket” type
ski, where she might be more scrunched up, or her body is more compressed
down, then the catheter line can become pinched or kinked up. If they use the
bucket type, then her rehab doctor recommends that she ski for about 2 hrs
and then be allowed to stand up to help “straighten” out the line. Then, go back
to skiing again. If they use a “sit down ski” where she is more upright (like sitting
in a wheelchair), then she shouldn’t have any problems. I am not familiar with
the types of equipment they have, but am only saying what other families
whose children also have pumps have told me about the equipment.
(Letter from Sara Squires dated February 12, 2008, Exhibit E to Reply (Doc. # 61-2)).
Despite that the Release does not specifically include the words, “skiing,” “sit-down,”
or “bi-ski,” Mrs. Squires understood that her daughter would be seated in some type of sit-ski
on the trip. While Mrs. Squires claims to have had no knowledge of what a sit-down bi-ski
was at the time she signed the Release, the evidence demonstrates that she had sufficient
Ms. Squires had a surgically inserted baclofen pump, which dispenses medication for
notice and knowledge of the activities that her daughter would be participating in and the
associated risks. Mrs. Squires conscientiously made inquiries to BOEC about the forms and
the trip. (See Doc. # 84-4 at 5 of 7). Mrs. Squires was familiar with releases generally. (See
Doc. # 84-4 at 4 of 7 (“Because . . . every single program on the face of the earth has a risk
and release of liability and some verbiage to that effect.”); see also 6 of 7 (“It’s the same
identical verbiage that is in every single risk and release of liability that I’ve signed for 20
years on Kimberley’s behalf for everything that she has ever participated in.”). Ms. Squires’
parents were informed that she would be skiing in Breckenridge, Colorado, in a type of
sit-down ski, controlled by an instructor with tethers. The Release specifically refers to
outdoor activities and associated risks and was accompanied by a cover letter that explained
the risks involved with ski lessons, including the possibility of serious injury and even death.
The Release provides that risks during outdoor programs include injury, permanent disability,
fatality, severe social or economic losses, and other risks not known or reasonably
foreseeable. See Hamill, 2011 WL 1168006 at * 8 (that “mother may not have contemplated
the precise mechanics of her daughter’s fall does not invalidate the release and does not
create a genuine issue of material fact”). When she signed the Release, Mrs. Squires had
sufficient information “to assess the degree of risk and the extent of possible injuries from
any activity,” Wycoff, 251 P.3d at 1265, and to make an informed decision to release any
claims that Ms. Squires may have had against BOEC.
Validity of Release
The court having determined that the decision to release Ms. Squires’ prospective
claims was informed pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-107(1)(a)(V), the court must next
determine whether the Release was legally valid. “Exculpatory agreements are construed
strictly against the party seeking to limit its liability.” Hamill v. Cheley Colorado Camps, Inc.,
___ P. 3d ___, 2011 WL 1168006, * 1 (Colo. App. March 31, 2011) (citation omitted). “The
determination of the sufficiency and validity of an exculpatory agreement is a question of law
for the court to determine.” B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134, 136 (Colo. 1998); see
also Robinette v. Aspen Skiing Co., LLC, 2009 WL 1108093 at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 2009),
aff’d, 363 Fed. Appx. 547 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 136). “Although
an exculpatory agreement that attempts to insulate a party from liability for his own simple
negligence” is disfavored, “it is not necessarily void as against public policy . . . as long as
one party is not at such obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the effect of the
contract is to put him at the mercy of the other’s negligence.” Chadwick v. Colt Ross
Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo. 2004) (citation omitted). “To be effective, the
release must meet four criteria: (i) there must not have been an obvious disparity in
bargaining power between the releasor and releasee; (ii) the agreement must set forth the
parties' intentions in clear and unambiguous language; (iii) the circumstances and the nature
of the service must indicate that the agreement was fairly entered into; and (iv) the
agreement may not violate public policy.” Robinette, 2009 WL 1108093 at *2 (citations
omitted). BOEC bears the burden of proving each of these elements. See id.
