Dowling v. IBEW Local #111

Filing 75

ORDER denying 73 Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from 57 Judgment. By Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 09/26/12. (alvsl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Robert E. Blackburn
Civil Case No. 11-cv-02695-REB-KMT
THERESA L. DOWLING,
Plaintiff,
v.
IBEW LOCAL #111,
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Blackburn, J.
The matter before me is Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief From Judgment [#73],1
filed August 14, 2012. Because the motion was filed more than 28 days after the entry
of Final Judgment [#57], filed June 1329, 2012, see FED. R. CIV. P. 59(b), I consider it
a request for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
In addition, because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, I have construed her pleadings
more liberally and held them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167
L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Thus construed, I deny the

1

“[#73]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a
specific paper by the court’s electronic case filing and management system (CM/ECF). I use this
convention throughout this order.

motion.
Rule 60(b) relief requires a showing of exceptional circumstances warranting
relief from judgment. Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.
1991). A litigant shows exceptional circumstances by satisfying one or more of the
grounds for relief enumerated in Rule 60(b). Id. at 1243-44. Here, the only possibly
applicable grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) are provided by subparagraph (3), which
allows the court to relieve a party from judgment on the basis of fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct of an opposing party, or alternatively subparagraph
(6), which contemplates relief from judgment based on “any other reason that justifies
relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3) & (6).
I perceive nothing in plaintiff’s motion to suggest that such extraordinary relief is
warranted in this case under either rubric. Although plaintiff makes conclusory
allegations regarding the allegedly unethical and fraudulent conduct of various attorneys
representing parties in other cases in which she is a plaintiff, she neither substantiates
these assertions nor shows how they infected this proceeding. Moreover, regardless
whether plaintiff has a viable claim vel non, her own inability or unwillingness to conform
to the reasonable rules of procedure is the cause of her inability to have these claims
vetted substantively. Her dilemma, in short, is one of her own making, and provides no
basis warranting relief from judgment.2
2

To the extent plaintiff also seeks my recusal from this case, I deny her request. Assuming
arguendo that I have jurisdiction to determine the matter at all, now that appeal has been taken to the
circuit court, plaintiff has failed to submit any facts that would cause "a reasonable person, knowing all the
facts, [to] harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of
Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Other than my rulings in this case, plaintiff
points to nothing even remotely suggesting that I have a “pervasive bias” against pro se plaintiffs in
general or an “extrajudicial bias” against this pro se plaintiff in particular. See Liteky v. United States,

2

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED it is ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief
From Judgment [#73], filed August 14, 2012, is DENIED.
Dated September 26, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

510 U.S. 540, 550, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1155, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994).

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