Jefferson County School District R-1 v. E.

Filing 50

ORDER Plaintiffs Objection to the Magistrate Judges Recommendation ECF No. 49 is OVERRULED; Magistrate Judge Tafoyas Recommendation ECF No. 48 is ADOPTED; Defendant Elizabeth E.s Motion for Award of Attorney Fees ECF No. 43 is GRANTED and sh e is awarded $141,731.00 in attorneys fees; and The Clerk shall enter judgment against Plaintiff Jefferson County School District R-1 and in favor of Defendant Elizabeth E. $141,731.00 for attorneys fees, by Judge William J. Martinez on 3/22/2012.(ervsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Case No. 10-cv-00741-WJM-KMT
JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT R-1,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELIZABETH E., by and through her parents, Roxanne B. and David E.,
Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RECOMMENDATION AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

In this case brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”), Jefferson County School District R-1 (“Plaintiff”) asked the Court to review the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) which required Plaintiff to reimburse
Defendant Elizabeth E., by and through her parents Roxanne B. and David E.
(collectively “Defendant”) for Elizabeth’s tuition and other services at a private
residential treatment facility. (ECF No. 1.) After full briefing on the merits, the Court
affirmed the ALJ’s decision and entered judgment in favor of Defendant. (ECF Nos. 30
& 31.)
On August 17, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion for Award of Attorney Fees
(“Motion”) seeking reimbursement of the attorney’s fees they had expended in pursuing
their IDEA claim. (ECF No. 43.) The Motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Kathleen
M. Tafoya for a recommended decision. (ECF No. 44.) Magistrate Judge Tafoya
entered her Recommendation on March 6, 2012, recommending that the Motion be

granted and that Defendant be awarded $141,731.00 in attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 48.)
Plaintiff filed a timely Objection to the Recommendation. (ECF No. 49.)
Before the Court are the Motion, Recommendation, and Plaintiff’s Objection. For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Objection is overruled, the Recommendation is
adopted, and the Motion is granted.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the district court judge “determine
de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s [recommendation] that has been properly
objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In conducting its review, “[t]he district court judge
may accept, reject, or modify the recommendation; receive further evidence; or return
the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id. The Court may review any
portion of the Recommendation that is not specifically objected to “under any standard
it deems appropriate.” Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 Advisory
Committee’s Note (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record.”).
II. ANALYSIS
IDEA contains a fee-shifting provision which allows a “prevailing party” to recover
its “reasonable attorneys’ fees”. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The Magistrate Judge
found that “the decision of the ALJ, and the subsequent decision by the District Court,
materially altered the legal relationship of the parties and required the plaintiff to do

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something it had previously refused to do” and, therefore, Defendant was the prevailing
party in this action. (Rec. at 11.) Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in
finding that Defendant was the prevailing party because the only relief she achieved
was the imposition of the statutorily required “stay-put provision.” (Obj. at 8-9.) Plaintiff
argues that “[a]n agreement during the pendency of judicial proceedings is not a
decision on the merits.” (Id. at 9.)
If the only relief Defendant obtained as a result of this litigation was the
imposition of the statutorily-required “stay-put” order, the Court agrees that she would
not be considered the prevailing party. See Bd. of Educ. V. Steven L., 89 F.3d 464,
469 (7th Cir. 1996). However, that is not the only relief Defendant obtained in this
action. The Court made a number of substantive rulings in favor of Defendant: (1)
Elizabeth’s placement at Innercept was a reimbursable placement under IDEA; (2)
Plaintiff was not entitled to a reduction in the amount it was required to reimburse
Defendant for Elizabeth’s placement at Innercept; and (3) Plaintiff was required to
reimburse Defendant for the cost of Elizabeth’s placement at Innercept, except for any
medical services provided. (ECF No. 30.) These are substantive rulings that materially
altered the legal relationship between the parties. As such, the Court agrees with the
Recommendation and finds that Defendant is the prevailing party in this action. See
P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ. 442 F.3d 848, 856-57 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that
parents were the prevailing party when they achieved success on significant issues).
Plaintiff also argues that the Court should not grant attorney’s fees to Defendant
at this time because it has appealed the Court’s ruling to the Tenth Circuit. (Obj. at 10.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendant will suffer no prejudice by having to wait until the Tenth
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Circuit resolves the appeal. (Id.) Addressing this point, the Magistrate Judge stated:
“The defendant has spent an exorbitant amount of money on attorney fees in this
matter. The court finds Plaintiff’s argument that the defendant would not be prejudiced
if the court postpones a decision on attorney fees to be incredible.” (Rec. at 12.) The
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge. Regardless of when the Tenth Circuit may
issue its decision in this case, Defendant has suffered substantial hardship in having to
defend against this case before the ALJ, this Court, and now the Tenth Circuit. The
Court sees no reason to delay entering the attorney’s fee award to which Defendant is
entitled under the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision. See Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of
Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974) (noting that delaying a fee award until the
conclusion of litigation would cause “substantial hardship” and be contrary to the
purposes of the fee-shifting provision).
In the Motion, Defendant requested $141,731.00 in attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 43
at 15.) Plaintiff did not oppose the reasonableness of the amount of fees requested.
(ECF No. 46.) The Magistrate Judge found that this non-opposition constituted an
admission that the amount was reasonable and recommended that the full amount be
awarded to Defendant. (ECF No. 48 at 13.) Plaintiff has not objected to the Magistrate
Judge’s analysis on this point. (ECF No. 49.) Having reviewed the issue for clear error,
the Court finds that the amount of attorney’s fees requested by Defendant is
reasonable.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

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1.

Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (ECF No. 49) is
OVERRULED;

2.

Magistrate Judge Tafoya’s Recommendation (ECF No. 48) is ADOPTED;

3.

Defendant Elizabeth E.’s Motion for Award of Attorney Fees (ECF No. 43) is
GRANTED and she is awarded $141,731.00 in attorney’s fees; and

4.

The Clerk shall enter judgment against Plaintiff Jefferson County School District
R-1 and in favor of Defendant Elizabeth E. $141,731.00 for attorney’s fees.
Dated this 22nd day of March, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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