Rivers v. Town of Windsor et al

Filing 8

ORDER of Dismissal. The amended complaint and the action are dismissed withoutprejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 12/8/11. (lsw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-02770-BNB
BERNARD KENNETH RIVERS, JR.-EL,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF WINDSOR,
MAGISTRATE JUDGE MICHAEL MANNING, and
KIMBERLY A. EMIL,
Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On October 24, 2011, Plaintiff, Bernard Kenneth Rivers, Jr.-El, a resident of
Greeley, Colorado, submitted a pro se Complaint and a Motion and Affidavit for Leave
to Proceed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
On October 31, 2011, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland directed Mr. Rivers to
cure certain deficiencies in this action. Specifically, he directed Mr. Rivers to submit an
amended complaint on the proper, Court-approved form.
On November 28, 2011, Mr. Rivers submitted an amended complaint. On
December 1, 2011, the Court granted Mr. Rivers leave to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to § 1915.
The Court must construe liberally the amended complaint because Mr. Rivers is
not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). If the amended complaint

reasonably can be read “to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, [the
Court] should do so despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. However, the Court
should not act as an advocate for pro se litigants. See id.
Mr. Rivers asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As background for his
claims, he alleges that he was ticketed for speeding in Windsor, Colorado, on March 22,
2011. He alleges that he notified the Defendants that he is a “Sovereign Moor . . . NOT
a corporate being dealing in commerce requiring a license of any kind” but that the
Defendants “tricked” him into entering an “involuntary plea” of not guilty. Amended
Complaint at 2. He asserts that Defendants Magistrate Judge Michael Manning and
Prosecutor Kimberly A. Emil lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him for speeding. Id. at 24. He also asserts that he was forced to provide a money order to the Town of Windsor
under “threats, coercion, and duress.” Id. at 4. Mr. Rivers asserts that his Fifth
Amendment right to due process was violated and he also asserts a claim for malicious
prosecution. As relief, he requests that the Court set aside the judgment entered
against him in Windsor Municipal Court Case No. 11-0538. He also seeks damages.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), the Court must dismiss an action if the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
sua sponte by the Court at any time during the course of the proceedings. See
McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1988). “The party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is

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within the court’s jurisdiction.” United States v. Bustillos, 31 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.
1994). The Court has examined the amended complaint filed in this action, and finds
that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Mr. Rivers may not challenge his speeding conviction in Windsor Municipal Court
in this Court. This is because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal
courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims seeking review of state court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes “cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)
(stating that the losing party in a state court proceeding is generally “barred from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state court judgment in a
United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment
itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”). Review of the state court judgment must
proceed to the state’s highest court and then to the United States Supreme Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars not only cases seeking direct review of state
court judgments; it also bars cases that are “inextricably intertwined” with a prior state
court judgment. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. “To determine whether a federal

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plaintiff’s claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment, [the Court] must
pay close attention to the relief the plaintiff seeks.” Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home
Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2004). “Where a plaintiff seeks a remedy
that would disrupt or undo a state court judgment, the federal claim is inextricably
intertwined with the state court judgment.” Id. at 1148. Furthermore, the RookerFeldman doctrine “precludes not only review of adjudications of the state’s highest
court, but also the decisions of its lower courts.” See Jordahl v. Democratic Party of
Va., 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997).
As noted, it is clear that Mr. Rivers is challenging his conviction for speeding in
Windsor Municipal Court Case No. 11-0538. Review of his claims would require the
Court to review the state court judgment. Therefore, the Court finds that the amended
complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th
Cir. 1986).
In addition, Defendant Magistrate Judge Michael Manning is absolutely immune
from liability in civil rights suits when he is acting in his judicial capacity, unless he acts
in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263,
1266-67 (10th Cir. 1994). The Defendant Judge’s involvement in Mr. Rivers’ municipal
court proceeding are actions taken in his judicial capacity, and there is no indication that
this state court judge was acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Therefore, the

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claims Mr. Rivers asserts against Magistrate Judge Manning are also barred by
absolute judicial immunity.
Finally, Mr. Rivers’ claims against Defendant Prosecutor Kimberly A. Emil are
barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity because “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in
preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the
course of [her] role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of
absolute immunity.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Hunt v.
Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1994). Because the alleged actions occurred in
the course of her role as a prosecuting attorney, Defendant Emil is entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity. Nonetheless, because the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction in this case, it will be dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the amended complaint and the action are dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this

8th

day of

December

, 2011.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK
Senior Judge, United States District Court

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