Stauffer v. Hayes et al

Filing 141

ORDER. ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer's Rule 59, FRCP 131 and Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(4) and (d)(1) Void Order Motion 134 are DENIED, by Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel on 9/26/12.(sgrim)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel
Civil Action No. 11-cv-02389-WYD-MJW
JOHN STAUFFER,
Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN E. HAYES, D.O.;
A WOMAN=S PLACE OF FORT COLLINS, P.L.L.P.;
PETER DUSBABEK;
TODD VRIESMAN;
MONTGOMERY, KOLODNY, AMATUZIO & DUSBABEK, L.L.P.;
J. BRADFORD MARCH, III;
MARCH, OLIVE, & PHARRIS, L.L.P.;
CHRISTINE SKORBERG;
CHERYL TRINE; AND
CHERYL TRINE LAW FIRM, LLC,
Defendants.

ORDER

I.

INTRODUCTION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Stauffer’s Rule 59, FRCP (ECF

No. 131), filed August 21, 2012, and Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(4) and (d)(1) “Void Order”
Motion (ECF No. 134), filed September 4, 2012. For reasons set forth below, the
motions are denied.
By way of background, I note that on August 8, 2012, I issued an Order affirming
and adopting Magistrate Judge Watanabe’s Recommendation dismissing this case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, I affirmed Magistrate Judge Watanabe’s
Recommendation that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

(ECF. 126, Order). The Recommendation (ECF No. 91) and my Order (ECF No. 126)
both include a detailed recitation of the procedural and factual background of this case.
The information contained in those orders is incorporated herein by reference. On
August 20, 2012, the Clerk of this Court entered judgment in favor of the Defendants.
II.

PENDING MOTIONS
A.

Plaintiff Stauffer’s Rule 59, FRCP (ECF No. 131)

In this motion, Plaintiff seeks to alter or amend the final Judgment based on
purported errors of law. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to correct his own errors made in
his prior pleadings along with making the following assertions: (1) the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply to void judgments; (2) the state court deprived him of his right to
counsel; and (3) the Magistrate Judge erred in failing to follow this Court’s governing
rules.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), there are three grounds that justify reconsideration:
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and
(3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Brunswick v. Brumark
Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1995).
Based on my review of the relevant pleadings, I find that Plaintiff has failed to set
forth a proper basis for relief under Rule 59(e). The Plaintiff has provided me with no
new evidence or recently promulgated authority to merit the reconsideration of my
Further, he has not identified a clear error or manifest injustice that warrants correction
this Court. Rather, Plaintiff simply contends that Magistrate Judge Watanabe and I
wrong in dismissing his Complaint without prejudice for the same reasons he argued
previously. A disagreement between the Court and the litigant and merely requesting
-2-

that a court rethink a decision it has already made are clearly improper bases for
relief under Rule 59(e). See Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012
(10th Cir. 2000) (in a Rule 59(e) motion, it “is not appropriate to revisit issues already
addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing”). I find
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable in this case and Magistrate Judge
Watanabe correctly recommended that this case be dismissed without prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, Plaintiff’s Rule 59 motion is denied.
B.

Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(4) and (d)(1) “Void Order” Motion (ECF No. 134)

In this motion, Plaintiff requests that I “declar[e] that all state court judgments
entered after November 5, 2007 … are void ab initio for lack of subject matter and
personal jurisdiction over them ….” (ECF No. 134) (emphasis in original).
“Relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary and is warranted only in exceptional
circumstances.” Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991); see
also Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1009. “A litigant shows exceptional
circumstances by satisfying one or more of Rule 60(b)’s six grounds for relief from
judgment.” Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243-44. Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to set aside
a judgment based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” As to
60(b)(4), “[a] judgment is void for Rule 60(b)(4) purposes if the ‘rendering court was
powerless to enter it.’” Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 232 F.3d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir.
2000) (quoting V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979)), cert.
121 S. Ct. 2520 (2001). Rule 60(b)(5) authorizes the Court to relieve a party from a
order or judgment “where it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application.” Finally, Rule 60(b)(6) provides that, “[o]n motion and upon
-3-

such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative
a final judgment . . . [for] any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.” “Rule 60(b)(6) has been described by this court as a ‘grand reservoir of
equitable power to do justice in a particular case.’” Van Skiver v. United States , 952
F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]
district court may grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion only in extraordinary circumstances and
only when necessary to accomplish justice.” Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d
572, 579 (10th Cir.1996).
Here, Plaintiff requests relief under Rule 60(b)(4). I find that subpart (b)(4)
does not apply because this Court had authority to enter the orders dismissing Plaintiff’s
Complaint without prejudice. See Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 232 F.3d 1342,
1346 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir.
1979)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2520 (2001) (Per Rule 60(b)(4), “[a] judgment is void for
Rule 60(b)(4) purposes if the ‘rendering court was powerless to enter it.’”). Therefore,
Plaintiff will prevail in the instant motion only if he can demonstrate unusual and highly
extra extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify relief under subpart (b)(6). “[A]
district court may grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion only in extraordinary circumstances and
only when necessary to accomplish justice.” Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d
572, 579 (10th Cir.1996). Extraordinary circumstances have been found to exist when,
after the entry of the judgment, enforcement of the judgment was made inequitable by
events not contemplated by the moving party. Id.; see also LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 248
F.3d 95, (2nd Cir. 2001) (extraordinary circumstances were demonstrated under Rule
60(b)(6) where the plaintiff would be left without a remedy due to the running of the
-4-

of limitations). The District Court has substantial discretion in a Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
Cashner, 98 F.3d at 580. In this motion, Plaintiff reasserts arguments that were already
rejected by both the Magistrate Judge and me. Thus, in these circumstances, I do not
find any extraordinary justification for Plaintiff’s request.
Plaintiff also requests that I set aside the judgment pursuant to Fed. Civ. P.
60(d)(1). Rule 60 contains a saving clause that provides that the rule “does not limit a
court's power to: (1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d). The Supreme Court has explained that
“an independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of
justice.” United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998). Here, I cannot find that this
case risks a grave miscarriage of justice. I dismissed Plaintiff’s action without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Even under the most liberal consideration of
Plaintiff’s motion, I find no merit to the requested relief.
III.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff Stauffer’s Rule 59, FRCP (ECF No. 131), filed August 21, 2012,
and Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(4) and (d)(1) “Void Order” Motion (ECF No. 134), filed
September 4, 2012, are DENIED.
Dated: September 26, 2012
BY THE COURT:

s/ Wiley Y. Daniel
Wiley Y. Daniel
Chief United States District Judge
-5-