SOLIDFX LLC v. Jeppesen Sanderson Inc

Filing 406

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59(e) MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 375 and 376 is GRANTED. 2. The Clerk shall AMEND the Judgment as follows: a.The portion of the jury 's verdict awarding damages for future lost business value on the claim for breach of contract-development of iPad apps is REINSTATED;b. Plaintiff is AWARDED an additional $21,385,500.00 in damages based on the jurys verdict and an additional $328,106.00 in pre-judgment interest; c. Pursuant to the parties' Stipulations 373 and 374 , Plaintiff is AWARDED costs in the amount of $294,098.88, by Judge William J. Martinez on 2/3/2015.(dhans, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 11-cv-01468-WJM-BNB
SOLIDFX, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEPPESEN SANDERSON, INC.,
Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S RULE 59(e) MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT

Plaintiff SOLIDFX, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “SOLIDFX”) brings this action against
Defendant Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Jeppesen”) alleging breach of
contract and various state law tort claims. The Court held an eight-day jury trial, which
resulted in the jury finding in Plaintiff’s favor on all claims. (ECF No. 343.) The jury
awarded Plaintiff the following damages: $42,308,000 on its claim for breach of contract
(development of iPad apps); $615,000 on its claim for breach of contract (JIT for tailored
terminal charts); $173,000 on its negligent misrepresentation claim; and $1 on each of
the other claims. (ECF No. 343-6.)
Post-trial, the Court granted in part Defendant’s Rule 50(a) Motion, and ordered
that the damages awarded to Plaintiff on its breach of contract claim related to the
development of iPad apps be reduced to $21,537,503. (ECF No. 369.) Judgment was
then entered and the case was closed. (ECF No. 370.)

