Auraria Student Housing at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC
Filing
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ORDER denying 23 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); granting 27 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Exhibits A-D to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, by Judge William J. Martinez on 11/23/2011.(wjc, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 10-cv-02516-WJM-KLM
AURARIA STUDENT HOUSING AT THE REGENCY, LLC, a Colorado limited liability
company,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMPUS VILLAGE APARTMENTS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 23), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Exhibits A-D to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27). Both motions are fully briefed and ripe for
adjudication. (See also ECF No. 28, 32-34.) For the following reasons, Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The following allegations, contained in Plaintiff’s operative Amended Complaint,
are accepted as true for purposes of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (See infra.)
This action arises from an allegedly anticompetitive agreement between
Defendant Campus Village Apartments, LLC and non-party University of Colorado
Denver (“UCD”) creating a residential location restriction for certain UCD students (“the
1
Agreement”). (ECF No. 19, ¶ 4.) Specifically, pursuant to the Agreement, most full-time
domestic freshman and international students are required, during the first two
semesters of their enrollment at UCD, to reside at Defendant’s Campus Village
Apartments complex, located approximately one-half mile from the center of UCD’s
Downtown Denver Campus (“the residency restriction”). (Id. ¶¶ 2, 22, 29, 45.) The
residency restriction took effect in the fall of 2006. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 29.) Plaintiff Auraria
Student Housing at the Regency, LLC operates an apartment complex approximately
two miles from UCD’s Downtown Denver Campus, and alleges that it has lost business
from students who were required by the residency restriction to reside at Campus
Village Apartments. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 66-69.)
In May 2005, in order to fund the construction of the Campus Village Apartments,
Defendant issued $50.365 million in revenue bonds through the Colorado Educational
and Cultural Facilities Authority (“CECFA”). (Id. ¶ 25.) The Official Statement for the
bond issue made express reference to the residency requirement, and made clear that
Defendant was the only entity obligated for repayment of the bonds. (Id.) Plaintiff
states, on information and belief, that the residency restriction was designed to ensure
minimum occupancy levels at Campus Village Apartments to enable Defendant to meet
its payment obligations on the bonds issued to fund the project. (Id. ¶ 20, 30, 45.)
Plaintiff also states, on information and belief, that UCD had no participation whatsoever
in the bond offering. (Id. ¶ 26.)
The Complaint contains four claims for relief: (1) conspiracy to monopolize, in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; (2) civil conspiracy; (3)
interference with prospective business relations; and (4) interference with existing
2
contractual relations. (Id. ¶¶ 70-88.) Jurisdiction in this Court is based on federal
question jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331) over the federal claim, and supplemental
jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)) over the state law claims. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Defendant now moves to dismiss the operative Amended Complaint for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It argues that it is entitled
to dismissal of the Sherman Act claim based on the state action immunity doctrine,
because the Agreement was authorized by a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy to replace competition with regulation. (ECF No. 23, at 9-11.) It
also argues that the state law claims should be dismissed on the same ground, namely,
no antitrust violation and therefore no wrongful conduct providing the necessary basis
for the state law claims. (Id. at 12-13.) Defendant submitted an affidavit and four
exhibits with its Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff moves to strike those exhibits on the ground
that they are not properly considered on a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a
complaint. (ECF No. 27.)
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Motion to Strike
Before turning to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court first addresses
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike in order to clarify what documentation, if any, the Court will
consider on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. In support of its Motion to Dismiss,
Defendant filed an affidavit of S. Jenny Van, a law clerk at the law firm representing
Defendant, and attached four exhibits to the affidavit. The exhibits are allegedly
documents evidencing various agreements between CECFA, Defendant, and/or UCD.
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Plaintiff moves to strike the four exhibits.
“Typically, a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) concerns only the
adequacy of the allegations in the complaint.” Straily v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No.
07-cv-00884, 2008 WL 793615, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 24, 2008). However,
if a plaintiff does not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its
complaint, but the document is referred to in the complaint and is central
to the plaintiff’s claim, a defendant may submit an indisputably authentic
copy to the court to be considered on a motion to dismiss.
GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir.
