Lindquist v. Robinson et al

Filing 86

ORDER. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant Sheriff Grayson Robinson to Provide Discovery Responses Related to Similar Claims 56 is granted in part and denied in part as specified. Defendants shall respond to the requests so ordered no later than 8/9/2011. By Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty on 7/26/2011.(sah, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 10-cv-02264-REB-MEH
DIANN LINDQUIST,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARAPAHOE COUNTY,
ARAPAHOE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
SHERIFF GRAYSON ROBINSON, in his official capacity,
DEPUTY JAMES COOK, in his official and individual capacities,
DEPUTY PAUL BOLTE, in his official and individual capacities,
DEPUTY KRISTEN MORRIS, in her official and individual capacities,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Sheriff Grayson Robinson to
Provide Discovery Responses Related to Similar Claims [filed June 6, 2011; docket #56]. The
matter is briefed and has been referred to this Court for disposition. Oral argument would not
materially assist the Court in adjudicating the motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants
in part and denies in part the Motion to Compel.
I.

Background
In this action, Plaintiff Diann Lindquist alleges that in or about September 2008 she was

unlawfully stopped and detained by Defendants Cook and Bolte, deputies of the Arapahoe County
Sheriff’s Office. Amended Complaint, docket #31. She further claims that, in retaliation for
expressing her objections to Defendants’ conduct, Defendants then handcuffed her, and while she
was restrained, repeatedly struck her in the arms, wrist and hands. Id. Lindquist seeks damages for

injuries she allegedly has suffered, and continues to suffer, from the arrest and use of force. Id.
In this matter, the parties have engaged in discovery and exchanged a good amount of
information and a significant number of documents. However, Lindquist contends that, while
Defendant Sheriff Robinson has produced certain requested documents for the years 2003-2009, he
has failed or refused to produce such documents for the year 2010. Lindquist argues that the 2010
documents are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence concerning her claim against
Arapahoe County pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 463 U.S. 658 (1978). Moreover,
Lindquist seeks copies of documents pertaining to the litigation of several cases Robinson has listed
for her, as well as any and all documents concerning “informal complaints” made against the County
for the relevant time period.
Robinson objects to Lindquist’s requests as vague, overly burdensome and irrelevant.
Robinson argues that the requested 2010 documents would not support Lindquist’s Monell claim
given that if she “is unable to substantiate her ‘custom and practice’ theory using the thousands of
pages of documents she has already been provided ... then she can hardly illustrate or prove her
theory using records originating after her arrest; and certainly not records illustrating arrests and
uses of force from 2010.” Response at 12, docket #66. Robinson further objects that he has no
documents concerning “informal complaints” in his possession, and any litigation documents
Lindquist seeks are accessible to her and to the public at large.
II.

Legal Standard
The party moving to compel discovery must prove that the opposing party’s answers are

incomplete. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Boland, 259 F.R.D. 516, 518 (D. Colo. 2009) (citing
Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 534 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1976) (“appellees had the burden

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of proving the answer to their interrogatory was indeed incomplete”)); see also Continental Ins. Co.
v. McGraw, 110 F.R.D. 679, 682 (D. Colo. 1986) (the burden of proof lies with the proponent to
prove answers are incomplete, inadequate, or false).
Here, Lindquist primarily challenges Robinson’s objections to her discovery requests based
upon relevance. The scope of evidence that is subject to discovery under the federal rules is broad:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense - including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the
court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Fed. R. Civ. P 26(b)(1) (2010). The party objecting to discovery must establish that the requested
discovery does not fall under the scope of relevance as defined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Simpson
v. University of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Colo. 2004).
III.

Analysis
In this matter, Lindquist’s document requests fall into three categories: (1) certain documents

related to conduct in the year 2010, including Professional Standards Bureau’s Summary of Internal
Affairs Investigations, Use of Force Incidents, and Vehicle Incidents; Use of Force Review Log
Sheets; “Sustained” Internal Affairs Complaints or “Not in Compliance Use of Force Summaries”;
and a list of similar lawsuits filed against Arapahoe County; (2) documents regarding “informal
complaints” against Arapahoe County; and (3) documents pertaining to the list of lawsuits already
provided to Lindquist by Robinson.
A.

