Weatherspoon v. Miller et al
Filing
41
ORDER denying 39 the Uncontested Motion to Stay Scheduling Conference and Disclosures Required Pursuant to Rule 26 filed by Defendants Rachel Blandin and Anthony Blandin, by Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty on 4/19/2011. (mehcd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 11-cv-00312-REB-MEH
BETTIE WEATHERSPOON, individually and on behalf of all others similar situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROHN DAVID MILLER,
GIZELA MILLER,
RACHEL BLANDIN,
BRETTLEY EVANS,
MICHAEL WILSON,
WASSIM HALABI,
PROVINCETOWNE MASTER OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., a Colorado not for profit
corporation,
CHARLES KAINE,
KRISTA MALONEY,
STAN WITKOWSKI,
KYLE PERCY,
JEFFERY WARREN,
MSI, LLC, a Colorado limited liability corporation,
TODD FACKLER,
KATHLEEN LORA,
RANDY HEGWOOD,
LAUREN JACQUES,
HINDMANSANCHEZ PC, a Colorado corporation,
BRIAN E. MARTIN,
DEBRA J. OPPENHEIMER,
LOURA K. SANCHEZ,
WILLIAM H. SHORT,
MOLLY C. LUCAS,
COOPER & DORANCY, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,
RENEE V. COOPER,
DONALD R. RICE,
JILL DORANCY-WILLIAMS,
ANDREW E. EVANS, JR.,
DAVID PAUL SMITH,
ALL PROPERTY SERVICES, INC., a Colorado limited liability company,
KIRSTEN MCKAY, and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 99,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is an Uncontested Motion to Stay Scheduling Conference and Disclosures
Required Pursuant to Rule 26 filed by Defendants Rachel Blandin and Anthony Blandin [filed April
14, 2011; docket #39]. The matter has been referred to this Court for disposition [docket #40]. For
the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is denied.
I.
Background
Plaintiff instituted this action on February 7, 2011. In essence, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants engaged in a “conspiracy to commit fraud upon the Plaintiff in order to deprive her of
her property.” See Complaint and Jury Demand at docket #1. Among others, Plaintiff brings claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal
protection clauses and the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiracy, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 for
retaliation, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 3. Those Defendants who have appeared in this case have filed various pleadings responding
to the Complaint, including four motions to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. See
dockets #25, #29, #30, #33, and #35.
In the present motion, Defendants Rachel and Anthony Blandin (hereafter, “Movants”) seek
an order protecting them and all other parties from proceeding with the scheduling conference and
discovery in this matter until all dispositive motions are resolved. Motion at docket #39. Movants
state “it would be in the best interest [sic] of the parties and for judicial economy to stay the
Scheduling Conference and Rule 26 disclosures until such time as the Court has entered rulings on
the various pending motions which may dispose of most, if not all, of the claims against these
defendants.” Id., ¶5.
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II.
Discussion
The decision to issue a protective order and thereby stay discovery rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. See Diaz v. Paul J. Kennedy Law Firm, 289 F.3d 671, 674 (10th Cir.
2002). Such protection is warranted, upon a showing of good cause, to “protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
A party seeking a protective order under Rule 26(c) cannot sustain the burden of
demonstrating good cause merely by relying upon speculation or conclusory statements. TolbertSmith v. Bodman, 253 F.R.D. 2, 4 (D.D.C. 2008).
The movant must show specific facts
demonstrating that the challenged discovery will result in a clearly defined and serious injury to the
party seeking protection. Id.; see also Exum v. United States Olympic Comm., 209 F.R.D. 201, 206
(D. Colo. 2002).
In determining whether to grant a stay, courts typically balance the following factors taking
into consideration the competing interests at stake: (1) the interests of the plaintiff in proceeding
expeditiously with the civil action and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden
on the defendants; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil
litigation; and (5) the public interest. String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., 2006 WL
894955, at *2 (D. Colo. March 30, 2006) (unpublished) (citing FDIC v. Renda, 1987 WL 348635,
at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 1987)).
First, according to Movants, the Plaintiff has consented to the Movants’ requested stay; thus,
she has not articulated any interest in proceeding expeditiously with the case.
Second, although not stated clearly in the motion, Movants apparently believe that it would
be unduly burdensome to proceed with discovery in this matter. However, unless the challenged
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discovery is unduly burdensome on its face, a party seeking a protective order based upon undue
burden or expense must submit affidavits or otherwise explain in detail the nature and extent of the
claimed burden or expense. Aikens v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 533, 537 (D. Kan. 2003).
Here, there is no indication that discovery in this case is facially burdensome, and Movants have
submitted no affidavits nor any explanation as to the nature and extent of any claimed burden.
Moreover, the record reflects that neither the Movants nor any other party in this case has asserted
a jurisdictional defense pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(2) for which stays of discovery
are generally favored. Without affidavits, documentation or detailed explanation, the Court cannot
determine the extent of the burden on the Movants and cannot justify imposing an indefinite stay
of the proceedings in this matter. Therefore, the Court finds this factor weighs against granting the
requested stay.
Third, Movants seek to stay discovery in this matter indefinitely until the pending dispositive
motions are resolved. A stay of all discovery is generally disfavored in this District. See Chavez
v. Young Am. Ins. Co., No. 06-2419, 2007 WL 683973, *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2007). This is
particularly true in cases requesting indefinite stays, which could substantially delay the ultimate
resolution of the case, with adverse consequences such as a decrease in evidentiary quality and
witness availability. The general interests of controlling the court’s docket and the fair and speedy
administration of justice prompt the Court to find that this factor weighs against granting the
requested stay.
Consideration of the remaining String Cheese factors does not tip the balance in favor of
either position. Movants make no argument concerning the interests of non-parties or the public,
and the Court perceives minimal effect, if any, resulting from of a stay of these proceedings.
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Therefore, weighing the factors necessary to consider whether to grant the requested stay,
the Court finds that the Movants’ request must be denied. Without sufficient evidence of Movants’
claimed burden, the Court cannot justify the imposition of an indefinite stay of discovery in this
matter.
III.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that the Uncontested
Motion to Stay Scheduling Conference and Disclosures Required Pursuant to Rule 26 filed by
Defendants Rachel Blandin and Anthony Blandin [filed April 14, 2011; docket #39] is denied.
Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 19th day of April, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
Michael E. Hegarty
United States Magistrate Judge
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