Magluta v. United States Federal Bureau of Prisons et al

Filing 147

ORDER denying 141 Motion to Reinstate Scheduling Conference and Discovery by Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix on 3/4/14.(lag)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 11-cv-02381-RM-KLM
SALVADOR MAGLUTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
AMBER NELSON, Acting Regional Director of the North Central Region,
CHARLES DANIELS, Warden at USP Florence,
MONICA WETZEL, Former Warden at FDC Miami,
LOUIS MILUSNIC, Assistant Warden at USP Florence,
JOHNSON (FNU), Assistant Warden at USP Florence,
G.T. KAPUSTA, Former Assistant Warden at FDC Miami,
BANUELOS (FNU), Lieutenant at USP Florence,
T. JAVERNICK, Case Manager Coordinator (CMC) at Florence Federal Complex,
ANDY FENLON, Counselor at ADX Florence,
MASSEY (FNU), Officer at USP Florence,
DUVAL (FNU), Officer at USP Florence,
STEGAL (FNU), Officer at USP Florence, and
JOHN DOES 1-9, to be identified later,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate Scheduling
Conference and Discovery [#141]1 (the “Motion”). On December 30, 2013, Defendants
filed a Response [#146]. Plaintiff has not filed a reply and his time to do so has elapsed.
The Motion is referred to this Court for disposition [#142]. The Court has reviewed the

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“[#141]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to
a specific paper by the Court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I
use this convention throughout this Order.

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Motion, the Response, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is fully advised in
the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion [#141] is DENIED.
I. Background
On October 31, 2013, Defendants filed their Unopposed Motion to Stay Discovery
and to Vacate Scheduling Conference [#138] (the “Motion to Stay”), which stated
“undersigned counsel states that she conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel prior to filing this
motion and he does not oppose the relief sought by the motion.” Motion to Stay [#138] at
14. The Motion to Stay sought a stay of discovery and asked that the Scheduling
Conference be vacated pending the Court’s adjudication of the pending motions to dismiss
[##56, 92] which, among other things, raise qualified immunity and sovereign immunity as
defenses. The Motion to Stay was granted in part on November 1, 2013. In its Order, the
Court vacated the Scheduling Conference and found that it was not necessary to enter a
stay of discovery as discovery had not yet begun in the case. Order [#140] at 2-3.
In the instant motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to “reset the previously vacated
scheduling conference herein and to vacate its stay of discovery.” Motion [#141] at 2.
Plaintiff argues that “[d]ue to restrictions unilaterally imposed by the Defendants on
undersigned counsel’s ability to conduct legal visitation with his client and/or communicate
via legal mail, undersigned counsel was unable to confer with his client prior to agreeing
to the government’s motion.” Id. Plaintiff maintains that his counsel “has since had a legal
call with [him and that Plaintiff] has requested that undersigned counsel file the Instant
Motion to Reinstate Scheduling Conference and Discovery as he is being prejudiced by the
continued delay herein.” Id. Plaintiff offers no explanation or further detail regarding the

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alleged prejudice.
In their Response, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s motion contains no substantive
legal arguments. It does not show any reasons why a scheduling conference should be
held or why discovery should proceed before the immunity defenses are resolved.”
Response [#146] at 4. Defendants further argue that the analysis the Court engaged in
when granting the Motion to Stay in part has not changed and there is no reason to reach
a different conclusion just because Plaintiff now opposes the relief requested. Id. at 4-5;
see also Order [#140] at 2-3. Defendants also analyze the various claims and defenses
asserted in this case and argue that a stay is appropriate. Id. at 6-14.
II. Analysis
Plaintiff has provided no legal authority to support the Motion.

Pursuant to

D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d), other than motions filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 or 65, “a motion
involving a contested issue of law shall state under which rule or statute it is filed and be
supported by a recitation of legal authority incorporated into the motion.” The Motion fails
to comply with this rule and is subject to denial on this basis alone. However, in the interest
of judicial economy, the Court will address the merits of the Motion.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of a non-final Order, the Motion “falls
within a court’s plenary power to revisit and amend interlocutory orders as justice requires.”
United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC, No. 06-cv-00037-PAB-CBS,
2010 WL 420046, *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 1, 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order
or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the
claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
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adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”). However, “[i]n order
to avoid the inefficiency which would attend the repeated re-adjudication of interlocutory
orders, judges in this district have imposed limits on their broad discretion to revisit
interlocutory orders.” United Fire & Cas. Co., 2010 WL 420046 at *3. “Although courts in
this district have applied different standards, . . . , the basic assessment tends to be the
same: courts consider whether new evidence or legal authority has emerged or whether
the prior ruling was clearly in error.” Vigil v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, No. 09-cv01676-PAB-KLM, 2011 WL 1518660, *1 (D. Colo. April 20, 2011) (citing to United Fire &
Cas. Co., 2010 WL 420046 at *3). Motions for reconsideration are “inappropriate vehicles
to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances
new arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion
. . . .

Thus, a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has

misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law. It is not appropriate to
revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior
briefing.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff offers no argument that the Court has misapprehended the facts or
the controlling law. While Plaintiff does argue that Plaintiff’s position has changed, that
does not mean that the Court misapprehended Plaintiff’s position at the time it entered the
Order regarding the Motion to Stay. Furthermore, the Court’s analysis in the Order is
sound and need not be reexamined. As explained in the Order:
Qualified immunity “give[s] government officials a right, not merely to
avoid ‘standing trial,’ but also to avoid the burdens of ‘such pretrial matters
as discovery . . . .’” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (citation
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omitted). Immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible
stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding many of the associated burdens and
costs. Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995).
Furthermore, when a defendant raises sovereign immunity as a defense, the
Court “must exercise its discretion in favor of not subjecting [the d]efendant
to possibly unnecessary discovery or other pretrial proceedings, until the
immunity and jurisdictional questions are resolved.” Sandoval v. United
States, No. 11-cv-01533-REB-KLM, 2011 WL 3682768, *2-3 (D. Colo. Aug.
23, 2011); see also Liverman v. Comm. on the Judiciary, 51 F. App’x 825,
827-28 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished decision) (finding “no logical reason
why [the rule precluding discovery before the resolution of a qualified
immunity question] should not apply where the defendant raises the defense
of sovereign immunity and the defense is primarily one of law.”).
Here, the only pending deadline and date are the November 6, 2013
deadline to submit a proposed scheduling order and the Scheduling
Conference set for November 13, 2013. See Minute Order [#136] at 1-2. In
light of the Court’s obligation to “exercise its discretion so that officials
[properly asserting qualified immunity] are not subjected to unnecessary and
burdensome discovery or trial proceedings,” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S.
574, 597-98 (1998), the Court grants the Motion by vacating the Scheduling
Conference pending resolution of the motions to dismiss [##56, 92]. The
Court sees no need to impose a stay of discovery, as the discovery deadlines
have not yet been set and discovery may not begin until after a Rule 26(f)
conference is held. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1).
Order [#140] at 2-3. Here, Defendants raise qualified immunity and sovereign immunity
defenses. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint [#56] at 7-8, 1920. The parties do not argue that the Court has misapprehended the facts or the law and
the Court concludes that it has not. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#141] is DENIED.
Dated: March 4, 2014

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