Johnson v. Heinis et al

Filing 45

ORDER Adopting 34 Report and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge; overruling 39 Objection to Report and Recommendations filed by Keith Allen Johnson, denying Plaintiff's 23 Motion for Reconsideration. By Judge William J. Martinez on 10/04/12. (alvsl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 11-cv-3135-WJM-KLM
KEITH ALLEN JOHNSON
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFERY HEINIS, #06140
CHRIS CAMERON, #87014 and
CHRISTOPHER BALES, #87014
Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the May 31, 2012 Recommendation by U.S.
Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix (ECF No. 34) (the “Recommendation”) that Plaintiff’s
“Objection to Dismissal of Claims” (ECF No. 23), filed by the Clerk’s Office as a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Court’s April 19, 2012 Order (ECF No. 19) (the “Motion”), be
denied. The Recommendation is incorporated herein by reference. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
I. BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to a resolution of the Motion are detailed in the
Recommendation. Briefly, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, claims that:
Denver police used unlawful force against him without cause and that Denver
detectives failed to report or preserve evidence they knew or should have
known would clear him of the charges imposed against him. [Plaintiff] further
assert[ed] that the charges were biased and based on false statements and
reports and that eyewitnesses were intimidated by the police and forced to

sign false statements. [Plaintiff] conclude[d] that as a result of the
investigations a jury found him guilty of resisting arrest.
(ECF No 19 at 2.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on December 2, 2011. (ECF No. 1.) On April 19,
2012, Senior U.S. District Judge Lewis T. Babcock issued an Order (the “April 19, 2012
Order”) dismissing all claims and Defendants other than the excessive force claim
against Defendants Jeffery Heinis, Chris Cameron, and Christopher Bales. (ECF No.
19 at 3.) Specifically, Judge Babcock found that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994) barred Plaintiff’s claims regarding false statements and reports, destruction of
evidence, and intimidation of witnesses, because a favorable judgment would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the resulting criminal conviction for resisting arrest.
(Id. at 2-3.)
Plaintiff filed his Motion on May 1, 2012, in which he argues that the rule stated
in Heck v. Humphrey does not apply to his case. (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff contends that
“[a]lthough the resisting arrest conviction is based on the same course of conduct
related to the assault, the resisting arrest is not substantially connected with the alleged
assault, or information alleged in the dismissed claims.” (Id. at 2.) Defendants did not
file a Response.
On May 31, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued her Recommendation that
Plaintiff’s Motion be denied because there is no basis for reconsideration of the Court’s
April 19, 2012 Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (ECF No. 34.)
On July 5, 2012, Plaintiff filed a timely Objection to the Recommendation. (ECF No.
39.) Defendants did not file a Response to Plaintiff’s Objection.
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For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Objection to the Recommendation is
overruled, the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation is adopted in its entirety, and
Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
When a Magistrate Judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the District Court Judge
“determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s [recommendation] that has been
properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In conducting its review, “[t]he district
court judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommendation; receive further
evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.
A party subject to an adverse judgment who seeks reconsideration of that
judgment may “file either a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) or a motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b).” Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). If a motion
is filed within ten days of the judgment, the motion usually falls under Rule 59(e). Id.
Here, the challenged Order was entered on April 19, 2012, and the Motion was
docketed on May 1, 2012. (ECF Nos. 19, 23.) However, the Motion is dated April 27,
2012. (ECF No. 23 at 3.) In accordance with the Recommendation, the Court accepts
the Motion as filed within the Rule 59(e) deadline and will consider the Motion pursuant
to Rule 59(e). See Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243.
In the Tenth Circuit, a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e) include: “(1)
an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable,

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and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of
Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Brumark Corp. v.
Samson Resources Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, a motion to
reconsider is “appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's
position, or the controlling law.” Id. Moreover, a motion to reconsider is not to be used
as a vehicle to “revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have
been raised in prior briefing.” Id. (citing Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243). A motion for
reconsideration is also “an extreme remedy to be granted in rare circumstances.”
Brumark Corp., 57 F.3d at 944.
Finally, in considering the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation in the instant
case, the Court is also mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and accordingly, reads his
pleadings and filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
However, such liberal construction is intended merely to overlook technical formatting
errors and other defects in Plaintiff’s use of legal terminology and proper English. See
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Pro se status does not relieve
Plaintiff of the duty to comply with various rules and procedures governing litigants and
counsel or the requirements of the substantive law and, in these regards, the Court will
treat Plaintiff according to the same standard as counsel licensed to practice law before
the bar of this Court. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Ogden v.
San Juan Cnty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).
III. ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion be denied because

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there is no basis for reconsideration of the April 19, 2012 Order pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff objects to the Recommendation
in its entirety and argues, in short, that the rule stated in Heck v. Humphrey does not
apply to his case. (ECF No. 39.) As Plaintiff has objected to the entirety of the
Recommendation, the Court will review the Recommendation de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3).
As Plaintiff does not include legal authority in support of his request, and he does
not cite to new evidence, the Court construes Plaintiff’s argument as an assertion that
reconsideration is necessary in order “to correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012. As referred to above, in order to
show “clear error or manifest injustice, the [movant] must base [his] motion on
arguments that were previously raised but were overlooked by the Court - parties are
not free to relitigate issues that the Court has already decided.” Ramsey v. Mansfield,
No. 07-cv-02612, 2008 WL 878946, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 2008) (citations omitted).
After a detailed analysis in the Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge found
that there is no basis for reconsideration of the Court’s April 19, 2012 Order. (ECF No.
34 at 4-6.) The Court agrees. As described in the Recommendation, on May 4, 2011,
Plaintiff was acquitted of third degree assault, but found guilty of resisting arrest at trial.
(Id. at 4.) However, there is no indication that the evidence and conduct at issue in this
matter were separately reviewed and applied in the adjudication of the assault and
resisting arrest charges. (Id.) Thus, the Court finds that the interrelatedness of the
criminal charges necessitates the application of Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (applying rule to

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actions that could “demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment”). In
short, Plaintiff’s “claims against Defendants regarding the preservation or destruction of
evidence, false reporting, and intimidation of witnesses implicate the validity of his state
court criminal conviction” for resisting arrest. (ECF No. 19 at 3.)
It follows, therefore, that Plaintiff’s Motion must necessarily be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 39) to the Magistrate Judge’s May 31, 2012
Recommendation (ECF No. 34) is OVERRULED and the Recommendation is
ADOPTED in its entirety; and

2.

Plaintiff’s Objection to Dismissal of Claims (ECF No. 23), filed by the Clerk’s
Office as a Motion for Reconsideration, is DENIED.
Dated this 4th day of October, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

William J. Martínez
United States District Judge

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