Reed v. Colorado Board of Parole et al
ORDER denying 5 Motion Injunctive Relief and for Temporary Restraining Order, by Judge Lewis T. Babcock on 4/10/12.(lswsl, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 12-cv-00068-BNB
NORMAN RAY REED, JR.,
COLORADO BOARD OF PAROLE,
JOHN SUTHERS, in his professional and individual capacity’s [sic],
TIM HAND, in his professional and individual capacity,
MICHAEL ANDERSON, in his professional and individual capacity,
DEBORAH ALLEN, in her professional and individual capacity,
TOM WATERS, in his proffesional [sic] and individual capacity, and
DAVID RILEY, in his professional and individual capacity,
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Plaintiff, Norman Ray Reed, Jr., is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado
Department of Corrections who currently is incarcerated at the correctional facility in
Sterling, Colorado. He initiated this action by filing pro se a prisoner complaint (ECF
No. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his civil rights were violated in
connection with the revocation of his parole in January 2010. On March 21, 2012, Mr.
Reed filed a motion titled “Temporary Injunction/Injunction/T.R.O.” (ECF No. 5). The
twenty-one page motion includes sixteen pages of attachments.
In the March 21 motion Plaintiff makes vague and conclusory allegations that he
has been and is being threatened and assaulted by administrative and correctional
officers who also encourage his co-inmates to assault him for filing grievances and
litigation, has been assaulted by co-inmates, is incarcerated in the same prison as
someone who sexually assaulted him and who is the step-brother of his sex assault
victim, and lives in fear for his life and safety. He also alleges that the prison mail room
is interfering with his legal mail. These allegations are not related to the substance of
The Court must construe the motion liberally because Mr. Reed is not
represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be an
advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated
below, the motion will be construed liberally as a motion for injunctive relief and/or for a
temporary restraining order, and will be denied.
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits, that he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues,
that the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may
cause the opposing party, and that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the
public interest. See Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980). Similarly, a
party seeking a temporary restraining order must demonstrate clearly, with specific
factual allegations, that immediate and irreparable injury will result unless a temporary
restraining order is issued. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and “the primary goal of a
preliminary injunction is to preserve the pre-trial status quo.” RoDa Drilling Co. v.
Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). Therefore, “courts should be especially
cautious when granting an injunction that requires the nonmoving party to take
affirmative action - a mandatory preliminary injunction - before a trial on the merits
occurs.” Id. Because Mr. Reed is seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction that
seeks to alter the status quo, he must make a heightened showing of the four factors
listed above. See id. at 1209.
Mr. Reed’s allegations are speculative or concern past events, and do not appear
to have any relevance to the allegations in the complaint. Mr. Reed does not
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits, that he will suffer
irreparable injury if no preliminary injunction is issued, that his threatened injuries
outweigh whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party, or
that a preliminary injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Therefore, the
motion for injunctive relief and/or a temporary restraining order will be denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the motion titled “Temporary Injunction/Injunction/T.R.O.” (ECF
No. 5) that Plaintiff, Norman Ray Reed, Jr., submitted to and filed with the Court pro se
on March 21, 2012, and which the Court has construed liberally as a motion for
injunctive relief and/or for a temporary restraining order, is denied.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 10th
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK
Senior Judge, United States District Court
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