Taylor v. Davis et al

Filing 24

ORDER re: 1 Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by VanDale Taylor, is DENIED and this civil action is dismissed with prejudice. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall bear their own costs and attorneys fees. It is FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability will issue because Applicant Vandale Taylor has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). by Judge William J. Martinez on 8/10/2011. (erv, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 11-cv-01025-WJM
VANDALE TAYLOR,
Applicant,
v.
JOHN DAVIS, Warden, and
JOHN SUTHERS, the Attorney General of the State of Colorado,
Respondents.

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
William J. Martínez. District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Applicant Vandale Taylor’s Application for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Application”) (Doc. No. 1).1
Respondents filed an Answer on June 30, 2011. (Doc. No. 21.) Applicant filed a Reply
on July 12, 2011. (Doc. No. 22). After reviewing the pertinent portions of the record in
this case including the Application, the Answer, the Reply, and the state court record,
the Court concludes that the Application should be denied.

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Because Applicant appears pro se, the Court has construed his filings liberally. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21(1972). However, the Court does not serve as his advocate. See Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

I. BACKGROUND
On October 30, 2008, Applicant pled guilty in the District Court, City and County
of Denver, Colorado to one charge of violating the Colorado Organized Crime Control
Act, Colo. Rev. Stat § 18-17-104(3), in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining 32
counts against him. Pre-Answer Response (Doc. No. 9) Ex. A at 4-10. Applicant was
sentenced to18 years imprisonment in the Colorado Department of Corrections, and
currently is serving that sentence at the Buena Vista Correctional Complex in Buena
Vista, Colorado. Id. at 3.
Applicant did not file a direct appeal, but on August 12, 2009, he filed a Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence Pursuant to Rule 35(a) (“Rule 35(a) Motion”) in the state trial
court. Applicant contended in his Rule 35(a) Motion that Colo. Rev. Stat § 18-17-104(3)
is invalid because the Colorado Revised Statutes do not contain an “enacting clause” as
required by the Colorado Constitution, and that, as a result, the state trial court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction over his case. State Court Record at 176-189. The trial
court denied the Rule 35(a) Motion, and Applicant appealed. Application at 10-11; PreAnswer Response Exs. B1, B2. On September 2, 2010, the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Rule 35(a) Motion in a per curiam opinion.
Application at 12-13 (People v. Taylor, No. 09CA2760 (September 2, 2010) (per curiam)
(unpublished)).

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Applicant thereafter filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Colorado Court of
Appeals, which was denied on February 22, 2011. Application at 15 (Taylor v. People,
No. 2010SC796 (Feb. 22, 2011) (unpublished)).
Applicant asserts two claims in his Application: (1) “violation of due process of
law,” on the basis that “[t]he U.S. Constitutions [sic] require that a criminal defendant be
made aware of the nature and cause of accusation against him,” and “[t]he requirement
of due process are [sic] satisfied by notice, which are [sic] given through the publication
of the statutes,” and (2) “[t]he courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction,” on the basis that
“[a] reading from the Colo. Rev. Statutes will show that they do not contain any enacting
clause, which violates Applicant’s federal rights.” Application at 5-6.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A federal court reviewing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition does not
reexamine the state court’s determination of state law questions. Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Rather, “[i]n conducting habeas review, a federal court is
limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” Id. Further, a § 2254 habeas petition may be granted only where the
state court adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Court reviews claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir.
2003). The threshold question pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) is whether Applicant seeks to
apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time his
conviction became final. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Clearly
established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme]
Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412.
Furthermore,
clearly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings
in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or
similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at
issue need not have had its genesis in the
closely-related or similar factual context, the Supreme Court
must have expressly extended the legal rule to that context.
House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008). If there is no clearly established
federal law, that is the end of my inquiry pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018.
If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, then the Court must
determine whether the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at
404-05.
A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established
federal law if: (a) “the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court
cases”; or (b) “the state court confronts a set of facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme
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Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that]
precedent.” Maynard [v. Boone], 468 F.3d [665,] 669 [(10th
Cir. 2006) ] (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405). “The word ‘contrary’ is
commonly understood to mean ‘diametrically different,’
‘opposite in character or nature,’ or ‘mutually opposed.’ ”
Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (citation omitted).
A state court decision involves an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law when it identifies the
correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but
unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08.
Additionally, we have recognized that an unreasonable
application may occur if the state court either unreasonably
extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle
from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it
should apply.
House, 527 F.3d at 1018.
The Court reviews claims of factual errors pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
See Romano v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1145, 1154 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2002). Section 2254(d)(2)
allows a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court decision was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
Pursuant to § 2254(e)(1), the Court must presume that the state court’s factual
determinations are correct, see Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1982), and
Applicant bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing
evidence, see Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1997).

