Montoya v. A&M Apartments, Inc.

Filing 31

ORDER denying 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Judge Christine M. Arguello on 10/29/12.(dkals, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 11-cv-03354-CMA-MJW
EDWARD M. MONTOYA,
Plaintiff,
v.
A&M APARTMENTS, INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendant A&M Apartments, Inc’s (“A&M”)
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Edward Montoya’s Complaint with prejudice, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(Doc. # 16.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action on December 22, 2011, alleging that Mary Truong,
owner and president of A&M, discriminated against him based on his gender, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq., and because of a disability he has, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Doc. # 1.) Plaintiff alleges that
Ms. Truong sexually harassed him on a continuing basis, and that he faced retaliation

for declining her advances. (Id. at 4-6.) He further alleges that Ms. Truong had
prohibited him from leaving work to attend his doctor’s appointments. (Id. at 3, 6.)
On March 8, 2012, A&M filed the instant. (Doc. # 16.) Plaintiff submitted his
response on March 14, 2012 (Doc. # 21), and A&M filed its reply on March 28, 2012
(Doc. # 22).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests
the formal sufficiency of a complaint. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201
(10th Cir. 2003). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the complaint’s
allegations as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jones v.
Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2005). To survive a motion to dismiss, “detailed factual
allegations are not required,” but there must be sufficient facts “to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face,” allowing the “court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)); see also Alvarado
v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (“We look to the specific
allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim
for relief”).
III. DISCUSSION
In its motion to dismiss, A&M asserts that it was not an employer as defined by
Title VII or the ADA and, therefore, Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may
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be granted. (Doc. # 16 at 1.) Title VII and the ADA both define an employer as
“a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). In its motion, Defendant states that it had never
employed the requisite fifteen employees and, thus, is not an employer under Title VII
or the ADA.1 (Doc. # 16 at 1.) Plaintiff admits that A&M did not employee fifteen or
more employees but argues that when aggregated, Ms. Truong’s related companies
employ more than fifteen employees. (Doc. # 21 at 7.) As such, Plaintiff contends that
the Court should employ the Single Employer Test to determine whether A&M, through
its allegedly related entities, is an integrated enterprise employing fifteen or more
employees. Id.
The Single Employer Test is a judicial doctrine developed and employed to
determine whether two or more nominally separated entities may be treated as one
integrated enterprise. Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th
Cir. 2002). The Single Employer Test is commonly utilized by plaintiffs to combine
the number of employees of two or more related entities in order for defendants to
meet the threshold number of employees. See Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283 (10th Cir.
1980) (holding that the Sheriff was an agent of the county for the sole purpose of
satisfying the fifteen employee requirement of Title VII); Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach,
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The threshold number of employees in Title VII and the ADA’s definition of employer is not
jurisdictional but, rather, an element of the claim for relief. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
503 (2006).
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Fla., 166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging the Single Employer Test’s
application to combine the number of employees for private entities); Patterson v.
Yazoo City, Miss., 847 F. Supp. 2d 924, 940 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff
could aggregate the number of city employees under the Single Employer Test). Courts
weigh four factors when applying the Single Employer Test to determine whether nominally separated entities constitute a single employer: (1) interrelatedness of operations;
(2) common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common
ownership and financial control. Bristol, 312 F.3d at 1220. Although no factor is
determinative, the third factor is generally considered to be the most important. Id.
In general, “determining whether an entity qualifies as an employer is a fact
issue for the jury.” Bristol, 312 F.3d at 1121. The Court’s limited inquiry for the instant
motion is merely whether Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts to plausibly state a claim for
relief, which in this case would be to show that Ms. Truong’s companies may be an
integrated enterprise. The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to
support his claim that A&M is an employer under Title VII and the ADA.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Ms. Truong is the owner and president
of: A&M; PPT Properties LLC; AMJ Property Investment Inc.; and A&M Property
Investment Inc. (Doc. # 1 at 3.) Additionally, in his Complaint, Plaintiff contends that
Ms. Truong “cuts the checks and pays all the employees for all the above companies
she is President of and owns.” (Doc. # 1 at 3.) These allegations support the notion
that A&M and the related enterprises had common ownership and financial control.
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Plaintiff further alleges that he served as “Regional Property Manager of all the
above companies” and that “if any of the employees working for [one of the companies]
had an issue, they would contact [him] and he would take the issue to Ms. Truong.” Id.
This allegation, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could support a finding
that the entities had interrelated operations, common management, and centralized
control of labor relations.
Accepting these allegations as true, and construing them in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to state a
claim for relief under the Single Employer Test. Therefore, with evidentiary support,
a reasonable inference could be drawn that Defendant and its associated entities are
an integrated enterprise with fifteen or more employees – that is, an employer under
Title VII and the ADA.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 16) is DENIED.
DATED: October

29

, 2012
BY THE COURT:

_______________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge

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