Jacobs et al v. Credit Suisse First Boston et al

Filing 94

ORDER granting 87 Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Record of Plaintiff's ; granting 91 Motion for Entry of Attorney Fee Amount; granting 92 Motion to Dismiss Remaining Parties Defendant. FURTHER ORDERS that Mr. Prater shall personally reimburse Defendants their reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $13,827.00. Accordingly, Defendants Central Loan Administration & Reporting (CENLAR), Taylor, Bean & Whittaker Mortgage, Inc., Susan Carter, the State of Colorado and John W. Hickenlooper are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, each party to pay his, her or its own costs. By Judge Christine M. Arguello on 12/26/2011.(jjpsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 11-cv-00042-CMA-KLM
DEAN L. JACOBS; and
MARCIELLE S. JACOBS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON;
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC;
CENTRAL LOAN ADMINISTRATION & REPORTING (CENLAR);
TAYLOR, BEAN & WHITTAKER MORTGAGE, INC.;
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.;
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.;
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS;
CHERRY CREEK MORTGAGE, INC.;
S. DINO PERRONE;
SUSAN CARTER;
CLARION MORTGAGE CAPITAL, individually and severally;
VADEN LAW FIRM, LLC;
THE STATE OF COLORADO, and
JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of Colorado,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the “Motion for Entry of Attorney Fee Amount”
of current Defendants Cherry Creek Mortgage Co., Inc. and S. Dino Perrone and former
Defendant Widespread Lending Solutions, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc.
# 91.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts and procedural history of this case are familiar to the parties and are

fully set out in this Court’s September 30, 2011 Order. (See Doc. # 89.) That Order, in
addition to granting all of the motions to dismiss that were before the Court, also
granted Defendants’ “Motion for Sanctions” (Doc. # 66), requiring, in part, that Plaintiffs’
counsel, Mr. John R. Prater, reimburse Defendants for “their reasonable attorney’s fees
. . .” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (Doc. # 89). On October 14, 2011, Defendants
filed the instant “Motion for Entry of Attorney Fee Amount” (Doc. # 91), which includes
an affidavit of Defendants’ counsel, Mr. D. Sean Velarde (Doc. # 91-1), and
accompanying documentation of the time spent, and tasks performed in, representing
Defendants (Doc. # 91-2). Mr. Prater has not filed any objection to Defendants’ Motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Before awarding attorneys' fees, the Court follows the three-step process set
forth in Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
The first step is to determine the number of hours reasonably spent by the
prevailing party’s counsel. Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 1996);
Ramos, 713 F.2d at 553. Factors considered in a reasonableness determination
include: (1) whether the amount of time devoted to a particular task appears reasonable
in light of the case’s complexity, the strategies pursued, and the responses necessitated
by an opponent's maneuvering; (2) whether the amount of time spent is reasonable in
relation to counsel's experience; and (3) whether the billing entries are sufficiently
detailed, indicating how much time was allotted to specific tasks. Rocky Mountain
Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder Cnty., No. 06-cv-00554, 2010 WL
3703224, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2010) (unpublished). “Counsel for the prevailing

party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
434 (1983). Although courts must exclude from the fee award hours not reasonably
expended, they need not “identify and justify every hour allowed or disallowed, as doing
so would run counter to the Supreme Court’s warning that a ‘request for attorney’s fees
should not result in a second major litigation.’” Malloy, 73 F.3d at 1018 (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437); Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2216 (2011) (“The essential
goal in shifting fees . . . is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.”).
Once the Court has determined the number of hours reasonably spent, it must
then decide a reasonable hourly rate of compensation. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555.
“A reasonable rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” Malloy, 73
F.3d at 1018 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). The party requesting
fees has the burden of persuading the court that the hours expended and the hourly
rate are both reasonable. Id.
The third step consists of multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the number
of hours reasonably expended to determine the “lodestar” amount. Hensley, 461 U.S.
at 433.
III. ANALYSIS
Because Defendants’ Motion is unopposed, the need for written findings in the
instant case is greatly diminished if not entirely nonexistent. See, e.g., Richmark Corp.
v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that “[i]t
would be pointless to require a district court to make written findings” concerning a
request for attorneys’ fees “where the opposing party does not contest the amount of

the award”). Accordingly, the Court will conduct an abbreviated analysis.
After reviewing Mr. Velarde’s affidavit and the related time sheets, the total
number of hours listed—83.4—appears to have been reasonably spent representing
Defendants. None of the time devoted to discrete tasks appears unreasonable, nor are
the hours disproportionate to the experience of counsel and the other individuals in his
firm who billed hours in this case. The billing entries are very detailed, explaining the
amount of time spent on each task and indicating who performed those tasks.
Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendants’ assertion that counsel sought to
“maximize efficiency and minimize the cost of [the] litigation” (Doc. # 91-1), as
evidenced by the overwhelming majority of the hours billed having come from an
associate and paralegal, as opposed to special counsel or a partner.
The Court further concludes that the hourly billing structure of counsel’s
firm—partner ($325), special counsel ($200), associate ($170), and paralegal
($125)—fairly reflects the prevailing market rate in the Denver metropolitan area.
Finally, the Court has independently verified Defendants’ calculations and
concurs with their assertion that $13,827 is the correct total dollar amount of their
attorneys’ fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Defendants’ “Motion for Entry
of Attorney Fee Amount” (Doc. # 91) is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court
FURTHER ORDERS that Mr. Prater shall personally reimburse Defendants their
reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $13,827. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Prater’s “Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of
Record for Plaintiff’s [sic]” (Doc. # 87) is GRANTED. However, such withdrawal does
not excuse Mr. Prater’s fulfillment of the sanctions ordered by this Court, including
payment of Defendants’ attorneys’ fees as specified in the instant Order and completion
of a continuing legal education course on federal pleading as detailed in the Court’s
September 30, 2011 Order. Finally, it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Dismiss Remaining Parties
Defendant” (Doc. # 92) is GRANTED. Accordingly, Defendants Central Loan
Administration & Reporting (CENLAR), Taylor, Bean & Whittaker Mortgage, Inc., Susan
Carter, the State of Colorado and John W. Hickenlooper are hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, each party to pay his, her or its own costs.
DATED: December 26, 2011
BY THE COURT:

_______________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge