McMinn v. Dodson et al

Filing 17

ORDER denying 14 Plaintiff's Motion to Re-Instate Defendants. By Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya on 8/12/11.(mnf, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya
Civil Action No. 11–cv–01511–PAB–KMT

GLENN McMINN,
Plaintiff,
v.
S.C.O. ROBERT DODSON,
AL (John Doe), last name unknown at this time), employed as truck driver by Bent County
Recycling,
Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s “Motion to Re-Instate Defendants” (Doc.
No. 14, filed August 10, 2011).
In his “Order to Dismiss in Part and to Draw Case to a District Judge and to a Magistrate
Judge” (Doc. No. 9, filed August 3, 2011), Senior Judge Lewis T. Babcock dismissed
Defendants Corrections Corporation of America (C.C.A.) and Bent County Recycling. (Id.)
Judge Babcock stated:
under § 1983, liability cannot be imposed “vicariously on a theory of respondeat
superior.” Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210,1228 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
Smedley v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 175 Fed. Appx. 943, 946 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2005)
(unpublished opinion) (holding that “a private actor such as CCA ‘cannot be held
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words . . . cannot be
held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.’ ”) (citation omitted)).
Instead, a private corporation is liable under § 1983 only when an official policy
or custom of the corporation causes or is the “moving force of the constitutional
violation.” Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Dubbs
v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that traditional

municipal liability principles apply to claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against private corporations). Therefore, C.C.A. and Bent County
Recycling would incur liability under § 1983 only if the harm had resulted from a
policy or custom on the part of the corporation. See Smedley, 175 Fed. Appx. at
946 (“in order to hold CCA liable for the alleged tortious acts of its agents, [the
plaintiff] must show that CCA directly caused the constitutional violation by
instituting an ‘official municipal policy of some nature,’ that was the ‘direct
cause’ or ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violations” (citations omitted)).
Judge Babcock noted that in this case, other than the actions or inactions of C.C.A.’s
employees, Plaintiff makes no specific allegations concerning the alleged wrongful conduct of
C.C.A. or Bent County Recycling and that Plaintiff has failed to allege that an official policy or
custom of C.C.A. was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of his civil rights by
C.C.A. employees. (Doc. No. 9 at 4 [citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 658].)
Plaintiff now moves the court to reinstate Bent County Recycle as a defendant to this
matter. Plaintiff argues Bent County Recyle is privately owned, and not owned by C.C.A. (Doc.
No. 14 at 1.) Plaintiff also argues Bent County Recycle should be held accountable for their lack
of a sign or precautions to prevent his accident. (Id.) However, it makes no difference whether
Bent County Recycling is owned by C.C.A. or not, as it is still a private corporation. As such,
Bent County Recycling would only be liable if Plaintiff could satisfy the Monell standard. As
Judge Babcock noted, Plaintiff has not alleged any official policies or customs by Bent County
Recycling–rather than actions or inactions by the individual C.C.A. defendants–in the amended
complaint. Accordingly, it is

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ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion to Re-Instate Defendants” (Doc. No. 14) is DENIED.
Dated this 12th day of August, 2011.

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