Medved Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc. et al v. Chrysler Group, LLC

Filing 5

ORDER OF RECUSAL directing reassignment to another judge. By Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 02/25/2010. (sah, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Judge Robert E. Blackburn Civil Case No. 10-cv-00403-REB-BNB MEDVED CHRYSLER JEEP DODGE, INC., a Colorado corporation, and LAKEWOOD CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC., d/b/a MEDVED CHRYSLER JEEP, INC., a Colorado corporation, Plaintiffs, vs. CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendants. ORDER OF RECUSAL Blackburn, J. This matter comes before me sua sponte. To eschew the appearance of impropriety, I conclude that I must recuse myself from this case. As a general rule, recusal is required when "a reasonable person armed with the relevant facts would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Maez v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge should recuse himself from a case when his participation in the case creates an appearance of impropriety. See United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1264 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2734 (2000). The standard under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) is an objective one, requiring recusal only "if a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). I am a customer of a related MEDVED dealership in the Denver metro area. I

continue to do business with and receive service from this related dealership. Thus, my proposed participation in this case could very well create the appearance of impropriety. Accordingly, my recusal is warranted. THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 1. That under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), I RECUSE myself from this civil case; and 2. That this case SHALL BE REASSIGNED pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1B. and F. Dated February 25, 2010, in Denver, Colorado. BY THE COURT:

2