Johnson v. Suthers et al

Filing 91

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS TO AND ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE denying as moot 34 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot 42 Motion for Joinder; granting 66 Report and Recommendations; denying as moot 15 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 17 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying as moot 19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The objections stated in the plaintiff's Objec tion To Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe (ECF No. 66 ) 80 filed 10 June 5, 2012, are OVERRULED. This case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judgment SHALL ENTER in favor of the defendants. Defendants are AWARDED their costs to be taxed by the clerk of the court in the time and manner prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1. By Judge Robert E. Blackburn on 7/3/12.(mjgsl, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Robert E. Blackburn
Civil Case No. 12-cv-00096-REB-MJW
ROBERT WAYNE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN SUTHERS, Attorney General of Colorado, individually and in his official capacity;
JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Governor of Colorado, individually and in his official capacity;
BILL RITTER, former Governor of Colorado, individually and in his official capacity;
REGGIE BICHA, Executive Director, Colorado, Department of Human Services,
individually and in his official capacity;
KAREN BEYE, former Executive Director, Colorado, Department of Human Services,
individually and in her official capacity;
MARY ANN HICKS, Administrative Program Specialist, Colorado Division of Child
Support Enforcement, individually;
MARDI HOUSTON, Evaluation Specialist, Colorado Division of Child Support,
individually;
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, EL PASO COUNTY, in their official
capacities;
BILL LOUIS, County Attorney of El Paso County, Colorado, individually and in his
official capacity;
RICHARD BENGTSSON, Director, El Paso County Department of Human Services,
individually and in his official capacity;
TONI HERMAN, El Paso County Department of Human Services, individually;
LAURA DAVIDSON, former employee of Policy Studies, Inc., individually;
CLAUDIA SMITH-SWAIN, former employee of Policy Studies, Inc., individually;
JONICA BRUNNER, former employee of Policy Studies, Inc. and current employee of

Young Williams, P.C., individually;
MELISSA BALQUIN, former employee of Policy Studies, Inc. and current employee of
Young Williams, P.C., individually;
POLICY STUDIES, INC.;
JEFF BALL, current employee of Young Williams, P.C., individually; and
YOUNG WILLIAMS, P.C.,
Defendants.

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS TO AND ADOPTING
RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Blackburn, J.
The matters before me are (1) the Recommendation on (1) Defendant Young
Williams, P.C.’s, and Defendant Jeff Ball’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) (Docket No. 15), (2) State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, for a More Definite Statement (Docket No. 17), (3) Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendants Board Of County Commissioners of El
Paso County, William Louis, Toni Hermann and Richard Bengtsson (Docket No.
19), and (4) Defendants Policy Studies Inc.’s, Melissa Balquin’s, and Jonica
Brunner’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim Against Them (Docket No. 34) [#66]1
filed May 22, 2012; (2) Defendant Young Williams, P.C.’s, and Defendant Jeff Ball’s
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Brief in Support [#15] filed
February 9, 2012; (3) State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for
a More Definite Statement [#17] filed February 9, 2012; (4) Motion to Dismiss

1

“[#66]” is an example of the convention I use to identify the docket number assigned to a
specific paper by the court’s case management and electronic case filing system (CM/ECF). I use this
convention throughout this order.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendants Board Of County Commissioners of El
Paso County, William Louis, Toni Hermann and Richard Bengtsson [#19] filed
February 10, 2012; (5) Defendants Policy Studies Inc.’s, Melissa Balquin’s, and
Jonica Brunner’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim Against Them [#34] filed April
5, 2012; and (6) Defendant Laura Davidson’s Joinder In Defendants Policy Studies
Inc.’s, Melissa Balquin’s, and Jonica Brunner’s Motion To Dismiss [#42] filed April
11, 2012. The plaintiff filed objections [#80] to the recommendation. The El Paso
County defendants and the Policy Studies Inc. defendants both filed responses [#83 &
#86] to the plaintiff’s objections. I overrule the plaintiff’s objections, approve and adopt
the recommendation, deny the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismiss this case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
As required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), I have reviewed de novo all portions of the
recommendation to which objections have been filed. I have considered carefully the
recommendation, objections, and applicable caselaw.
The plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Thus, I have construed his pleadings more
liberally and held them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167
L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)).
The claims of the plaintiff, Robert Johnson, concern his contention that his rights
have been violated in the course of efforts to enforce Mr. Johnson’s court-ordered child
support obligation. In Case No. 1996DR1112, the District Court of El Paso County,
Colorado ordered Mr. Johnson to pay child support. On September 17, 2008, Mr.
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Johnson’s ex-wife instituted a child support enforcement case to collect back child
support from Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson does not dispute that he owes some back child
support, but he does dispute the amount he owes. In September 2009 Mr. Johnson filed
a motion in state court to modify his child support obligation. On January 31, 2010, a
magistrate in the El Paso County District Court entered an order establishing the
amount of the arrearage owed by Mr. Johnson under the court’s child support order. A
district judge of the El Paso County District Court affirmed that order.
Mr. Johnson’s complaint [#1] in this case is 154 pages long.2 Obviously, Mr.
Johnson describes in his complaint more than the orders of the El Paso County District
Court concerning his child support obligation. Among many other topics, Mr. Johnson
addresses in his complaint the procedures allegedly undertaken by state and county
officials to determine the amount by which he is in arrears on his child support obligation
and to enforce that obligation.
In addition, Mr. Johnson describes the alleged role of defendant Policy Studies
Inc. (PSI) and its employees in determining and enforcing Mr. Johnson’s child support
obligation. Mr. Johnson alleges that PSI was a contractor for El Paso County for the
purpose of child support enforcement. According to Mr. Johnson, the actions of the
defendants and others caused the amount of his child support arrearage to be
miscalculated.
Most of the procedures described by Mr. Johnson are essentially administrative
procedures that preceded the orders of the El Paso County District Court establishing