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) (“Motion”). (ECF No. 375.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is
granted.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 59(e) permits a Court to alter or amend a judgment on timely motion by a
party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “Rule [59(e)] was adopted to make clear that the district
court possesses the power to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately
following the entry of judgment.” White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450
(1982) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Accordingly, the Court may
amend the judgment in its discretion to correct clear error, including a misapprehension
of the controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. Servants of the Paraclete v.
Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
II. ANALYSIS
At trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $42,308,000 on its breach of contract claim
arising out of Jeppesen’s denial of Plaintiff’s ability to develop iPad apps that would
display Jeppesen’s terminal charts. (ECF No. 343-6 at 1.) Based on the evidence
presented by the parties, this award included $20,922,500 for lost profits Plaintiff would
have obtained during the initial five-year term of the contract, and $21,385,500 for lost
business value assuming the contract was allowed to automatically renew for an
additional five years. (See ECF No. 369 at 3-4.)
In its renewed Rule 50(a) Motion, Defendant argued that any damages after the
initial five-year term of the contract were barred because it had the ability to terminate
the contract as of December 31, 2014. (ECF No. 363 at 3.) The Court held that
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Colorado law did not bar recovery of damages after the initial term of the contract as a
matter of law, but that Plaintiff had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to have
allowed a reasonable juror to conclude that the contract would have been renewed and,
therefore, all damages awarded for breach of contract beyond December 31, 2014 were
speculative. (ECF No. 369 at 4, 8.) Thus, the Court set aside the portion of the jury’s
verdict that awarded damages for lost business value beyond December 31, 2014. (Id.
at 15.)
In the instant Motion, Plaintiff contends that the Court misapprehended the
evidence presented at trial, which altered the Court’s analysis such that it is clearly
erroneous. (ECF No. 375 at 11-12.) Specifically, Plaintiff points out that the Court
incorrectly believed that George John’s deposition testimony had not been admitted at
trial when, in fact, excerpts of his deposition were read to the jury. (Id.; see also Trial
Ex. 412.)
The Court agrees that the perceived absence of Mr. John’s testimony was a
significant factor in the earlier decision to vacate a portion of the jury’s award. In fact,
the Court’s Order stated “the fact that Plaintiff did not present Mr. John’s opinion as
substantive evidence is significant because it is undisputed that the contract between
the parties was non-exclusive.” (ECF No. 369 at 7.) The Court also stated: “Because
Mr. John’s testimony was not admitted into evidence, there was no evidence upon
which a juror could rely to find that Jeppesen would not have created its own app,
regardless of the status of its contract with Plaintiff.” (Id.)
Though Plaintiff did not cite Mr. John’s testimony in its original opposition to
Defendant’s Rule 50(a) Motion (see ECF No. 360 at 7-8), Plaintiff now directs the Court
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to the portion of the trial record in which Mr. John’s deposition testimony was read to the
jury. (ECF No. 375 at 7-8.) In this testimony, Mr. John stated that, based on his review
of Jeppesen’s communications, the company was either going to make its own iPad app
or buy one from another company. (Tr. Ex. 412 at 272.) That is, Jeppesen did not
seem to be seriously considering a strategy that would involve both buying an app from
another company (through some sort of licensing agreement like that entered into with
Plaintiff), and also making its own app in-house. (Id.) Mr. John’s testimony buttresses
Plaintiff’s theory that, had Jeppesen allowed Plaintiff to develop an iPad app in 2010,
Jeppesen would not have subsequently developed its own iPad app, and would
therefore have been inclined to renew its licensing agreement with Plaintiff.
Coupling this testimony with other evidence in the record, the Court now finds
that a reasonable juror could have concluded that Jeppesen would likely have allowed
the contract to automatically renew, and that Plaintiff would have continued to profit
from its iPad app. Plaintiff’s damages expert, Melinda Harper, testified that Plaintiff’s
iPad app would have been the first to market if the contract had not been breached, and
that, in her professional experience, customers are not inclined to change providers
once they have invested in a product. (ECF No. 375-1 at 37-38.) Ms. Harper’s
testimony was backed up by Rick Ellerbrock, a Jeppesen employee, who testified that,
once airline customers had started to use a particular app, they were unlikely to switch.
(ECF No. 375-1 at 65.) This evidence suggests that, had Plaintiff been allowed to
develop an iPad app and been permitted to market it to Jeppesen’s customers, that
ongoing customer relationship would have been an incentive for Jeppesen to renew its
contract with Plaintiff. (Id. at 74.)
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The Court continues to believe that the evidence supporting Plaintiff’s theory that
Jeppesen would have renewed the contract beyond the initial five-year term is
remarkably slim. However, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
jury’s verdict post-trial, the Court must review all of the evidence presented, draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and “disregard all evidence
favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The Court is not permitted
to make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence, as these are jury functions.
Id. When considering Mr. John’s testimony in concert with the other testimony
presented by Plaintiff, and given the overwhelming deference afforded a jury’s verdict in
the context of Defendant’s post-trial Rule 50 motion, the Court finds that there is
substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict such that Defendant is not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the portion of the damages awarded by the jury for lost
business value. See Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 530 F.3d 1260, 1269
(10th Cir. 2008) (“A party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ‘only if the evidence
points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may support
the opposing party’s position.’”) (quoting Tyler v. RE/MAX Mountain States, Inc., 232
F.3d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that its earlier ruling vacating the jury’s award
of damages beyond December 31, 2014 was based on a misapprehension of the
record. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to relief under Rule 59(e), and the Court orders that
the judgment be amended to reinstate the full jury verdict on the breach of contract
claim related to development of iPad apps. The Court directs the Clerk to amend the
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judgment to include an additional $21,385,500 in damages for Plaintiff, and $328,106.00
in pre-judgment interest (70 days at $4,688.00 per day).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (ECF
Nos. 375 & 376) is GRANTED;

2.

The Clerk shall AMEND the Judgment as follows:
a.

The portion of the jury’s verdict awarding damages for future lost business
value on the claim for breach of contract—development of iPad apps is
REINSTATED;

b.

Plaintiff is AWARDED an additional $21,385,500.00 in damages based on
the jury’s verdict and an additional $328,106.00 in pre-judgment interest;

c.

Pursuant to the parties’ Stipulations (ECF Nos. 373 & 374), Plaintiff is
AWARDED costs in the amount of $294,098.88.

Dated this 3rd day of February, 2015.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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