Robillard v. Weld County, Board of County Commissioners et al

Filing 59

ORDER. The 44 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted. Defendants' 47 Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as moot. This case is dismissed. By Judge Philip A. Brimmer on 4/18/13.(mnfsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 11-cv-03180-PAB-KMT
CHRISTOPHER P. ROBILLARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WELD COUNTY COLORADO,
THE OFFICE OF THE WELD COUNTY CORONER/MEDICAL EXAMINER,
PATRICK C. ALLEN, M.D., in his individual capacity,
MARK WARD, in his individual capacity, and
JAMES A. WILKERSON IV, M.D., in his individual capacity,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
[Docket No. 44] filed by defendants The Board of County Commissioners of Weld
County, Colorado (“BOCC”), The Office of the Weld County Coroner/Medical Examiner
(“WCCO”), Patrick C. Allen, Mark Ward, and James A. Wilkerson.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Christopher P. Robillard filed this case on December 7, 2011 [Docket
No. 1], asserting the following claims for relief: (1) violation of the overtime pay
requirements in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), see 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; (2)
violation of the FLSA compensation time regulations; (3) retaliation in violation of the
FLSA; (4) violation of the overtime pay requirements in the Colorado Wage Claim Act
(“CWCA”), see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-101 et seq.; (5) breach of contract; and (6)

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Docket No. 1 at
19-26, ¶¶ 115-52. Specifically, Mr. Robillard alleges that defendants failed to pay him
overtime for the hours he spent on call in his capacity as a Medical Investigator
employed by WCCO. Docket No. 1 at 19-20, ¶¶ 115-21. He alleges that defendants
improperly limited his work hours to prevent him from accumulating compensation time.
Docket No. 1 at 21, ¶¶ 122-27. He further alleges that when he voiced concerns about
the compensation time agreement that he had signed with WCCO, he received poor
evaluations and was not compensated for time spent in required training activities.
Docket No. 1 at 22-23, ¶¶ 128-38.
On January 30, 2012, defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) partial motion to dismiss
[Docket No. 13] Mr. Robillard’s first through sixth claims against WCCO, his first
through third claims against Mr. Allen and Mr. Wilkerson, and his fourth through sixth
claims against all defendants. On September 26, 2012, the Court issued an order (the
“Order”) granting defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. Docket No. 42. In its Order, the
Court found that “the complaint lacks a factual basis for determining that plaintiff was
subject to call response and reporting requirements that triggered an obligation to pay
him overtime pursuant to the FLSA.” Docket No. 42 at 8. It further found that there
were “no allegations . . . that he was not permitted to use compensation time he
actually accrued” and that there was no authority “for the proposition that WCCO was
required to permit employees to work extended hours so as to accrue compensation
time without limitation.” Id. With respect to the retaliation claim, the Court held that
“plaintiff has failed to state a plausible FLSA retaliation claim.” Docket No. 42 at 10.
After granting defendants’ partial motion to dismiss, the Court ordered the parties
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to “indicate which claims, and as to which defendants, survive this order.” Docket No.
42 at 11. In response, defendants filed a stipulated notice of remaining claims [Docket
No. 43], stating that only Mr. Robillard’s first through third claims (namely, his FLSA
claims for overtime pay, compensation time violations, and retaliation) survived against
Mr. Ward, WCCO, and BOCC. On October 11, 2012, defendants filed the instant
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Docket No. 44. Defendants argue that Mr.
Robillard’s remaining claims should be dismissed on the bases set forth in the Order.
Id. at 3.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) much as it would a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Park Univ. Enters., Inc. v. Am. Cas. Co. of
Reading, PA, 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We review a district court’s grant
of a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo, using the same standard that
applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”). Accordingly, the Court “accept[s] all facts pleaded
by the non-moving party as true and grant[s] all reasonable inferences from the
pleadings in favor of the same.” Id.
Therefore, to survive defendants’ motion, the complaint must allege enough
factual matter that, taken as true, makes their “claim to relief . . . plausible on its face.”
Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-

