Madera v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Filing 56

ORDER denying 46 Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order; denying 50 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, as set forth in this Order, by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe on 6/8/2011.(mjwcd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 10-cv-01507-MSK-MJW
COURTNEY MADERA,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER REGARDING
(1) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (DOCKET NO. 46)
AND
(2) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL (DOCKET NO. 50)

Entered by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order (docket
no. 46) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (docket no. 50). The court has reviewed the
subject motions (docket nos. 46 and 60) and the responses (docket nos. 54 and 55)
thereto. In addition, the court has taken judicial notice of the court file and has
considered applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and case law. The court now
being fully informed makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and Order.
Plaintiff alleges in this lawsuit that Defendant Wal-Mart (“Defendant”) subjected
her to a sexually hostile work environment, gender discrimination, and retaliation, in
violation of Title VII.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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The court finds:
1.

That I have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties
to this lawsuit;

2.

That venue is proper in the state and District of Colorado;

3.

That each party has been given a fair and adequate opportunity to
be heard;

4.

That in Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order (docket no. 46), the
Plaintiff argues that there is no need for Defendant to subpoena
personnel and wage information from Plaintiff’s current employer
and from Plaintiff’s former employers RGIS, IBMC, and Albertson’s.
Plaintiff further argues that she will supplement her discovery
responses to include the requested information listed above.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that if Defendant is allowed to subpoena
such personnel and wage information directly from Plaintiff’s
current employer, there is a potential that such subpoena will cause
Plaintiff’s current employer to view her negatively, or with suspicion,
and therefore a Protective Order should be issued by this court
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to prevent such harm;

5.

That the requested information by Defendant as outlined in
paragraph 4 above is relevant and probative on the disputed issues
of actual damages and mitigation of damages;

6.

That a party seeking a protective order must show that a “clearly
defined and serious injury” will result to the moving party in the

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absence of such protective order. Exum v. United States Olympic
Committee, 209 F.R.D. 201, 206 (D. Colo. 202); see also Charles
A. Wright & Arthur Miller, Fed. Practice and Pro (Civ) § 2035 n.39
(“The courts have insisted on a particular and specific
demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and
conclusory statements, in or to establish good cause.”). Here,
Plaintiff has failed to show that she will suffer a “clearly defined and
serious injury” in the absence of a protective order and therefore
has failed to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Consequently, Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order (docket no. 46)
shall be denied;
7.

That Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defines
the scope of discovery as follows:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense–including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the
court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information
need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears

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reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed
by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However, “a party’s right to obtain
discovery of ‘any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim
or defense of a party’ . . . may be constrained where the court
determines that the desired discovery is unreasonable or unduly
burdensome given the needs of the case, the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving the issues.” Simpson v. University of Colo.,
220 F.R.D. 354, 356 (D. Colo. 2004). “The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permit a court to restrict or preclude discovery when
justice requires in order to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense. . . .” Id. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) and (c);

A given topic is relevant if it has “the mere tendency” of making any
material fact more or less probable. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168, 170 (D. Colo. 1991). See Fed. R. Evid. 401;
8.

That as to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (docket no. 50), Plaintiff
asserts that Defendant has failed to respond fully to the following
three Requests for Production of Document (“RFP”):
a.

RFP No. 3: Produce and identify by Bates numbers any

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and all complaints, written or verbal, or documentation
regarding complaints, written or verbal, made by Ms.
Madera;
b.

RFP No. 4: Produce and identify by Bates numbers each
and every document related to complaints of any kind made
against Ms. Bennett;

c.

RFP No. 5: Produce and identify by Bates numbers any and
all documentation regarding complaints of sexual
harassment, including physical and verbal conduct, by any
employee of the Wal-Mart Store at which Ms. Madera was
employed; and

9.

That RFP Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are overly-broad. Furthermore, I find that
Defendant has nevertheless produced in response to RFP Nos. 3,
4, and 5 the entire file compiled in the internal investigation of Ms.
Madera’s sexual harassment allegations which consists of
approximately 140 pages of witness statements, interview notes,
and business records. Accordingly, no further response is required
by Defendant to RFP Nos. 3, 4, or 5, and Plaintiff’s Motion to
Compel (docket no. 50) shall be denied.
ORDER

WHEREFORE, based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law this
court ORDERS:

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1.

That Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order (docket no. 46) is
DENIED. Defendant may serve subpoenas duces tecum for
personnel and wage information from Plaintiff’s current employer
and from Plaintiff’s former employers RGIS, IBMC, and Albertson’s.
Plaintiff shall provide to Defendant a written release on or before
June 15, 2011, for personnel and wage information from Plaintiff’s
current employer and from Plaintiff’s former employers RGIS,
IBMC, and Albertson’s;

2.

That Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (docket no. 50) is DENIED; and

3.

That each party shall pay their own attorney fees and costs for
these motions.

Done this 8th day of June 2011.
BY THE COURT
s/Michael J. Watanabe
MICHAEL J. WATANABE
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE