Jackson v. Hannen et al

Filing 8

ORDER of Dismissal and to Show Cause. The complaint, the amended complaint, the second amended complaint, and the action are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is denied. Plaintiff show cause why the filing restrictions specified in this order should not be imposed, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 1/24/12. (lsw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 11-cv-03312-BNB
DAVID JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
J. MARK HANNEN, Judge, 18th Judicial District, in his official capacity,
TAMMY L. HERIVEL, Clerk of Arapahoe County, Colo., in her official capacity, and
JOHN W. SUTHERS, Colorado Attorney General, in his official capacity,
Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff, David Jackson, initiated this action by filing pro se a Complaint. On
December 28, 2011, Mr. Jackson filed an Amended Complaint. On January 4, 2012, he
filed a Second Amended Complaint. The Court must construe the Second Amended
Complaint liberally because Mr. Jackson is not represented by an attorney. See Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991). If the Second Amended Complaint reasonably can be read “to state a valid
claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, [the Court] should do so despite the plaintiff’s
failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor
syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Hall,
935 F.2d at 1110. However, the Court should not act as an advocate for pro se
litigants. See id.
Mr. Jackson is challenging the validity of various orders and the judgments

entered in two state court domestic relations cases. The relevant state court cases are
Denver District Court case number 86DR4718 and Arapahoe County District Court case
number 01DR2767. Mr. Jackson contends in the Second Amended Complaint that his
federal constitutional rights were violated in the state court proceedings. The named
Defendants in this action are an Arapahoe County District Court Judge, the Clerk of the
Arapahoe County District Court, and the Attorney General of the State of Colorado.
Mr. Jackson previously has filed a number of actions in the District of Colorado
raising the same or substantially similar claims challenging various orders entered in his
state court cases. See Jackson v. Jackson, No. 05-cv-02033-WYD-CBS (D. Colo. May
19, 2006), aff’d as modified, 195 F. App’x 745 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1223 (2007); Jackson v. Jackson, No. 07-cv-01439-ZLW (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2007), aff’d,
272 F. App’x 722 (10th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Davidson, No. 07-cv-01763-ZLW (D. Colo.
Aug. 30, 2007), aff’d, 272 F. App’x 722 (10th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Jackson, No. 07-cv01871-ZLW (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2007), aff’d, 272 F. App’x 722 (10th Cir. 2008); Jackson
v. Jackson, No. 10-cv-00122-ZLW (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2010), aff’d, 392 F. App’x 664 (10th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1048 (2011). Each of these prior cases was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Because it was not clear whether the state court proceedings had been
reopened, the orders dismissing 07-cv-01439-ZLW, 07-cv-01763-ZLW, and 07-cv01871-ZLW alternatively relied on the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Mr. Jackson did not argue on appeal in those cases that his
divorce decree was not final and, therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit concluded that 07-cv-01439-ZLW, 07-cv-01763-ZLW, and 07-cv-018712

