General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Chumley et al

Filing 345

ORDER denying 344 Motion to Consolidate Related Cases. By Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 4/26/13.(mnfsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 10-cv-01398-PAB-KLM
GENERAL STEEL DOMESTIC SALES, LLC,
d/b/a General Steel Corporation, a Colorado limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.
ETHAN DANIEL CHUMLEY, individually, and
ATLANTIC BUILDING SYSTEMS, LLC, a Delaware corporation,
doing business as Armstrong Steel Corporation,
Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Consolidate Related Cases
[Docket No. 344] filed by defendants Ethan Chumley and Atlantic Building Systems,
LLC, doing business as Armstrong Steel Corporation (“Armstrong”), on April 17, 2013.
Plaintiff General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, doing business as General Steel
Corporation (“General Steel”), takes no position on this motion. Docket No. 344 at 1.
Defendants request that the Court consolidate the instant case with a second case that
General Steel filed against them on March 25, 2013. See General Steel Domestic
Sales, LLC v. Chumley, No. 13-cv-00769-MSK-KMT (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2013).
Defendants assert that consolidation would “promote judicial economy, conserve the
parties’ resources, and minimize the risk of inconsistent decisions regarding common
issues of fact and law.” Docket No. 344 at 2.
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]f actions

before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may . . .
consolidate the actions.” FED . R. CIV. P. 42(a)(2). The decision whether to consolidate
actions involving common questions of law or fact is committed to the sound discretion
of the district court. Shump v. Balka, 574 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978). The
purpose of Rule 42(a) is “to give the court broad discretion to decide how cases on its
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched with
expedition and economy while providing justice to the parties.” Breaux v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 220 F.R.D. 366, 367 (D. Colo. 2004) (quoting 9 C. W RIGHT & A.
MILLER , FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2381 at 427 (2nd ed. 1995)). Therefore,
the Court will consider both judicial economy and fairness to the parties in exercising its
discretion under Rule 42(a). See Harris v. Illinois-California Express, Inc., 687 F.2d
1361, 1368 (10th Cir. 1982).
Despite certain similarities between the two cases–specifically, the identity of the
parties and several of the asserted legal claims–consolidation of these matters would
not serve judicial economy. First, the instant action has already been tried and is
awaiting only the issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of law, while the second
action, filed a little over a month ago, is in the initial stages of litigation. Second,
General Steel has asserted a number of claims in the second action that it did not raise
in the first, namely, copyright infringement, anticybersquatting, defamation, intentional
interference with prospective business advantage, civil conspiracy, misappropriation of
trade secrets, and intentional interference with contract. Compare Docket No. 21 at 1223 with No. 13-cv-00769-MSK-KMT, Docket No. 1 at 14-37. There would be limited

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judicial economy in the consolidation of these claims. Third, the recently filed case
concerns new factual matter that has emerged over the nine months since the trial of
the first action took place. See, e.g., No. 13-cv-00769-MSK-KMT, Docket No. 1 at 13,
¶ 46 (“In December 2012, Chumley commenced another attack on General Steel.”), 14,
¶ 52 (“In February 2013, Defendants Chumley and Armstrong began sending a further
follow-up ‘Consumer Advocacy Alliance’ letter to General Steel’s customers.”). In light
of these differences, the Court’s general familiarity with the subject matter would be
unlikely to conserve many resources, whether of the parties or of the Court. Moreover,
defendants’ concern regarding inconsistent judgments, see Docket No. 344 at 6, is
unfounded since the effect of a judgment issued in the instant action will be the same
regardless of whether the matters are consolidated. The doctrine of collateral estoppel
will preclude the parties from relitigating any issues decided in the first action. See B-S
Steel of Kan., Inc. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 662 (10th Cir. 2006) (collateral
estoppel precludes a court from reconsidering an issue decided in a previous
adjudication where (1) the issues are identical; (2) the prior action was fully adjudicated
on the merits; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party to the prior
adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior adjudication) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Motion to Consolidate Related Cases [Docket No. 344] is
DENIED.

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DATED April 26, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

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