Jackson v. Hannen et al

Filing 17

ORDER Denying Motions. ORDERED that Plaintiff's "Motion for New Trial..." 10 is DENIED. FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's "Motion to Expedite..." 12 is DENIED as moot, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 2/21/12.(lygsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-03312-LTB
DAVID JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
J. MARK HANNEN, Judge, 18th Judicial District, in his official capacity,
TAMMY L. HERIVEL, Clerk of Arapahoe County, Colo., in her official capacity, and
JOHN W. SUTHERS, Colorado Attorney General, in his official capacity,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS

Plaintiff, David Jackson, has filed pro se on February 10, 2011, a “Motion for New
Trial Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59 and Plaintiff’s Sworn Response to Show Cause
Order” (Doc. #10) in which he asks the Court to reconsider and vacate the Order of
Dismissal and the Judgment entered in this action on January 24, 2012. Mr. Jackson
also has filed on February 10 a Notice of Appeal (Doc. #11) and a “Motion to Expedite .
. .” (Doc. #12) asking the Court to expedite ruling on the motion to reconsider and
processing the Notice of Appeal. The Court must construe the motions liberally
because Mr. Jackson is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). For the
reasons discussed below, the motions will be denied.
The Court first will address the motion for a new trial. A litigant subject to an
adverse judgment, and who seeks reconsideration by the district court of that adverse

judgment, may “file either a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) or a motion seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b).” Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). A motion to
alter or amend the judgment must be filed within twenty-eight days after the judgment is
entered. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Court will consider Mr. Jackson’s motion for a
new trial pursuant to Rule 59(e) because the motion was filed within twenty-eight days
after the Judgment was entered in this action. See Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243
(stating that motion to reconsider filed within ten-day limit for filing a Rule 59(e) motion
under prior version of that rule should be construed as a Rule 59(e) motion).
A Rule 59(e) motion may be granted “to correct manifest errors of law or to
present newly discovered evidence.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir.
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relief under Rule 59(e) also is appropriate
when “the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law.”
Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). However, a
Rule 59(e) motion is not a new opportunity to revisit issues already addressed or to
advance arguments that could have been raised previously. See id.
Mr. Jackson filed this action to challenge the validity of various orders and the
judgments entered in two Colorado state court domestic relations cases. Mr. Jackson
contends that his federal constitutional rights were violated during the course of the
state court proceedings. The Court noted that Mr. Jackson previously has filed a
number of cases in the District of Colorado raising the same or substantially similar
claims challenging various orders entered in his state court cases. See Jackson v.
Jackson, No. 05-cv-02033-WYD-CBS (D. Colo. May 19, 2006), aff’d as modified, 195 F.
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App’x 745 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1223 (2007); Jackson v. Jackson, No.
07-cv-01439-ZLW (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2007), aff’d, 272 F. App’x 722 (10th Cir. 2008);
Jackson v. Davidson, No. 07-cv-01763-ZLW (D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2007), aff’d, 272 F.
App’x 722 (10th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Jackson, No. 07-cv-01871-ZLW (D. Colo. Sept.
20, 2007), aff’d, 272 F. App’x 722 (10th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Jackson, No. 10-cv00122-ZLW (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2010), aff’d, 392 F. App’x 664 (10th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1048 (2011). The Court also noted that each of Mr. Jackson’s prior
cases was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the RookerFeldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). The Court
determined that the instant action also was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court also ordered Mr.
Jackson to show cause why filing restrictions should not be imposed based on his
history of filing repetitive actions raising the same or substantially similar claims seeking
review of state court orders and judgments.
Mr. Jackson contends in the motion to reconsider that his claims are not barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and he cites Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289
(2011), in support of this argument. Skinner involved a Texas prisoner who sought
postconviction DNA testing of untested biological evidence collected by police at the
scene of the crime. See id. at 1295. The prisoner filed two motions in state court
requesting DNA testing and both motions were denied. See id. He then filed an action
in federal court challenging the Texas statute that prevented him from obtaining the
DNA testing he sought. See id. at 1295-96. The Supreme Court held that the Rooker3

Feldman doctrine did not bar the federal action because the prisoner “does not
challenge the adverse [state court] decisions themselves; instead, he targets the Texas
statute they authoritatively construed.” Id. at 1298. The Supreme Court reached this
conclusion because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “a state-court decision
is not reviewable by lower federal courts, but a statute or rule governing the decision
may be challenged in a federal action.” Id.
Relying on Skinner, Mr. Jackson contends that the Court has misunderstood the
injunctive relief he seeks in this action and that “this Court has jurisdiction to declare the
state court judgments and orders null and void based on the authoritative precedent and
enjoin the enforcement.” (Doc. #10 at 3; see also Doc. #10 at 20.) He specifically
“prays for this Court to declared [sic] the state court orders unconstitutional based on
authoritative precedent and then issue an injunction enjoining the enforcement of the
state court orders as unconstitutional based on authoritative precedent.” (See Doc. #10
at 11.)
Upon consideration of the motion to reconsider and the entire file, the Court finds
that Mr. Jackson fails to demonstrate some reason why the Court should reconsider and
vacate the order to dismiss this action. The Court remains convinced that Mr. Jackson’s
claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because he is asking the Court to
review state court judgments and orders and declare those judgments and orders
unconstitutional. Unlike Skinner, Mr. Jackson is not challenging the validity of any state
statutes that controlled the outcome of his state court domestic relations cases.
Therefore, the Rule 59(e) motion will be denied. To the extent Mr. Jackson also may be
attempting in the motion for a new trial to show cause why filing restrictions should not
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be imposed, the Court will address the matter of filing restrictions in a separate order.
Finally, Mr. Jackson’s “Motion to Expedite . . .,” in which he asks the Court to
expedite ruling on the motion to reconsider and processing the notice of appeal he has
filed, will be denied as moot. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion for New Trial . . .” (Doc. #10) filed on February
10, 2012, is DENIED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Motion to Expedite . . .” (Doc. #12) filed on
February 10, 2012, is DENIED as moot.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 21st day of

February

, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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