Where, as here, the service provided is a recreational service and not an essential
service, there is no unfair bargaining advantage. See Mincin v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 308 F.3d
1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 2002) (public need and disparity of bargaining power absent in context
of mountain biking and bicycle rental); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 377-78 (Colo. 1981)
(because recreational skydiving service “was not a matter of practical necessity for even
some members of the public” and thus “not an essential service,” Defendant did not possess
a decisive advantage of bargaining strength over plaintiff); Potter v. Nat’l Handicapped
Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407, 1409-10 (D. Colo. 1994) (handicapped downhill ski racing was “a
recreational activity, . . . neither a matter of great public importance nor a matter of practical
necessity”) (citing Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp. 472, 475 (D. Colo.
1992) (upholding an exculpatory clause in the context of ski equipment rental)). Ms. Squires
does not challenge BOEC’s ability to prove this first element.
Second, the court evaluates whether the Release expresses the parties’ intent in clear
and unambiguous language. “Interpretation of a written contract and the determination of
whether a provision in the contract is ambiguous are questions of law.” Dorman v. Petrol
Aspen, Inc., 914 P.2d 909, 912 (Colo. 1996) (citation omitted). Ms. Squires argues that the
Release is ambiguous and, therefore, invalid, because the language, “[a]lso I understand that
I share the responsibility for safety during all activities” expresses a “shared regime of risk,”
contradicts the language “I hereby release the BOEC, its successors, representatives,
assigns, and employees from any and all claims, demands, and causes of action, whether
resulting from negligence or otherwise, of every nature and in conjunction with a BOEC
activity,” and makes the participant/signer solely responsible for any injuries or bad
outcomes. (See Doc. # 52-1; Doc. # 56 at 15-17 of 19).
“Terms used in a contract are ambiguous when they are susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” Ad Two, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 9 P.3d 373, 376
(Colo. 2000). “In determining whether a provision in a contract is ambiguous, the
instrument's language must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain and
generally accepted meanings of the words used, and reference must be made to all the
agreement's provisions.” Ringquist v. Wall Custom Homes, LLC, 176 P.3d 846, 849 (Colo.
App. 2007) (citations omitted). “The meaning and effect of a contract is to be determined
from a review of the entire instrument, not merely from isolated clauses or phrases.” Moland
v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of State, 111 P.3d 507, 510 (Colo. App. 2004). Specific
terms, such as “negligence,” are not required for an exculpatory agreement to shield a party
from negligence claims. Potter, 849 F. Supp. at 1410 (citing Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v.
Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989) (noting that the release was written in simple and
clear terms that were free from legal jargon, the release was not inordinately long and
complicated, the plaintiff indicated in her deposition that she understood the release, and the
first sentence of the release specifically addressed a risk that described the circumstances of
the plaintiff's injury)). The inquiry is not whether specific terms are used, but “whether the
intent of the parties was to extinguish liability and whether this intent was clearly and
unambiguously expressed.” Id. See also Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 467 (Colorado Supreme
Court has “previously examined the actual language of the agreement for legal jargon, length
and complication, and any likelihood of confusion or failure of a party to recognize the full
extent of the release provisions”). “If there is no ambiguity, a contract will be enforced
according to the express provision of the agreement.” B & B Livery, 960 P.2d at 136.
Here, the Release is written in clear and simple terms, is free from legal jargon, is
neither long nor complicated, and encompasses the risks encompassed by Ms. Squires’ Fifth
Claim for Relief. The Release specifically includes claims for negligence. The specific risk of
what occurred in the Accident is encompassed within the risks of BOEC’s outdoor winter
program. See Robinette, 2009 WL 1108093 at * 3 (“specific risk of colliding with a
snowmobile being operated by a ski resort employee is necessarily within the risks of
skiing/riding”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court does not find the Release
Nor does the court find the Release is reasonably susceptible to Ms. Squires’
interpretation. Ms. Squires interprets two provisions in the Release in a way that strains logic
to conclude that the Release as a whole is ambiguous. That Ms. Squires agrees to share the
responsibility of safety during BOEC activities is not mutually exclusive from Ms. Squires
agreeing to release claims arising out of BOEC activities.