1997). Even as to such documents, however, the Court has discretion whether or not to
consider them on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Prager v. LaFaver, 180 F.3d
1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999) (“GFF Corp. did not purport to decide whether
consideration of materials appended to a motion to dismiss is mandatory or
discretionary. . . . We agree with our sister circuits that . . . the court has discretion to
consider such materials.”).
The Court declines to consider the exhibits attached to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss for two reasons. First, the Court cannot conclude that these are indisputably
authentic copies of the documents purportedly being submitted by Defendant. “The
requirement of authentication . . . is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). One
such way to authenticate a document is to provide “[t]estimony [of a witness with
knowledge] that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). Here, the
documents are attached to an affidavit filed by a law clerk of the law firm representing
Defendant. The law clerk, S. Jenny Van, only declares that she “reviewed documents
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associated with the 2008 Campus Village Apartments bond offering by the [CECFA],”
and on that basis certifies that the documents are true and correct copies of what she
purports them to be. The mere fact that Ms. Van “reviewed documents” she believes
were “associated with the 2008 Campus Village Apartments bond offering” does not
sufficiently authenticate those documents. A much surer way to authenticate the
documents would have been to submit an affidavit from one of the signatories to the
agreements (such as Defendant’s employee (or former employee) David E. Chadwick).
Further, even if the documents had been properly authenticated, the Court would
have declined to exercise its discretion to consider the documents. As Plaintiff points
out, Defendant has only selected certain documents referenced in the Amended
Complaint to submit to the Court. The Court declines to consider this select universe of
documents at the motion to dismiss stage, and for the same reason declines to convert
Defendant’s Motion to a motion for summary judgment. See Straily, 2008 WL 793615,
at *3.1 Should either party file a motion for summary judgment after discovery of this
action, the Court will consider such a motion based on a complete evidentiary record.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Exhibits A-D to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
therefore GRANTED. The Court now turns to addresses the merits of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss.
1
Even if the Court had denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and considered the four
exhibits, it would have still ruled that Defendant has not carried its burden of showing that it is
entitled to dismissal based on the state-action doctrine.
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B.
Motion to Dismiss
1.
Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to
dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In
evaluating such a motion, a court must “assume the truth of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ridge at
Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In ruling on such
a motion, the dispositive inquiry is “whether the complaint contains ‘enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Granting a motion to dismiss “is a harsh remedy
which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of
pleading but also to protect the interests of justice.” Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567
F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). “Thus, ‘a well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).
2.
Analysis
a.
Sherman Act Claim
Defendant argues that the Sherman Act claim is subject to dismissal because
Defendant is shielded from liability by the state action immunity doctrine. Specifically, it
argues that
Colorado has clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policies
that authorize the [CECFA] to issue bonds to build educational facilities,
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including student housing, empower the [CECFA] and [Defendant] to
regulate any such facility to enter into contracts for the use of any such
facility, and provide that the [CECFA]’s bonds shall be repaid solely from
the rents and revenues of the constructed facility. [citation omitted] Thus,
the controlling question is only whether, in light of Colorado’s clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policies, the agreements
between [Defendant] and [UCD] were foreseeable.
(ECF No. 23, at 9-10.)
“The state action immunity doctrine . . . exempts qualifying state and local
government regulation from federal antitrust, even if the regulation at issue compels an
otherwise clear violation of the federal antitrust laws.” Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 111 F.3d 1495, 1498 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
“Although the doctrine was [originally] aimed at protecting state legislatures and state
supreme courts acting in their legislative capacities, it can provide protection to other
individuals or entities acting pursuant to state authorization. In such situations,
however, closer analysis is required to determine whether antitrust immunity is
appropriate.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
As an initial matter, there is a question as to what legal test applies to this case.
Plaintiff argues that the test from California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (“Midcal test”) applies, in which the Supreme Court
established a two-part test to determine whether alleged anticompetitive conduct by a
private party is immunized under the state action immunity doctrine. The two
requirements under that test are: (1) “the challenged restraint must be one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,” and (2) “the policy must be
actively supervised by the State itself.” Id. at 105 (quotation marks omitted).
Defendant, meanwhile, argues that the test from Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
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Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (“Town of Hallie test”) applies, in which the Supreme Court
modified the Midcal test for cases involving municipalities. The Supreme Court held
that municipalities need only satisfy the first prong of the Midcal test by demonstrating
that it acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.