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III. DISCUSSION
A. Exhaustion of State Remedies and Timeliness
Exhaustion of available and adequate state court remedies is a prerequisite to a
habeas application in federal court. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987).
Respondents do not dispute that Applicant has exhausted his state court remedies.
See Pre-Answer Response (Doc. No. 9) at 5. Respondents also acknowledge that the
present Application is timely under the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Id. at 4-5.
B. Applicant’s Claims
Article V, sec. 18 of the Colorado Constitution states that “[t]he style of the
laws of this state shall be: ‘Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of
Colorado.’ ” Applicant’s claims, construed liberally and with the aid of reference to
Applicant’s state court filings, assert that all of the Colorado Revised Statutes, including
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-17-104(3), are invalid because they do not contain this
introductory “enacting clause.” As a result, according to Applicant, Applicant’s rights
under the United States Constitution were violated because he did not have notice of
the “nature and cause of accusation against him,” and because the state court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over his case. Application at 5-6.
Applicant’s claims are not cognizable in a federal § 2254 habeas action because
they turn on the state of Colorado’s interpretation of Colorado state law. On Applicant’s
appeal of the denial of his Rule 35(a) motion, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined

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that “the General Assembly properly enacted section 18-17-104(3),” and “there mere
fact that the enacting clause does not appear in the Colorado Revised Statutes does not
affect the validity of defendant’s conviction under that statute. See People v.
Washington, 969 P.2d 788 (Colo. App. 1998).” Application at 13 (Taylor, No. 09CA2760
at 2). Applicant contends in the present action that the Colorado Court of Appeals was
wrong, that the Colorado Revised Statutes are in fact invalid because they do not
contain an “enacting clause” as required by the Colorado Constitution, and that his
federal constitutional rights were violated as a result. However, whether the Colorado
Revised Statutes are invalid under the Colorado Constitution, or any other Colorado
law, because they do not contain an “enacting clause” is purely a state law issue.2
Although Applicant has wrapped his claims in federal nomenclature, those claims are, in
substance, a challenge to the Colorado Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Colorado law.
On habeas review, this Court cannot reexamine state court determinations of state law
questions. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; see also Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866,

2

It bears noting that the Colorado Supreme Court has squarely rejected the argument presented
by Plaintiff, explaining that:
[b]ecause each section in the statutory compilation is required to cite to
its underlying source legislation pursuant to [Colo. Rev. Stat.] §2-5102(1)(a), because the act adopting the statutory compilation itself
contains the proper enacting clause, and because §2-5-118 does not
preclude introduction of the Session Laws into evidence to prove or
challenge the validity of a legislative enactment, we hold that the enacting
clause as published in the Session Laws of Colorado satisfies the
mandate of Colo. Const. art V, §18 and its underlying policy.
Consequently, the omission of the enacting clause from the Colorado
Revised Statutes does not render the statutes unconstitutional, and there
was no constitutional deficiency in defendant's conviction.
Washington, 969 P.2d at 790.

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870 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[R]elief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does not lie for errors of state
law.”) Accordingly, Applicant’s claims are not properly the subject of a federal habeas
action, and must be dismissed on that basis.
Even if Applicant’s claims were reviewable in this habeas action, the claims fail
nonetheless because they do not seek to apply a rule of law that has been clearly
established by the United States Supreme Court. Applicant has cited to no Supreme
Court case law holding that the Colorado Revised Statutes are invalid because they do
not contain an “enacting clause,” and the Court is aware of no such authority. Because
there is no applicable clearly established federal law, the state court’s conclusion cannot
have been contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law. Accordingly, my inquiry ends, and the action must be dismissed. See House, 527
F.3d at 1018.
Because Applicant has not argued that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), the state
court’s decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented, and, indeed, neither the state trial court nor the state court of
appeals made any factual determinations in reviewing the issues presented in
Applicant’s Rule 35(a) Motion, section 2254(d)(2) affords no relief in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Applicant Vandale Taylor’s Application for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. No. 1) is DENIED and this
civil action is dismissed with prejudice. It is

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FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall bear their own costs and attorney’s
fees. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that no certificate of appealability will issue because
Applicant Vandale Taylor has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
Dated this 10th day of August, 2011.
BY THE COURT:

_______________________
William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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