Ms. Squires also notes the Release language that “BOEC has taken precautions to
provide proper organization, supervision, instruction and equipment for each course,”
claiming that BOEC failed to do this, and querying how BOEC could shift this responsibility to
its participants. Ms. Squires claims that BOEC’s failures related to the equipment used,
terrain selected, use of volunteers, control of the bi-ski, training and selection of instructors,
assessment of plaintiff’s disabilities, provision of instructions and safety precautions, and
prevention of accidents with other skiers. The Release specifically addresses that “although
the BOEC has taken precautions to provide proper organization, supervision, instruction and
equipment for each course, it is impossible for the BOEC to guarantee absolute safety.”
(See Doc. # 52-1).
When the Release is read as a whole and the words are given their generally
accepted meaning, it is susceptible to one reasonable interpretation: that although BOEC
has taken precautions, it cannot guarantee absolute safety; that there are serious risks
involved in BOEC activities; and that, to participate in BOEC activities, the releaser agrees to
release BOEC from any and all claims related to a BOEC activity. The Release by its plain
language expresses the parties’ intent to release BOEC from liability for all personal injuries
resulting from negligence in conjunction with a BOEC activity.
Third, the court examines whether the Release was fairly entered into. “A contract is
fairly entered into if one party is not so obviously disadvantaged with respect to bargaining
power that the resulting contract essentially places him at the mercy of the other party's
negligence.” Hamill, 2011 WL 1168006 at *3 (citations omitted). Ms. Squires does not
challenge BOEC’s ability to prove that the service provided here is a recreational service, not
an essential service, and thus there is no unfair bargaining advantage. Where the releasor
fails to point to any other unfair circumstances surrounding the exculpatory agreement, the
third factor is satisfied. See Mincin, 308 F.3d at 1111. As in Chadwick, Mrs. Squires signed
the Release at home in Kansas, in advance of the ski trip. 100 P.3d at 469. Mrs. Squires
signed the Release voluntarily. There is no suggestion that Mrs. Squires is not competent. It
is clear that Mrs. Squires is a devoted parent who has zealously tried to enhance her
daughter’s quality of life. There is no evidence that the services provided by BOEC could not
have been obtained elsewhere. See Hamill, 2011 WL 1168006 at * 3 (“in assessing fairness,
courts may also examine whether the services provided could have been obtained
elsewhere”) (citing Jones, 623 P.2d at 375). Mrs. Squires is experienced and familiar with
liability releases in general. Ms. Squires has not demonstrated any other unfair
circumstances surrounding the execution of the Release.
Finally, the court finds that the Release does not violate public policy. The adaptive
recreational ski services provided by BOEC are recreational and not a matter of great public
importance or practical necessity. The evidence does not indicate that the Release was
entered into in any unfair manner. The Release does not exculpate BOEC from any duty in
violation of public policy. The Release does not undermine any competing public policy. See
Robinette, 2009 WL 1108093 at *4. The expressed public policy in Colorado is “to
encourage the affordability and availability of youth activities in this state by permitting a
parent of a child to release a prospective negligence claim of the child against certain
persons and entities involved in providing the opportunity to participate in the activities.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-107(1)(a)(VI).
In sum, as the court finds no obvious disparity in bargaining power between the
parties to the Release, that the parties' intentions are clear and unambiguous, that the
agreement was fairly entered into, and that the Release does not violate public policy, the
court concludes that the Release is valid. See Hamill, 2011 WL 1168006 at *6 (Colo. App.