Id. at 46-47.
The Tenth Circuit in Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car held that the Town of Hallie
test applied to a case in which defendants – private car rental companies – were sued
for antitrust violations arising from their imposition of a daily usage fee set by a City and
County of Denver ordinance. 111 F.3d at 1498-1501. The Court held that the Town of
Hallie test applied, and not the Midcal test, because the private car rental companies
had no discretion in imposing the fee or in setting the amount of the fee, both of which
were dictated by the County ordinance. See id. The court pointed out that the plaintiff
could have named the City and County of Denver as a defendant (or even as the sole
defendant) in the action, and had he done so, the single-pronged Town of Hallie test
clearly would have applied. Id. at 1500.
This case is sufficiently comparable to Zimomra such that the Court finds it most
appropriate to apply the Town of Hallie test to the instant action. The anticompetitive
conduct complained of in this action is the Agreement between Defendant and UCD. If
Plaintiff had sued both Defendant and UCD, or UCD alone, the Town of Hallie test
would clearly apply. Just because Plaintiff has chosen to sue only Defendant, a private
party, does not alter the legal test this Court should apply in evaluating the Agreement.
Plaintiff argues that the “active supervision” prong of the Midcal test should apply
because, unlike in Zimomra, Defendant here maintained some discretion in carrying out
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the Agreement, specifically, by controlling the terms, including rental rates, for the lease
agreement with UCD students. However, as Defendant argues, the rental rates
Defendant charged are merely the allegedly anticompetitive effects of the conduct that
forms the basis for this action. The allegedly anticompetitive conduct in this action is
the Agreement between UCD and Defendant creating the residency restriction. The
allegations in the Amended Complaint indicate that UCD enforced the residency
restriction (ECF No. 19, ¶¶ 22-23, 37-39, 42), with little or no “discretion” left in
Defendant regarding enforcement of the Agreement.2
The Court’s analysis turns to the Town of Hallie test (and the first prong of the
Midcal test), namely, whether the challenged restraint – the Agreement between
Defendant and UCD creating the residency restriction – was one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy. The Tenth Circuit’s most recent decision
applying the Town of Hallie test came earlier this year in Kay Electric Cooperative v.
The City of Newkirk, Oklahoma, 647 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2011). There, the court
grappled with the question of “[h]ow clearly must a state legislature articulate its
authorization of anticompetitive . . . conduct to trigger antitrust immunity?” Id. at 1042.
Attempting to reconcile the various standards the Supreme Court has set out over the
years, the Kay Electric court stated that, at the very least, a defendant seeking immunity
2
Even if the Court were to apply the Midcal test, it would hold that the second prong of
the Midcal test – active supervision by UCD – is met here. As alleged by the Amended
Complaint, UCD has overseen and enforced the residency requirement by, inter alia, “sending
letters to students referencing the [residency restriction] and indicating that non-compliance
could impact their judicial and student status.” (ECF No. 19, ¶¶ 22-23, 37-39, 42.) Plaintiff
argues that UCD has not overseen the terms of the leases entered into between Defendant and
UCD students. Again, as discussed above, the terms of the leases, including rental rates, are
not the anticompetitive conduct at issue here. The anticompetitive conduct at issue is the
residency restriction itself.
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bears the burden “of showing that its challenged conduct was at least a foreseeable (if
not explicit) result of state legislation.” Id. at 1043 (emphasis in original). A previous
Tenth Circuit case – Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver – framed this
foreseeability test by emphasizing that “[n]onetheless, there must be a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition,” as opposed
to merely a “neutral” expression of state policy. 937 F.2d 1502, 1507 (10th Cir. 1991)
(emphasis added).
