Santacruz v. Standley and Associates, LLC

Filing 90

ORDER granting 61 Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees. Based on the foregoing, the Court calculates Plaintiffs fee award as follows: The Court deducts fees for work dedicated to the defense of the state law suit ($825.00) and for non-legal clerical work ($275.00) for a total fee award of $46,345.00 ($47,445.00 - $825.00 - $275.00) by Judge Christine M. Arguello on 8/4/2011.(erv, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 10-cv-00623-CMA-CBS
Roxzana Santacruz,
Plaintiff,
v.
STANDLEY AND ASSOCIATES, LLC and
GTF SERVICES, LLC,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

The matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Roxzana Santacruz’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. # 61), filed on April 20, 2011. For the following reasons, the
Motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural history of this case is familiar to the parties and
more fully set out in this Court’s Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. (Doc. # 51.) A brief recap follows.
On March 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging
several violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) pertaining to
Defendants’ efforts to collect on a debt that was allegedly owed by Plaintiff.1 (Doc. # 1.)
On November 30, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the
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On March 23, 2010, Defendants served Plaintiff with a state court complaint to collect
the debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff presented Defendants with a letter that she had
received from Credit One Bank on March 19, 2010, which cleared her of responsibility for the
debt. Defendants subsequently dismissed the state court complaint against Plaintiff.

issue of liability and Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgement. (Doc. ## 25,
27.) On March 17, 2011, the Court found that Defendants had violated the FDCPA by
informing Plaintiff that possessed had affidavits from Credit One Bank stating that the
debt belonged to Plaintiff when Defendants did not, in fact, possess those affidavits and
the debt did not belong to Plaintiff. (Doc. # 51 at 15.) Although the Court found that
genuine issues of material fact existed as to Plaintiff’s other FDCPA claims, because
the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, the Court granted summary judgment as to liability
based on this violation. After a trial on the issue of damages, the jury awarded Plaintiff
$1,000.00 in statutory damages and $29,300.00 in actual damages. On April 20, 2011,
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, requesting $47,445.00 in fees.
(Doc. # 61.) Defendants responded on May 10, 2011, and Plaintiff replied on May 19,
2011. (Doc. ## 76, 86.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When evaluating a motion for attorneys’ fees, the Court must follow the
three-step process set forth in Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983),
overruled on other grounds by Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air, 483 U.S. 711, 725 (1987).
The first step in determining a fee award is to determine the number of hours
reasonably spent by counsel for the prevailing party. Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012,
1017 (10th Cir. 1996); Ramos, 713 F.2d at 553. Factors considered in a reasonableness determination include: (1) whether the amount of time spent on a particular task
appears reasonable in light of the complexity of the case, the strategies pursued, and

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the responses necessitated by an opponent's maneuvering; (2) whether the amount of
time spent is reasonable in relation to counsel's experience; and (3) whether the billing
entries are sufficiently detailed, showing how much time was allotted to a specific
task. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder Cnty.,
No. 06-cv-00554, 2010 WL 3703224, at *2-3 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2010). “Counsel for the
prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that
are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 434 (1983). Although courts are obligated to exclude hours not reasonably
expended from the fee award, courts need not “identify and justify every hour allowed
or disallowed, as doing so would run counter to the Supreme Court’s warning that a
‘request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.’” Malloy, 73
F.3d at 1018 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437); Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2216
(2011) (“The essential goal in shifting fees . . . is to do rough justice, not to achieve
auditing perfection.”).
Once the Court has determined the number of hours reasonably spent, it must
then determine a reasonable hourly rate of compensation.2 Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555.
“A reasonable rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” Malloy, 73
F.3d at 1018 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 885, 897 (1984)). The party seeking the

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Defendants do not contest the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate.
The Court also finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s rate to be reasonable. Therefore, the Court analysis
will focus on the reasonableness of the hours expended by Plaintiff’s counsel.

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award has the burden of persuading the court that the hours expended and the hourly
rate are both reasonable. Id.
The third step consists of multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the number of
hours reasonably expended to determine the “lodestar” amount. Hensley, 461 U.S. at
433.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fees should be reduced by
20%, from $47,445.00 to $37,956.00 for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff’s counsel
duplicated efforts regarding the jury instructions; (2) Plaintiff did not prevail on all claims;
(3) Plaintiff’s award request includes hours billed for time expended on an unrelated
state suit; and (4) Plaintiff’s counsel billed for clerical work.
A.

FEES FOR PREPARING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Defendants challenge the reasonableness of the hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent

drafting and researching jury instructions. Upon review of the billing records submitted
by Plaintiff’s counsel, it is difficult for the Court to determine the exact number of hours
that Plaintiff’s counsel expended in preparation of the jury instructions because some
time entries are in the form of “block-billing,” i.e., lumping together multiple tasks into
one entry. The use of block-billing often warrants a reduction in the award of attorneys’
fees because the records are inadequate insofar as they are not “meticulous, contemporaneous time records that reveal, for each lawyer for whom fees are sought, all hours