Mar. 31, 2011) (determining exculpatory agreement was valid because it “did not implicate a
public duty, did not involve an essential service, was fairly entered into, and it plainly
expressed the intent to release prospective negligence claims”); Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 46970 (enforcing exculpatory agreement releasing organizer of hunting trip from injuries
sustained when he was thrown off mule, where exculpatory agreement unambiguously
expressed the intent of the parties, was not unfairly entered into, injured party read
agreement and understood he was executing a release of liability when he signed it, and
agreement violated no duty to the public). Ms. Squires has released “BOEC, its successors,
representatives, assigns, and employees from any and all claims, demands, and causes of
action” from any claims resulting from negligence in conjunction with a BOEC activity.
Material Misrepresentation and Fraud in the Inducement
Ms. Squires argues that BOEC’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied
because the Release is voidable based on material misrepresentation and fraud in the
inducement. “A release is an agreement to which the general contract rules of interpretation
and construction apply.” Chase v. Dow Chemical Company, 875 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted). “Like any contract, a release procured through fraud can be set aside.”
Ms. Squires argues that BOEC fraudulently misrepresented in the Greetings Letter, on
the reverse side of the Release, that all of its “activities are conducted in a manner consistent
with the highest standards, as defined by the Association of Experiential Education (“AEE”),”
when in fact there were no written standards for the adaptive ski program, and that the
program was accredited by AEE when in fact the program was not so accredited. (See Doc.
# 61-1 at 4 of 5). There is no statement regarding AEE standards or accreditation in the
Release itself. (See Doc. # 52-1). BOEC representative and Ski Program Director Paul
Gamber testified that on the day of the Accident, BOEC did not have any written ski lesson
policies and procedures for the adaptive ski program. (See Doc. # 84-6 at 2 of 2). BOEC’s
Ski Program Director, Jeffrey Inouye, testified that the AEE accreditation related to programs
other than the adaptive ski program that Ms. Squires attended. (See Deposition of Jeffrey
Inouye (Doc. # 84-2) at 2 of 2). Ms. Squires argues that based on the lack of written safety
standards, “it is not a stretch to conclude that the adaptive skiing program was not conducted
in a manner consistent with the highest standards of the AEE, contrary to the representations
made by BOEC in its Greetings Letter.” (Reply Memorandum Brief Regarding
Misrepresentation (Doc. # 84) at 4 of 11). Ms. Squires argues that Mrs. Squires relied on
these claimed misrepresentation when she signed the Release on January 13, 2008.
In addition to its adaptive ski program, BOEC has a department that operates its
wilderness program, which facilitates year-around programming for people with disabilities
and special needs. (See Doc. # 89-3 at 3 of 3). The Greetings Letter is sent to participants
involved in a wilderness course, who may or may not participate in the ski program. (See
Doc. # 89-1 at 2-5 of 5). Groups interested in a wilderness course, which includes lodging
and activities other than skiing, such as a ropes course, and climbing wall, will complete
paperwork through the wilderness program. Id. Each program has its own separate set of
forms to be completed by participants. Id. Groups who are interested only in skiing at BOEC
will complete paperwork for the ski program. (See Doc. # 89-1 at 2-5 of 5). Ms. Squires was
a student of BOEC as a participant of the Camp Fire USA group (“Camp Fire”). (See Doc. #
61-1 at 1-2 of 5). For its trip to Colorado, Camp Fire contracted with the wilderness program
for a five-day wilderness course that included transportation and lodging in addition to skiing.
(See Wilderness Course Contract (Doc. # 89-2) at 1-2 of 2). The Release and Greetings
Letter were from the wilderness program. (See Doc. # 89-1 at 3 of 5).
While BOEC’s adaptive ski program did not have its own written ski lesson policies
and procedures at the time of the Accident, it has at all times trained its instructors and
followed the standards for adaptive skiing set forth by the PSIA, the governing body that
establishes national standards for skiing. (See Doc. # 89-3 at 2 of 3). BOEC’s adaptive ski
program used the PSIA Core Concepts book, the Adaptive Ski Program Manual, and the
Alpine Technical Manual. (See id.; see also Doc. # 84-5).