ZLW properly were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Jackson v. Davidson, 272 F. App’x 722 (10th Cir. 2008).
In his most recent action, 10-cv-00122-ZLW, Mr. Jackson was warned that sanctions
may be imposed if he persists in filing repetitive complaints. For the reasons stated
below, this action also will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Mr.
Jackson will be ordered to show cause why filing restrictions should not be imposed.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), the Court must dismiss an action if the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
sua sponte by the Court at any time during the course of the proceedings. See
McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1988). “The party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is
within the court’s jurisdiction.” United States v. Bustillos, 31 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.
1994).
The Court has examined the Second Amended Complaint filed in this action and
finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Jackson again is
asking the Court to review and reverse orders entered in his Colorado state court cases.
As has been explained to Mr. Jackson repeatedly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
provides that federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, lack
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims seeking review of state court judgments. See District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
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district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1005-06 (1994) (stating that the losing party in a state court proceeding generally
“is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state court
judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the
state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”). Review of the state court
judgment must proceed to the state’s highest court and then to the United States
Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543
(10th Cir. 1991).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars not only cases seeking direct review of state
court judgments; it also bars cases that are “inextricably intertwined” with a prior state
court judgment. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. “To determine whether a federal
plaintiff’s claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment, [the Court] must
pay close attention to the relief the plaintiff seeks.” Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home
Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 2004), overruled in part on other grounds by
Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. 280. “Where a plaintiff seeks a remedy that would disrupt
or undo a state court judgment, the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the
state court judgment.” Id. at 1148 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “precludes not only review of adjudications of the state’s
highest court, but also the decisions of its lower courts.” See Jordahl v. Democratic
Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997).
As noted above, Mr. Jackson is asking the Court to review state court orders and
declare those orders unconstitutional. Mr. Jackson alleges in the Second Amended
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Complaint that a number of state court orders are illegal, unconstitutional, and null and
void, including the original 1987 divorce decree in Denver District Court case number
86DR4718. However, he specifically is challenging in this action a contempt conviction
entered on November 4, 2005, as well as an order entered on December 17, 2010,
denying his motion for review of the 2005 contempt conviction, both of which were
entered in Arapahoe County District Court case number 01DR2767. Mr. Jackson also
argues that he has been denied due process because he has been unsuccessful in his
efforts to challenge these orders in the Colorado appellate courts.
The Court finds that Mr. Jackson’s claims in the instant action, like his claims in
the prior actions listed above, are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgments
and, as a result, must be dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Van
Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1986). Therefore, the action will be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status will be denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal he also must pay the full $455
appellate filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App.
P. 24.
The Court also finds that imposition of filing restrictions is appropriate. “[T]he
right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, and there is no
constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or
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malicious.” Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (citation
omitted). “Federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive
litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.”
Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007).
Specifically, injunctions restricting further filings are
appropriate where the litigant’s lengthy and abusive history is
set forth; the court provides guidelines as to what the litigant
may do to obtain its permission to file an action; and the
litigant receives notice and an opportunity to oppose the
court’s order before it is implemented.
Id.
The Court finds that Mr. Jackson’s history of filing repetitive actions raising the
same or substantially similar claims seeking review of state court orders and judgments
discussed above is abusive and demonstrates that imposition of filing restrictions is
appropriate. Therefore, the Court will prohibit Mr. Jackson from filing new actions in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado without the representation of a
licensed attorney admitted to practice in the District of Colorado unless he obtains
permission to proceed pro se. In order to obtain permission to proceed pro se, Mr.
Jackson must take the following steps:
1.

File with the clerk of this Court a motion requesting leave to file a
pro se action.

2.

Include in the motion requesting leave to file a pro se action the
following information:
A.

A list of all lawsuits currently pending or filed
previously in the District of Colorado, including the
name, number, and citation, if applicable, of each
case, and the current status or disposition of each
case; and

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B.

3.

A statement of the legal issues to be raised in the
proposed new pleading and whether he has raised
the same issues in other proceedings in the District of
Colorado. If so, he must cite the case number and
docket number where the legal issues previously have
been raised.

Submit the proposed new pleading to be filed in the pro se action.

The motion requesting leave to file a pro se action and the proposed new
pleading shall be submitted to the clerk of the Court, who shall forward them to the
judicial officer designated by the Chief Judge pursuant to D.C.COLO.CivR 8.1C. for
review. If the motion requesting leave to file a pro se action is denied, the matter will be
dismissed. If the motion requesting leave to file a pro se action is granted, the case will
proceed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of
Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado-Civil.
Finally, as noted above, Mr. Jackson must be given an opportunity to oppose
imposition of these filing restrictions before they may be implemented. Therefore, Mr.
Jackson will be directed to show cause why the filing restrictions discussed in this order
should not be imposed. If Mr. Jackson fails to show good cause within the time allowed,
the filing restrictions will be imposed. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the complaint, the amended complaint, the second amended
complaint, and the action are dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
denied. It is

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FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff show cause in writing within twenty-one days
from the date of this order why the filing restrictions specified in this order should not be
imposed. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that, if Plaintiff fails to show good cause within the time
allowed, the filing restrictions specified in this order will be imposed.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this

24th

day of

January

, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
United States District Court

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