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Although not at issue in the recommendation, I conclude that Mr. Johnson’s complaint [#1] does
not comply with the most basic requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Rule 8 requires, inter alia, a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” Mr. Johnson’s statement of his
claims in his complaint is neither short nor plain.

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the amount of Mr. Johnson’s child support arrearage. Allegedly, the defendants named
in the complaint played some role in these procedures, and Mr. Johnson claims the
defendants violated his rights in the course of these procedures.
Dissatisfied with the determinations of the El Pasto County Child Support
Enforcement Unit and the Colorado Division of Child Support Enforcement concerning
the amount of the child support arrearage owed by Mr. Johnson, Mr. Johnson filed a
motion with the El Paso County District Court to modify his child support obligation and
to move the child support enforcement case to that court for judicial review. Complaint,
¶¶ 131 - 132, pp. 85 - 86. As described by Mr. Johnson, the administrative procedures
and Mr. Johnson’s efforts to seek judicial review of those procedures led to one or more
hearings and various motions filed with the El Paso County District Court. Ultimately,
orders issued by that court determined the amount of the arrearage on Mr. Johnson’s
child support obligation. See, e.g., Complaint [#1], ¶¶ 144 - 178, pp. 88 - 104. In the
end, Mr. Johnson contends, the erroneously calculated child support arrearage amount
was approved by the El Paso County District Court and has been enforced against Mr.
Johnson.
The magistrate judge recommends that this case be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because Mr. Johnson’s claims are barred under the RookerFeldman doctrine. If a claim is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, then the
federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.3 Crutchfield v.
Countrywide Home Loans, 389 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2004), overruled in part on

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The defendants have not asserted the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a basis for dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint. However, a court must consider its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte if its subject
matter jurisdiction is in question. See, e.g., Hardiman v. Reynolds, 971 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1992).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