The Court proceeds to evaluate the state legislation from which Defendant
argues that Agreement was foreseeable. Title 23, Article 15 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes, entitled the Colorado Educational and Cultural Facilities Authority Act (“the
Act”), governs the CECFA’s operations. Section 102 of the Act provides,
It is the intent of the general assembly to create the Colorado educational
and cultural facilities authority to lend money to educational institutions
and cultural institutions; to authorize the authority to acquire, construct,
reconstruct, repair, alter, improve, extend, own, lease, and dispose of
properties to the end that the authority may be able to promote the welfare
of the people of this state; to authorize the authority to administer the
Colorado education savings program; to permit the bonds or certificates of
participation of the authority and the bonds or certificates of participation
of other issuers to be designated as Colorado education savings bonds or
certificates; and to vest such authority with powers to enable such
authority to accomplish such purposes. It is not the intent of the general
assembly to authorize the authority to operate any such educational or
cultural facility.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-15-102(1)(a). Section 107 of the Act lays out the general powers
of the CECFA. Defendant argues that three provisions of this Section – provisions
(1)(f), (1)(h), and (1)(I) – are the ones evidencing the Colorado legislature’s
authorization of the conduct complained of in this action. Those provisions provide:
(1) In addition to any other powers granted to the authority by this article,
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the authority shall have the following powers: . . .
(f) To determine, in accordance with the provisions of this article, the
location and character of any facility to be financed under the provisions of
this article and to acquire, construct, reconstruct, renovate, improve, alter,
replace, maintain, repair, operate, and lease such facility as lessee or
lessor; to enter into contracts for any and all of such purposes and for the
management and operation of a facility; and to designate a participating
educational institution or cultural institution as its agent to determine
the location and character of a facility undertaken by such participating
institution under the provisions of this article and, as agent of the authority,
to acquire, construct, reconstruct, renovate, replace, alter, improve,
maintain, repair, operate, lease as lessee or lessor, and regulate the same
and to enter into contracts for any and all of such purposes including
contracts for the management and operation of such facility; . . .
(h) To borrow money and to issue bonds, notes, bond anticipation notes,
or other obligations for any of its corporate purposes and to fund or refund
the same, all as provided for in this article;
(I) To establish rules and regulations, and to designate a participating
educational institution or cultural institution as its agent to establish
such rules and regulations, for the use of the facilities undertaken or
operated by such participating institution and to employ or contract for
consulting engineers, architects, attorneys, accountants, construction and
financial experts, superintendents, managers, and such other employees
and agents as may be necessary in its judgment and to fix their
compensation; . . . .
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-15-107(1) (emphasis added). Defendant argues that it is “a
participating educational institution” under the statute, “designate[d]” as an “agent” of
the CECFA to “enter into any contracts for any and all of such purposes including
contracts for the management and operation” of the Campus Village Apartments and to
“establish . . . rules and regulations” governing the use of the Campus Village
Apartments.
Kay Electric is instructive as to this argument. There, the Court stated,
[A] state’s grant of a traditional corporate charter to a municipality isn’t
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enough to make the municipality’s subsequent anticompetitive conduct
foreseeable. Municipal charters typically endow the municipality with the
authority to make contracts, to buy and sell property, to enter into joint
ventures. But most private corporation charters allow companies to do
these same things. And natural persons win these powers simply by
reaching the age of majority. Neither companies nor persons
automatically take with these pedestrian powers the right to use them in
an anticompetitive fashion, and there’s no reason to think municipalities do
either. Put simply, simple permission to play in a market doesn’t
foreseeably entail permission to roughhouse in that market unlawfully.
Kay Electric, 647 F.3d at 1043. As a result, the Court rejected the defendant’s
argument that it was entitled to immunity for anticompetitive conduct based on certain
“general enabling statutes conferring on [the defendant] the authority to do business.”
Id. at 1044.
The broad and general legislative authorization discussed in this passage from
Kay Electric – “the authority to make contracts, to buy and sell property, to enter into
joint ventures” – is just the type of broad and general legislative authority provided to
CECFA by the Colorado legislature via Colorado Revised Statute § 23-15-107(1). The
authority granted to CECFA here, including, inter alia, the authority “to enter into
contracts for any and all of such purposes” and “to establish such rules and regulations
for the use of the facilities undertaken or operated by such participating institution,” does
not indicate a sufficiently clear articulation of a policy to displace competition. There is
insufficient indication (at least at this early stage of the proceeding) that the Agreement
between Defendant and UCD was sufficiently foreseeable based on the Colorado
legislature’s grant of these broad and general powers to CECFA.
The cases relied on by Defendant are to be distinguished. As discussed above,
Zimomra involved a challenge to a fee charged by private rental car companies at
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Denver International Airport, a fee that was required to be charged, and the amount of
which was set, by a City and County of Denver ordinance. Another case relied on by
Defendant – Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.