“To establish fraud, a plaintiff has to prove that (1) a fraudulent misrepresentation of
material fact was made by the defendant; (2) at the time the representation was made, the
defendant knew the representation was false or was aware that he did not know whether the
representation was true or false; (3) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation; (4) the
plaintiff had the right to rely on, or was justified in relying on, the misrepresentation; and (5)
the reliance resulted in damages.” Barfield v. Hall Realty, Inc., 232 P.3d 286, 290 (Colo.
App. 2010) (citing CJI-Civ. 4th 19:1 (1998)). See also J.A. Walker Co., Inc. v. Cambria
Corp., 159 P.3d 126, 132 (Colo. 2007) (applying same elements to a fraudulent inducement
claim). “Implicit within these elements are the requirements that the claimant demonstrate
that it relied on the misrepresentation and that its reliance was justified under the
circumstances.” Loveland Essential Group, LLC v. Grommon Farms, Inc., 251 P.3d 1109,
1116 (Colo. App. 2010) (citation omitted).
“The misrepresentation must be made with the intent to deceive and for the purpose
of inducing the other party to act on it, and there must be evidence that the other party did in
fact rely on it and was induced thereby to act to his injury or damage.” Club Valencia
Homeowners Ass’n v. Valencia Assocs., 712 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Colo. App. 1985) (citation
omitted). Ms. Squires has not produced any evidence that BOEC made the alleged
misrepresentations with the intent to deceive. For failure to demonstrate this element, Ms.
Squires’ argument that the Release is voidable based on material misrepresentation and
fraud in the inducement must fail.
Reasonable and justifiable reliance is also required for a claim of fraudulent
misrepresentation. Ivar v. Elk River Partners, LLC, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1238 (D. Colo.
2010). See also Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 725 (Colo. App. 2009)
(“a necessary element to all fraud actions is that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the
misrepresentation or the nondisclosure”); Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 399 (Colo. App.
2003) (element of fraudulent misrepresentation is “the right or justification in relying on the
The evidence fails to demonstrate justifiable reliance by Mrs. Squires on the
statements regarding AEE standards and accreditation in the Greetings Letter. The
Greetings Letter emphasized the importance of reading and signing the Release on the
reverse side. (See Doc. # 84-1 at 1 of 1). The Release explains that skiing involves a risk of
serious bodily injury and that it is impossible to eliminate all risk. (See Doc. # 52-1). Despite
the emphasis on the importance of reading and signing the Release, Mrs. Squires did not
take particular note of the language in the Release. “I can only say I assume I read it. I have
no recollection of reading it before I signed it.” (See Doc. # 84-4 at 6 of 7). Ms. Squires
propounds that Mrs. Squires paid close attention to the Greetings Letter but did not place any
importance on the Release itself, which contained the exculpatory provisions. (See id. (the
Release contained “the same identical verbiage that is in every single risk and release of
liability that I’ve signed for 20 years on Kimberly’s behalf for everything that she has ever
participated in. So I did not put any more credence towards this particular document than I
did anything else.”)). Mrs. Squires had substantial knowledge about the ski trip, learned from
Camp Fire’s past experiences, communications with Ms. Breier, and BOEC’s written
materials. (See Doc. # 84-4 at 2-7 of 7). The evidence does not support a finding that Mrs.
Squires justifiably relied on the information in the Greetings Letter regarding the AEE while
taking no notice of the exculpatory language in the Release she signed. The evidence
shows that Mrs. Squires did not make the decision for Ms. Squires to participate in the ski trip
in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. The court concludes that Ms. Squires has not
created a genuine issue of fact for trial on the element of justifiable reliance on the Greetings
Letter. For this reason also, Ms. Squires’ argument that the Release is voidable based on
material misrepresentation and fraud in the inducement must fail.