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other grounds by Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
On June 22, 2012, one month after the recommendation of the magistrate judge was
filed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued an opinion in which
it reviewed the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Campbell v. City of
Spencer, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 2362613 (10th Cir. 2012). I review the plaintiff’s
complaint, the recommendation, the plaintiff’s objections, and the other relevant filings
in light of the guidance provided recently in Campbell.
In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, the case that provides
the Feldman portion of the name Rooker-Feldman, the Supreme Court used the
phrase “inextricably intertwined” to describe the type of claim which, when asserted in
federal court, is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States District Court are
inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in a judicial proceeding
of a particular plaintiff's application for admission to the state bar, then the
District Court is in essence being called upon to review the state court
decision. This the District Court may not do.
460 U.S. 462, 483 (1983). In Campbell, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court subsequently has eschewed use of the phrase “inextricably intertwined” in the
Rooker-Feldman analysis.
(T)he Supreme Court has reformulated the Rooker–Feldman doctrine,
apparently out of concern that the doctrine “ha[d] sometimes been
construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman
cases, overriding Congress' conferral of federal-court jurisdiction
concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the
ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.”
Exxon Mobil [v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.], 544 U.S. [280,] at 283
[(2005)]. Eschewing the inextricably-intertwined language, it wrote:
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined
to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its
name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
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district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.
Id. at 284. We think it best to follow the Supreme Court's lead, using the
Exxon Mobil formulation and not trying to untangle the meaning of
inextricably intertwined. The essential point is that barred claims are those
“complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments.” Id. In other
words, an element of the claim must be that the state court wrongfully
entered its judgment.
Campbell, ___ F.3d at ___, 2012 WL 2362613 at *4 - *5 (10th Cir. 2012).
The Rooker-Feldman standard of review recited by the Tenth Circuit in
Campbell is, in essence, the standard of review cited by the magistrate judge in his
recommendation. Recommendation [#66] pp. 9 - 10. In analyzing the plaintiff’s claims,
however, the magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Johnson’s claims are based on
“actions inextricably intertwined with the state judgment” and that the plaintiff’s claims
are not independent from the state judgment. Recommendation [#66], p. 12. Because
the inextricably intertwined language now is disfavored in analyzing Rooker-Feldman
issues, I evaluate Mr. Johnson’s claims under the standard refined last week in
Campbell.
Following 151 pages of factual allegations, Mr. Johnson defines his four claims
on pages 152 through 154 of his complaint. In his first claim, Mr. Johnson claims the
Colorado Department of Human Services and the El Paso County Department of
Human Services have an unwritten policy to deny the plaintiff his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In his second claim, Mr. Johnson asserts that the Colorado
Department of Human Services and the El Paso County Department of Human Services
have an unwritten policy to deny the plaintiff his rights under the Constitution of the
State of Colorado. Reading the complaint as a whole, I conclude that the alleged policy
to deny Mr. Johnson his constitutional rights concerns the alleged miscalculation of Mr.
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Johnson’s child support obligation. In both his first and second claims, Mr. Johnson
seeks a declaratory judgment without specifying the nature of the declaratory judgment
he seeks.
In his third claim, Mr. Johnson again asserts a violation of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and asks that the “cases presently before the El Paso County
District and County Courts . . .be stayed and enjoined . . . .” In his fourth claim, Mr.
Johnson alleges that all of the defendants other than the Colorado Department of
Human Services and the El Paso County Department of Human Services have violated
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In his general prayer for relief, Mr.
Johnson seeks: (1) a declaration that the alleged unwritten policy to violate Mr.
Johnson’s rights be declared to be unconstitutional; (2) an order enjoining “case
numbers 2011CV229 and 1996DR001112/1996C014418;” (3) compensatory damages;
and (4) attorney fees and costs.
Each of Mr. Johnson’s claims is dependent on his contention that the amount of
his child support arrearage was miscalculated. As described in the complaint, Mr.
Johnson sought and obtained a determination of that amount from the El Paso County
District Court. In each of his claims in the present case, Mr. Johnson challenges the
propriety of that determination. Each of Mr. Johnson’s claims is a claim brought by a
state-court loser complaining of injuries caused by a state-court judgment rendered
before proceedings in the above-captioned case commenced. Most important, Mr.
Johnson asks this court to review and reject the determinations of the state court.
Of course, Mr. Johnson contends that some of the defendants violated his rights
before the state court issued its orders determining the amount of Mr. Johnson’s child
support arrearage. The core of those alleged violations, as described by Mr. Johnson,
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is the alleged miscalculation of Mr. Johnson’s child support arrearage during essentially
administrative proceedings. At Mr. Johnson’s behest, the El Paso County District Court
reviewed the determination made in the administrative proceedings and arrived a a
determination of the amount of Mr. Johnson’s child support arrearage. A determination
by this court that the amount of Mr. Johnson’s child support arrearage was
miscalculated, at any stage of the process, would constitute a determination by this
court that the state court’s orders were wrongful. Stated more directly, Mr. Johnson’s
claims have merit only if the state-court’s orders concerning Mr. Johnson’s arrearage on
his child support obligation were incorrect and unlawful. Given this legal landscape, Mr.
Johnson’s claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson’s claims.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. That supplemented with the analysis stated in this order, the
Recommendation on (1) Defendant Young Williams, P.C.’s, and Defendant Jeff
Ball’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 15), (2) State
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a More Definite
Statement (Docket No. 17), (3) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as to
Defendants Board Of County Commissioners of El Paso County, William Louis,
Toni Hermann and Richard Bengtsson (Docket No. 19), and (4) Defendants Policy
Studies Inc.’s, Melissa Balquin’s, and Jonica Brunner’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Claim Against Them (Docket No. 34) [#66] filed May 22, 2012, is
APPROVED and ADOPTED as an order of this court;
2. That the objections stated in the plaintiff’s Objection To Recommendation
of United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe (ECF No. 66) [#80] filed
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June 5, 2012, are OVERRULED;
3. That this case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
the plaintiff’s claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine;
4. That Defendant Young Williams, P.C.’s, and Defendant Jeff Ball’s
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Brief in Support [#15] filed
February 9, 2012, is DENIED as moot;
5. That the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for a
More Definite Statement [#17] filed February 9, 2012, is DENIED as moot;
6. That the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendants Board
Of County Commissioners of El Paso County, William Louis, Toni Hermann and
Richard Bengtsson [#19] filed February 10, 2012, is DENIED as moot;
7. That the Defendants Policy Studies Inc.’s, Melissa Balquin’s, and Jonica
Brunner’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim Against Them [#34] filed April 5,
2012, is DENIED as moot;
8. That Defendant Laura Davidson’s Joinder In Defendants Policy Studies
Inc.’s, Melissa Balquin’s, and Jonica Brunner’s Motion To Dismiss [#42] filed April
11, 2012, is DENIED as moot;
9. That judgment SHALL ENTER in favor of the defendants, John Suthers, John
Hickenlooper, Bill Ritter, Reggie Bicha, Karen Beye, Mary Ann Hicks, Mardi Houston,
Board of County Commissioners, El Paso County, Bill Louis, Richard Bengtsson, Toni
Herman, Laura Davidson, Claudia Smith-swain, Jonica Brunner, Melissa Balquin, Policy
Studies, Inc., Jeff Ball, and Young Williams, P.C., against the plaintiff, Robert Wayne
Johnson, as to all claims for relief and causes of action asserted in this action; and

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9. That defendants are AWARDED their costs to be taxed by the clerk of the
court in the time and manner prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) and
D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.1.
Dated July 3, 2012, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:

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