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but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alteration marks omitted). Thus, even
though modern rules of pleading are somewhat forgiving, “a complaint still must contain
either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to
sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bryson, 534 F.3d at 1286
(alteration marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
With respect to his first and third claims, Mr. Robillard reasserts the same
arguments he made in response to defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. Compare
Docket No. 24 at 6-11 with Docket No. 45 at 3-5, 6-7 (“Plaintiff incorporates the
argument of Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Partial Dismissal of Claims concerning
FLSA-Overtime by reference.”). The Court has already considered and rejected Mr.
Robillard’s arguments that he has stated a claim for failure to pay overtime and it will
not revisit them here. See Docket No. 42.
In addition, Mr. Robillard states that, because defendants BOCC, WCCO, and
Mr. Ward filed an answer with respect to his first three claims, the Court “did not and
could not address” those claims in its Order. Docket No. 45 at 7-8. Mr. Robillard does
not, however, explain why this would prevent the Court from applying its previous
findings to the remaining defendants at this juncture. Indeed, the explicit findings in the
Order constitute the “law of the case” and “should continue to govern the same issues
in subsequent stages” of this litigation. See Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181,
1183 (10th Cir. 1995); see also In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., 87 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir.

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1996) (“The law of the case is a judicial doctrine designed to promote decisional finality.
Once a court decides an issue, the doctrine comes into play to prevent the re-litigation
of that issue in subsequent proceedings in the same case.”). Nor does Mr. Robillard
argue that the Court’s findings were specific to the particular defendants involved and
cannot logically be applied to the remaining defendants. On the contrary, the Court’s
findings were based on Mr. Robillard’s failure to establish his entitlement to overtime
pay for time spent on call, and not on his failure to establish the liability of particular
defendants. See, e.g., Docket No. 42 at 8 (“Plaintiff, however, fails to indicate to what
extent these calls occurred during his primary or backup on-duty shifts, required him to
travel to the scene of death, or occurred during any time ‘in excess of forty hours in a
week’ not otherwise compensated pursuant to the Comp Time Agreement.
Consequently, the complaint lacks a factual basis for determining that plaintiff was
subject to call response and reporting requirements that triggered an obligation to pay
him overtime pursuant to the FLSA.”); Docket No. 42 at 9-10 (“The allegations are
unclear regarding the chronology of events, appear to largely relate to policies
impacting all employees of WCCO, and provide no basis to draw the inference that any
of his treatment resulted from the fact that he communicated certain undefined
‘concerns.’ Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a plausible FLSA
retaliation claim.”). Accordingly, the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Robillard fails to state a
claim under the FLSA for either unpaid overtime or retaliation applies to his claims
against defendants BOCC, WCCO, and Mr. Ward.
Finally, Mr. Robillard argues that the partial motion to dismiss did not challenge
his claim for violation of the compensation time regulations and thus that claim was not
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addressed in the Court’s order. With respect to compensation time, Mr. Robillard
alleges that he entered into a compensation time agreement, under which he was
required to maintain his accumulated compensation time at or below eighty hours; that
Mr. Ward required him to limit his accumulated hours to forty; and that Mr. Robillard
was required to take compensation time to prevent hours from accumulating, regardless
of his workload. Docket No. 1 at 12-19, ¶¶ 66-114.
The FLSA provides that
(1) Employees of a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of
a State, or an interstate governmental agency may receive, in accordance
with this subsection and in lieu of overtime compensation, compensatory
time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of
employment for which overtime compensation is required by this section.
(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph (1)
only–
(A) pursuant to . . . an agreement or understanding arrived at between
the employer and employee before the performance of the work . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 207(o). The Supreme Court held in Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S.
576, 585 (2000), that the FLSA restricts employers’ ability to prohibit the use of
compensatory time but “says nothing about restricting an employer’s efforts to require
employees to use compensatory time.”
Mr. Robillard’s allegations that he was required to use compensation time to
prevent him from accruing excess hours thus does not establish a violation of the
FLSA. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 585. Moreover, the Court found in its Order that
there was no “authority for the proposition that WCCO was required to permit
employees to work extended hours so as to accrue compensation time without
limitation.” Docket No. 42 at 8.
Accordingly, Mr. Robillard fails to state a claim under the FLSA related to
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compensation time.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket No. 44] is
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 47] is
DENIED as moot. It is further
ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.

DATED April 18, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

s/Philip A. Brimmer
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

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