2010 Documents

The Court broadly construes relevancy, and a request for discovery should be considered

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relevant if it is possible that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any
party. Bonanno v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., 255 F.R.D. 550, 552 (D. Colo. 2009). When the
requested information appears to be relevant, the party objecting to the discovery has the burden to
establish the information is irrelevant by demonstrating the information does not come within the
scope of relevance as defined by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or is of such marginal relevance that the
harm in producing the information outweighs the presumption in favor of broad disclosure. Id.
(citing Simpson, 220 F.R.D. at 359). “Conversely, when the request is overly broad on its face or
when relevancy is not readily apparent, the party seeking the discovery has the burden to show the
relevancy of the request.” Hammond v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs Inc.., 216 F.R.D. 666, 670 (D. Kan.
2003); see also Bonnano, 255 F.R.D. at 553.
Here, the Court finds that information concerning use of force issues and internal affairs in
the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office for a portion of the year 2010 to be relevant for purposes of
discovery in this case.1 Therefore, Robinson has the burden to demonstrate that such information
does not come within the scope of relevance as defined by Rule 26(b)(1) or is of such marginal
relevance that the harm in producing the information would outweigh the presumption in favor of
broad disclosure. Bonnano, 255 F.R.D. at 552. In this case, Robinson has not made the required

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Robinson’s citations to Graber v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2011 WL 839283, at *7 (D.
Colo. Mar. 7, 2011) and Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 2008 WL 2559443, at *2 (D. Colo. June
23, 2008) are not persuasive here. In those cases, the courts were asked to determine whether the
plaintiffs had proffered sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment on the question of
causation for the challenged municipal policies. In the discovery context here, the information
requested need not be admissible at trial (or for summary judgment purposes); therefore, the
standard is quite different. Moreover, the court in Graber cites to the opinion in Cordova v.
Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009), which acknowledges that “[a] subsequent coverup might provide circumstantial evidence that the city viewed the policy as a policy in name only
and routinely encouraged contrary behavior.”
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showing for documents pertaining to similar conduct for the entire year 2010. The Court agrees
with Lindquist that some post-incident conduct may be relevant to a showing of an unconstitutional
policy, custom or practice pursuant to Monell, supra. See, e.g., Estate of Rice ex rel. Garber v. City
& Cnty. of Denver, No. 07-cv-01571-MSK-BNB, 2008 WL 2228702, at *6 (D. Colo. May 27, 2008)
(unpublished) (“post-incident investigations and discipline are relevant to the issue of policy or
custom”); see also Martinez v. Cornell Corrs. of Texas, 229 F.R.D. 215, 223-24 (D.N.M. 2005)
(compelling production of documents concerning similar claims without a time frame
stating,“[t]here is a reasonable argument that subsequent acts or conduct may be admissible to
establish municipal liability”). At the same time, the Court believes that relevancy under these
circumstances diminishes as time passes. With that in mind, and considering the liberal breadth of
discovery allowed under the rules, the Court finds that a reasonable time period for post-incident
conduct in this case to be two years. Thus, the Court grants the motion in part and orders Robinson
to produce copies of documents, including those described by Lindquist as Professional Standards
Bureau’s Summary of Internal Affairs Investigations, Use of Force Incidents, and Vehicle Incidents;
Use of Force Review Log Sheets; “Sustained” Internal Affairs Complaints or “Not in Compliance
Use of Force Summaries”; and a list of similar lawsuits filed against Arapahoe County in the same
format already provided to Lindquist and for the time period January 1, 2010 through September 16,
2010.
B.

Informal Complaints

Lindquist complains that Robinson responded to her request for “informal complaints” made
against Arapahoe County asserting that “no such documents exist.” Motion at 6. Robinson confirms
in his response to the motion that “no records regarding ‘informal complaints’ are known to exist.”

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Response at 12. The Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of the individual who executed
the sworn discovery responses, nor an officer of the court responding to discovery in this case; if the
documents do not exist, then the Court has nothing to compel. Therefore, the motion is denied as
to the production of “informal complaints” against Arapahoe County.
C.

Litigation Documents

With respect to her request for information and documentation concerning similar lawsuits
filed against Arapahoe County, Lindquist claims that she has “tailored this request to seek
production only of the complaints, orders regarding dispositive motions, and settlement documents
(if applicable).” Motion at 6. Robinson counters that such documents are public and are easily
accessible to Lindquist. The Court agrees with Robinson. He has provided Lindquist a list of the
titles, case numbers and court locations of similar lawsuits brought against Arapahoe County for the
relevant time period (except as set forth above). See March 18, 2011 Letter from Newman to
Caswall, docket #56-2 at 6. In addition, Lindquist has been provided with copies of all relevant
settlement agreements. Response at 13 n.9. The federal rules require only that the party responding
to a request for production of documents produce what is in its “possession, custody or control.”
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). Here, Lindquist has all of the information she needs to access the
public documents she seeks at her own expense. Thus, the motion to compel is denied as to
Lindquist’s request for copies of “complaints, orders regarding dispositive motions, and settlement
documents” pertaining to the list of similar lawsuits provided by Robinson.
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion

to Compel Defendant Sheriff Grayson Robinson to Provide Discovery Responses Related to Similar

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Claims [filed June 6, 2011; docket #56] is granted in part and denied in part as specified herein.
Defendants shall respond to the requests so ordered no later than August 9, 2011.
Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 26th day of July, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

Michael E. Hegarty
United States Magistrate Judge

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