1991) – involved the City and County of Denver’s operation of a shuttle bus service at
Stapleton International Airport and its policies, including the imposition of fees,
negatively impacting private shuttle bus companies’ operations. In both cases, the
Tenth Circuit held that the state action immunity doctrine shielded the defendants’
conduct, based on a Colorado statute which reads,
In connection with the erection, maintenance, and operation of any . . .
airport . . ., any county has the power and jurisdiction . . . to regulate the
receipt, deposit, and removal and the embarkation of passengers or
property to or from such airports; to exact and require charges, fees, and
tolls, together with a lien to enforce their payment . . .
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-4-106; Zimomra, 111 F.3d at 1501-03 (citing statute and
emphasizing the importance of its explicit authorization “to exact and require charges,
fee, and tolls”); Allright Colorado, 937 F.2d at 1508-09 (citing statute and emphasizing
the importance of its explicit authorization “to regulate the receipt, deposit, and removal
and the embarkation of passengers or property to or from such airports” and “to exact
and require charges, fees, and tolls”).
Here, however, we do not have such a specific statute evidencing, for example, a
state policy authorizing CECFA loan recipients to enter into exclusive agreements to
better ensure that the loan provided by the CECFA is repaid. Instead, we only have
very general, and neutral, authorizations to “enter into contracts” and “establish rules
and regulations.” As Kay Electric explains, the broad and general authorizations
applicable in this case do not clearly articulate and affirmatively express a state policy to
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displace competition.
Although Defendant does not so argue (see ECF No. 23, at 9-11; ECF No. 32, at
4-7), the more seemingly direct inquiry would be whether the Colorado legislature has
authorized public universities, such as UCD, to enter into agreements creating such
residency restrictions. Defendant does take the time in its Motion to Dismiss to provide
background as to “[t]he University of Colorado and its [p]owers.” (ECF No. 23, at 6-7.)
However, the statutes cited by Defendant regarding the legislature’s authorization of
power to UCD provide that UCD is “an urban comprehensive undergraduate and
graduate research university” (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-20-101(1)(b)) and that the
University of Colorado’s Board of Regents has “general supervision of the university”
(Colo. Rev. Stat. § 23-20-111). These statutes certainly do not evince a legislative
authorization for UCD to enter into an agreement creating a residency requirement for
certain students to live at a privately-owned apartment complex not physically on the
UCD campus. While such a decision by UCD is not necessarily anticompetitive or
otherwise wrongful, the question before the Court is whether Defendant is entitled to
immunity from antitrust liability based on the state action immunity doctrine. The Court
holds, at least at this stage of the proceedings, that it is not.3
3
While there is a significant question in the Court’s view as to how discovery revealing
UCD’s motivation to enter into the Agreement would change its conclusion as to the applicability
of the state action immunity doctrine, the Court notes there is no evidence at this stage of the
proceeding as to UCD’s motivation to enter into the Agreement. Defendant implies that UCD
enacted the residency requirement “for the mental, physical and social development of
students.” (ECF No. 23, at 7.) At this point in the litigation, however, there is no evidence in
support of that assertion. In fact, the Amended Complaint alleges, on information and belief,
that the Agreement “[h]ad nothing whatever to do with attempting to further the educational,
mental, physical or social development of affected students.” (ECF No. 19, ¶ 23.b.iii.) While the
Court need not accept this conclusory allegation as true, there is also no reason for the Court to
assume at this early stage that the UCD official who entered into the Agreement did so for
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b.
State Law Claims
As Defendant appears to concede in its Motion and Reply (ECF No. 23, at 12-13;
ECF No. 32, at 10), the Court’s denial of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to the
Sherman Act claim warrants denial of the Motion to Dismiss as to the state law claims.
Specifically, because Plaintiff has stated a viable Sherman Act claim based on
Defendant’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct in entering into the Agreement, Plaintiff
has also stated viable claims of wrongfully interfering with Plaintiff’s existing and
prospective business relations, and civil conspiracy. The Court therefore denies
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the state law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
(1)
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF
No. 23) is DENIED; and
(2)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Exhibits A-D to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 27) is GRANTED.
Dated this 23rd day of November, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge
legitimate purposes.
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