Young v. LaPage et al

Filing 226

ORDER denying 220 Mr. Young's "Motion Requesting Recusal of Magistrate Judge and Objection of Decisions Made by Magistrate Judge." By Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer on 03/27/2013. (cbslc1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 10-cv-01513-WJM-CBS
JOHNATHAN YOUNG, SR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
[JASON] BROCK,
Defendant.

ORDER

Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer
THIS MATTER comes before the court on Plaintiff Johnathan Young’s Motion Requesting
Recusal of Magistrate Judge and Objection of Decisions Made by Magistrate Judge (hereinafter “Motion
Requesting Recusal”) (Doc. # 220) filed February 25, 2013. Pursuant to the Order of Reference (Doc. #
32) and memorandum (Doc. # 221) this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge. The court has
carefully reviewed the motions, the related briefings and hearings, the entire case file, and the applicable
law. For the following reasons, I recommend that Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Recusal be DENIED.
Plaintiff, Johnathan Young, is an inmate in the custody of the Colorado Department of
Corrections (“CDOC”). Defendant is a deputy at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado. The original
complaint stems from an incident that occurred when Mr. Young was a pretrial detainee held at the El
Paso County Jail. See Recommendation on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 107). Additional
facts and the procedural background of this litigation have been detailed in this court’s Recommendation
on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 107) and in the district court’s Order Adopting the
Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. # 118), so it will not be repeated here. Mr.
Young now argues that the Magistrate Judge must recuse himself because his decisions and actions
reflect a bias in favor of the Defendant. See Motion Requesting Recusal (Doc. # 220).

1

A United States magistrate judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012). In the Tenth Circuit,
disqualification should occur in cases where “a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would
harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.” United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993).
This is an objective standard, In re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir. 2004), and the relevant
inquiry is whether, based on the judge’s “outward manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom,” a sufficient factual basis exists to reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. Cooley, 1
F.3d at 993.
The Tenth Circuit has confirmed that a motion to recuse is insufficient if it is based only on
“beliefs, conclusions, …suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters.” Id.; see also Hinman v.
Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987) (affirming that “conclusions, rumors, beliefs, and opinions
are not sufficient to form a basis for disqualification”). Additionally, adverse rulings against a litigant
do not provide a sufficient basis for recusal. Cooley, 1 F.3d at 994 (affirming that motions to recuse will
be denied if based on “prior rulings in the proceeding …solely because they were adverse”); Glass v.
Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1268 (10th Cir. 1988) (affirming “adverse rulings are not in themselves grounds
for recusal”); Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir. 1992) (denying motion to recuse because it
alleged no factual basis to warrant recusal but only restated the party’s conclusive beliefs, and because
substance of the motion was “based on adverse rulings,” which “cannot in themselves form the
appropriate grounds for disqualification”).
The moving party bears the burden to prove the objective bias of the judge; the judge does not
bear a burden to prove that he is impartial. McCarthey, 368 F.3d at 1269. “The statute is not intended to
give litigants a veto power over sitting judges, or a vehicle for obtaining a judge of their choice.”
Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993. Finally, “[t]here is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no
occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.” Hinman, 831 F.2d at 939.

2

Plaintiff Young asserts the following in support of his motion to recuse: (1) the Magistrate Judge
is biased because he asked Plaintiff to cooperate with defense counsel to complete a final pretrial order
when Plaintiff does not understand the purpose or format of the order; (2) that Plaintiff does not trust
opposing counsel and does not want to discuss the final pretrial order with him; (3) the Magistrate Judge
should have referred Plaintiff for pro bono counsel earlier in the proceedings; and (4) the Magistrate
Judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for a second set of interrogatories evidences the judge’s bias in favor
of Defendant. See Motion Requesting Recusal (Doc. # 220).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would cause a reasonable person to question my
impartiality or that would warrant recusal. Plaintiff has alleged only information that is an opinion or
belief, or complains about adverse rulings, and neither are sufficient grounds for recusal. First,
Plaintiff’s opinion that he does not trust opposing counsel and that “if the magistrate Shaffer had put me
in sooner for pro bono counsel its [sic] possible that I would have had an attorney by now” merely
express Plaintiff’s suspicions about how this litigation is proceeding, and do not adequately support
recusal. Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993; Hinman, 831 F.2d at 939. Second, the Plaintiff merely relies on adverse
orders rather than facts to support his motion. He complains that the denial of a second set of
interrogatories, requests to work with opposing counsel, and the timing of his referral to pro bono
counsel, orders that he perceives to be adverse, demonstrate bias. See Motion Requesting Recusal (Doc.
# 220). However, adverse rulings are not grounds for recusal. Cooley, 1 F.3d at 994; Glass, 849 F.2d at
1268; Green, 969 F.2d at 919.
The history of this litigation reveals that I have made multiple rulings favorable to Plaintiff. For
example, I have granted Mr. Young’s motion for proof that a prison surveillance camera was broken at
the time of the incident (Doc. # 151), granted Mr. Young’s motion requesting a copy of his deposition
(Doc. # 151), and granted Mr. Young’s “Subpoena for Command to Produce,” and ordered that the clerk
of court issue a subpoena for Mr. Young’s medical records (Doc. # 160). Additionally, I have worked to
accommodate the Plaintiff’s unique situation as a pro se prisoner litigant. Among other things, I have
3

explained discovery and filing deadlines (Doc. # 138); I set a status conference on November 5, 2012
with Mr. Young and his case managers to address Mr. Young’s access to discovery discs at the prison
law library; and I directed opposing counsel to inform the prison law librarians that Mr. Young has
access to and control over his discovery materials (Doc. # 194). At the January 30, 2013 hearing I
explained in detail the “good cause” standard to permit discovery deadline extensions and explained the
denial of his second set of interrogatories (Doc. # 215). Finally, I placed Mr. Young on the list for
which counsel may choose to volunteer on November 6, 2012, (Doc. # 200), and explained to Mr.
Young how the list and process works.
Therefore, the court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Recusal of Magistrate Judge and
Objection of Decisions Made by Magistrate Judge, and the Magistrate Judge declines to disqualify
himself.
DATED this 27th day of March, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

s/Craig B. Shaffer
United States Magistrate Judge

4