Willful and Wanton Conduct
The parties acknowledge that the Release cannot bar civil liability for gross
negligence. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-107(4) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed
to permit a parent acting on behalf of his or her child to waive the child's prospective claim
against a person or entity for a willful and wanton act or omission, a reckless act or omission,
or a grossly negligent act or omission.”); Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 467 (“In no event will an
exculpatory agreement be permitted to shield against a claim of willful and wanton
“Although the issue of whether a defendant's conduct is purposeful or reckless is
ordinarily a question of fact, if the record is devoid of sufficient evidence to raise a factual
issue, then the question may be resolved by the court as a matter of law.” Forman v. Brown,
944 P.2d 559, 564 (Colo. App. 1996). See also Terror Mining Co. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929,
935 (Colo. 1994) (summary judgment proper even when willful and wanton conduct alleged,
where facts are undisputed and do not establish or imply willful conduct); United States Fire
Insurance Co. v. Sonitrol Management Corp., 192 P.3d 543 (Colo. App. 2008) (“Ordinarily,
determining whether a defendant's conduct is willful and wanton is a question of fact.”)
“Gross negligence is willful and wanton conduct, that is, action committed recklessly,
with conscious disregard for the safety of others.” Hamill, 2011 WL 1168006 at *9 (citing
Forman, 944 P.2d at 564. “Willful and wanton conduct is purposeful conduct committed
recklessly that exhibits an intent consciously to disregard the safety of others. Such conduct
extends beyond mere unreasonableness.” Forman, 944 P.2d at 564. See also Stamp v. Vail
Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 449 (Colo. 2007) (“Conduct is willful and wanton if it is a dangerous
course of action that is consciously chosen with knowledge of facts, which to a reasonable
mind creates a strong probability that injury to others will result.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 523 n. 10 (Colo. 1992)
(“Willful misconduct consists of conduct purposely committed under circumstances where the
actor realizes that the conduct is dangerous but nonetheless engages in the conduct without
regard to the safety of others.”) (citation omitted); Safehouse Progressive Alliance for
Nonviolence, Inc. v. Qwest Corporation, 174 P.3d 821, 830 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Willful and
wanton behavior is defined as a mental state of the actor consonant with purpose, intent, and
voluntary choice.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Based on her expert witness, Mr. Gale’s, opinion, Ms. Squires argues that BOEC
acted recklessly, precluding application of the Release. Mr. Gale, a snow sports safety
consultant with 43 years of ski safety training and experience, concludes that BOEC acted
recklessly based on: (1) “an inherently unsafe bi-ski program administered and conducted by
BOEC,” (2) BOEC instructor Jennifer Phillips’ selection of inappropriately difficult terrain and
failure to follow proper lesson plan procedures, and (3) BOEC volunteer Jim Trisler’s failure
to “do his job as a blocker, look-out . . . .” (See Doc. # 56-4 at 9-11 of 11; Doc. # 56-5 at 1-2
of 8; Doc. # 88-8 (Curriculum Vitae)).
In his Expert Report, Mr. Gale concludes:
The incident was the cumulative result of an inherently unsafe bi-ski program
administered and conducted by BOEC. It knew or should have known that its
“word of mouth” rather than written safety protocols and procedures were
ineffective and substantially enhanced the risk over and above the inherent
risks of skiing to Miss Squires. It purposely chose a dangerous course of
training, supervision, and bi-ski program implementation. In doing do it created
a strong probability that this circumstance was [a] predictable incident that was
bound to happen sooner or later. It failed to address fundamental safety
procedures even though it appears to do so in its other adaptive program
offerings. . . This further demonstrates BOEC’s willful, reckless, and
comprehensive disregard for Miss Squire’s safety.
(Doc. # 56-5 at 1 of 8, ¶ 5.2). Mr. Gale also concludes that the conduct of BOEC’s instructor,
Ms. Phillips, was intentional, willful, and reckless.
The conduct of BOEC’s instructor Jennifer Phillips fell well below the PSIA
standards. As a PSIA certified instructor, she was or should be well aware of
the policies, procedures, and standards for bi-ski instruction particularly terrain
selection. The plethora of written PSIA instructional methodology and
information addresses skill based instructional activities with safety as a
fundamental priority and duty. She intentionally made the decision to abandon
the PSIA lesson plan and sequential format for bi-ski instruction. This conduct
demonstrates intentional, willful, and reckless disregard for Miss Squire[s’]
(Doc. # 56-5 at 1 of 8, ¶ 5.3). Mr. Gale further identifies reckless conduct with regard to the
use of slip knots to ensure that the bi-ski would remain tethered to the BOEC instructor. He
Defendant BOEC was or should have been fully aware of the dangers of a
detached bi-ski caused by the reckless choice not to properly utilize or
dangerously utilize BOEC’s own slip knot rule powerfully hitting some object,
person, or a tree. The safety procedures, training, and program risk
management did not match the risk nor fully address the safety requirements
dealing with a detached and out of control bi-ski loose on the slope. The
foreseeable consequence was a serious injury to the student, the public, or
both. The entities recklessly disregarded Miss Squires[’] safety and willfully
created this higher than normal risk for Miss Squires. There were no prudent or
careful precautions taken to reduce or lessen the risk of this predictable and
(Doc. # 56-5 at 2 of 8, ¶ 5.5).
Mr. Bil Hawkins of Knott Laboratories also provided an expert report. (See Doc. # 562). Mr. Hawkins has a B.S. in civil engineering and is a certified Level II Rope Access
Technician. (See Doc. # 88-5). Mr. Hawkins examined the safety knot, or slip knot, used to
fasten the bi-ski’s tether to BOEC instructor Ms. Phillips. This knot was the only mechanism
that prevented the downhill movement of the bi-ski. Mr. Hawkins concludes in his expert
Based upon Knott Laboratory’s inspection, the available evidence, and this
engineer’s education, training, and experience, the following conclusions have
been reached within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty:
• Ms. Phillips was not certified to [i]nstruct students on a bi-ski device at the
time of Ms. Squires[’] accident on February 13, 2010
• BOEC knew or should have known that Ms. Phillips was not certified to
instruct participants on a bi-ski device at the time of Ms. Squires[’] accident on
February 13, 2010
• Ms. Phillips did not follow BOEC’s written policy by providing two independent
means of anchor when providing sole support to a participant on a rope device
• The safety knot Ms. Phillips reportedly tied directly against the skin of her wrist
would not have slipped off her arm had it been tied properly
(Doc. # 56-2 at 11 of 11).
There is thus some evidence in the record that it may have been reckless for Ms.
Phillips to take Ms. Squires on Cashier, a blue run, on the day of the Accident. Ms. Squires
was a blind, first-time skier strapped to a bi-ski with no means to control her own speed or
direction. It was BOEC policy to start such a student on a green run. (See Deposition of
Paul E. Gamber (Doc. # 97-11) at 2 of 2). But see Deposition of Stanley Gale (Doc. # 90-5)
at 2 of 2 (“Q: Are you saying – are you saying that it’s wrong to have an adaptive bi-skier on
Cashier run? A: No.”); Expert Report of Ruth Ann DeMuth (Doc. # 100-5) at 5 of 6 (BOEC
employee Jennifer Phillips “did not compromise the safety of Miss Squires by going up the
Beaver Run Lift to Cashier.”).
The court cannot conclusively determine based on the evidence before it whether
there was a purposeful or conscious failure to use a slipknot or tie the properly. The use of a
slipknot with a bi-ski is the established BOEC policy. (See Deposition of Jennifer L. Phillips
(Doc. # 100-3) at 2-3 of 3; Deposition of Paul E. Gamber (Doc. # 100-4) at 4 of 4).
Witnesses who were asked agreed that it could be reckless to conduct a bi-ski lesson without
a properly-tied slip knot tethering a bi-ski with fixed outriggers. (See Deposition of Jennifer L.