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for which compensation is requested and how those hours were allotted to specific
tasks.” Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998); see
also Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1215 (10th Cir. 2000). However, the
Tenth Circuit does not mandate that district courts reduce attorneys’ fees for blockbilling. Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1215; Robinson v. City of Edmund, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281
(10th Cir. 1998). The Court finds that a reduction in the attorneys’ fees award is
unwarranted in this case.
Only two entries pertaining to jury instructions, reflecting 7.5 and 8 hours of
time expended, respectively, are in the form of block-billing. The Court agrees with
Defendants that Plaintiff’s counsel would have spent an unreasonable number of hours
on jury instructions if all 15.5 of those hours were attributed to jury instructions.
However, it is apparent that many of those hours were used to prepare for trial,
including prepping for witness examination and preparing exhibits, as few other hours
were allocated for trial preparation. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably spent a
substantial number of hours preparing jury instructions. Plaintiff’s counsel had to revise
the jury instructions after the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and had to spend time responding to Defendants’ objections. Although
Defendants are entitled to object, “[they] cannot then complain that the fees award
should be less” when Plaintiff’s counsel had to spend time addressing those objections.
See Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 770 F.2d 1566, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985).
Additionally, as Plaintiff notes, it is unlikely that an attorney, working on a contingency
basis, would intentionally run up the time expended on a case when the risk of not being
able to recover a fee is high.
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The Court also takes into consideration Plaintiff’s high degree of success in this
case, which underscores the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s time expended on
jury instructions. Plaintiff was awarded $29,300.00 in actual damages by a jury, more
than five times Defendants’ offer of judgment. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103,
114 (1992) (the degree of success is “the most critical factor in determining the
reasonableness of a fee award” (internal quotations omitted)); See Moreno v. City of
Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008) (if the prevailing party’s counsel had
spent less time on the case, they may not have achieved such success). Thus, a
reduction for block-billing and time spent on jury instructions is unwarranted.
B.

FEES FOR WORK RELATED TO “UNSUCCESSFUL CLAIMS”
Defendants assert that Plaintiff should not recover attorneys’ fees for time

expended on unsuccessful claims. This is without merit. First and foremost, the Court’s
denial of summary judgment on all but one of Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims does not mean
those claims failed. The Court found only that there were genuine issues of material
fact with respect to those claims that were more appropriately addressed to a jury.
Because the FDCPA is a strict liability statute and only one violation must be proven to
find liability, there was no need to litigate those claims at trial. Thus, none of Plaintiff’s
claims were found to be without merit.
Moreover, even if these claims were “unsuccessful,” Plaintiff would still be
entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for that time. It is well settled that a prevailing party
may recover attorneys’ fees for time expended on pursuing claims that did not ultimately
prevail or were not fully litigated provided that those claims were related to the

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successful claim. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (“Litigants in good faith may raise
alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection of or failure to
reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee.”). All of Plaintiff’s
claims shared a common core of facts and were related to the successful claim in that
they challenged the manner by which Defendants attempted to collect on the contested
debt.3 Therefore, Plaintiff may recover the claimed attorneys’ fees and costs for work
expended on all claims.
C.

REDUCTION FOR WORK RELATED TO STATE LAW SUIT
Plaintiff may not recover attorneys’ fees for the hours expended in defending

against the state law suit brought by Defendants against Plaintiff because the state law
suit was unrelated to Plaintiff’s case against Defendants. The state suit was separate
from this case and Plaintiff’s success in defending against the state law suit had no
bearing on this action. Although it is apparent that Plaintiff’s counsel spent at least 1.05
hours defending against the state court complaint, it is difficult to determine the exact
number of hours as some of the entries are in block billing format. For example,
submerged in a three hour time entry, is time expended for drafting and filing an answer
in the state court case. The Court estimates that Plaintiff’s counsel, in total, expended
three hours in defending against the state law suit, and the Court will accordingly reduce
the fee award by $825 ($275 x 3 hours). See Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. at 2216 (stating
that trial courts “may use estimates in calculating . . . an attorney’s time.”).

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The same holds true for the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) claim, which was
ultimately not pursued.

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D.

REDUCTION FOR LACK OF GOOD BILLING JUDGMENT
Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees award should further be reduced

because Plaintiff’s counsel billed for clerical tasks. Upon review of the billing records,
the Court finds three entries that contain tasks that do not appear legal in nature, i.e.,
filing documents with the Court and loading documents onto the laptop. See Hayden v.
Astrue, No. 01-cv-01861, 2009 WL 4563120, at *4 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2009) (“Plaintiff’s
attorney is not entitled to an award of fees for time spent on work that is essentially
clerical, or at most paralegal, rather than legal.”). The Court will reduce the fee award
by $275.00, or one hour, for clerical work.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court calculates Plaintiff’s fee award as follows: The
Court deducts fees for work dedicated to the defense of the state law suit ($825.00) and
for non-legal clerical work ($275.00) for a total fee award of $46,345.00 ($47,445.00 $825.00 - $275.00).4
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
(Doc. # 61) is GRANTED.

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The Court acknowledges that this fee award is higher than average for an FDCPA
case. See, e.g., Smith v. Argent Mortg. Co., LLC, No. 05-cv-02364, 2008 WL 1840727, at *2
(D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2008) (awarding $18,601.00 in attorney fees); Kittle v. Accredited Collection
Agency Inc., No. 07-cv-01716, 2011 WL 683815, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2011) (awarding
$5,175.00 in attorney fees). However, this case required significantly more work than the
average FDCPA case as Defendants fought tooth and nail at every step of the this litigation.
Although Defendants were entitled to mount a vigorous opposition, the heavily contested
nature of this case explains the higher than average fees incurred by Plaintiff.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall be awarded fees in the amount
of $46,345.00.
DATED: August

04 , 2011
BY THE COURT:

_______________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge

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