Phillips (Doc. # 90-8) at 2 of 2; Deposition of Peter W. Axelson (Doc. # 97-9) at 3 of 3;
Deposition of Paul E. Gamber (Doc. # 97-11) at 2 of 2; (Doc. # 90-7) at 2 of 2; Deposition of
Ruth Ann DeMuth (Doc. # 90-6) at 2 of 2; Deposition of Patrick B. Kelley (Doc. # 90-4) at 2 of
3). Mr. Hawkins concludes that “[t]he safety knot Ms. Phillips reportedly tied directly against
the skin of her wrist would not have slipped off her arm had it been tied properly.” (Doc. # 562 at 11 of 11).
This evidence and these conclusions by the expert witnesses could demonstrate
reckless, grossly negligent, and willful and wanton acts and omissions. A jury could conclude
there was purposeful conduct committed recklessly with conscious disregard for the rights
and safety of Ms. Squires. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Squires,
might lead a reasonable jury to conclude that BOEC was conscious of its conduct and the
existing conditions and knew there was a strong probability that injury to Ms. Squires would
result. The court concludes that Ms. Squires is properly afforded an opportunity to present to
a jury evidence of the alleged willful and wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent acts or
omissions. It will best be determined at trial, after the submission of Ms. Squires’ case in
chief, whether BOEC acted recklessly.
The court addresses separately Ms. Squires’ argument that BOEC volunteer, Mr.
Trisler’s, “acts and omissions” were “more than mere recklessness.” (See Doc. # 56 at 14 of
19). Mr. Gale concludes that
[t]he conduct of BOEC trained Jim Trisler fell below the duty of a blocker. He
did absolutely nothing to prevent the collision or intervene prior to the collision
between Jennifer Phillips and Michael Goodwin. He failed in his essential duties
which were to prevent the collision, or at the very least, to reduce the severity of
(See Doc. # 56-5 at 2 of 8, ¶ 5.4). See also Doc. # 56-4 at 10 of 11 (“he did not do his job as
a blocker, look-out, or make his presence known to Michael Goodwin. Apparently, he did not
hear or see Michael Goodwin coming down out of control before the powerful impact. He
was not vigilant nor did he fulfill his duty and responsibility to protect and warn. It seems that
he was not on the look-out as he should have been or he would have likely seen Michael
Goodwin skiing too close, out of control, and headed for Jennifer Philips and Miss Squires[’]
bi-ski device.”). Ms. Squires argues that ‘[a]lthough Mr. Gale does not specifically use the
word reckless in describing Mr. Trisler’s acts and omissions, his analysis and description
describe more than mere recklessness.” (Response (Doc. # 56) at 14 of 19). The court
disagrees. Colorado law defines negligence as “a failure to do an act which a reasonably
careful person would do, or the doing of an act which a reasonably careful person would not
do, under the same or similar circumstances to protect . . . others from bodily injury, . . .”
CJI-Civ. 9:6 (2011). The evidence in the record, including Mr. Gale’s opinion, amounts to no
more than negligence by Mr. Trisler. As to Mr. Trisler, there is insufficient evidence to create
a genuine issue of material fact that he acted willfully and wantonly, that is, that he
consciously chose a dangerous course of action with knowledge of facts that, to a
reasonable mind, created a strong probability that injury to Ms. Squires would result. The
Release thus bars Ms. Squires’ claim based on Mr. Trisler’s conduct.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
Defendant BOEC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (filed December 3, 2010)
(Doc. # 52) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
The Fifth Claim for Relief in the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 13) shall
proceed against Defendant Breckenridge Outdoor Education Center only on the alleged
willful and wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent acts or omissions.
The court will hold a Telephonic Status Conference on Thursday December 8,
2011 at 8:30 a.m. Counsel for the parties shall create a conference call and then telephone
the court at 303-844-2117 at the scheduled time.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 8th day of November, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
s/Craig B. Shaffer
United States Magistrate Judge
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