Escobar v. Foster et al
Filing
113
ORDER denying 106 Motion to Recuse Magistrate and Trial Judge by Judge Christine M. Arguello on 5/15/13.(dkals, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Christine M. Arguello
Civil Action No. 12-cv-00489-CMA-KLM
JOSE MEDINA ESCOBAR,
Plaintiff,
v.
ASSOCIATE WARDEN S. FOSTER,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR L. REID,
MAJOR L. MALFELD,
LIEUTENANT L. TRAVIS,
LIEUTENANT TEDEMANN,
LIEUTENANT BURKE,
CAPTAIN PADILLA,
CAPTAIN D. WILLIAMS,
SERGEANT MARQUEZ,
SERGEANT MONTGOMERY,
SERGEANT HAWKINS,
SERGEANT FRETWELL,
C/O CALDARONELLO,
C/O P. ARCHULETA,
C/O ALANIS,
C/O AURITI,
C/O SAUCIDO,
C/O KITCHEN,
C/O S. HARTUNG,
C/O MONTANEZ, and
C/O B. TETRICK,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a “Motion for Recusal of Both Trial Judge C.M.
Arguello and Magistrate Judge K.L. Mix” filed by pro se prisoner Plaintiff, Jose Medina
Escobar. (Doc. # 106.) For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
Plaintiff has filed many lawsuits in this district. (Case Nos. 08-cv-01992-ZLW,
90-cv-00018-RPM, 91-cv-01580-RPM, 93-CV-1950-LTB, 96-cv-00107-RPM, 93-cv01950-LTB, 96-cv-00107-RPM, 99-cv-01573-RPM, 02-cv-01796-REB-BNB, 06-cv01222-CMA-KLM, 09-cv-02207-CMA-KLM, 10-cv-2050-CMA-KLM, 11-cv-00169-CMAKLM, 11-cv-01443-CMA-KLM, 12-cv-00489-CMA-KLM, 12-cv-01662-CMA-CBS, 12-cv03052-CMA-KLM.) In these lawsuits, Plaintiff has filed several motions to recuse based
on unfounded and incendiary accusations of personal biases. (See Case No. 06-cv1222, Doc. ## 105 (trial court and magistrate judges “have been extreme biased,
discriminative/racially”); 310 (accusing magistrate judge of “bias and prejudice,
hostilities, gender and racial discrimination”); see also Case No. 12-cv-01662-CMACBS, Doc. # 34 (“this district court has for numerous years [] forced the Plaintiff to
consummate a continual series of beatings, infliction after infliction of unnecessary pain
– hunger, thirst, warmth, etc. due to malfeasance, nonfeasance, and severe bias due to
his unwarranted accusations against the U.S. magistrate judge in 2008.”)
On May 2, 2013, Plaintiff once again filed a motion requesting that the trial and
magistrate judges recuse from this case. (Doc. # 106.) In support of his motion,
Plaintiff again lodges numerous disrespectful, baseless, and outlandish allegations
against United States Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix1 and the undersigned. As
examples, Plaintiff contends that “both court officials entered into an understanding and
agreement and conspired to willfully, maliciously and arbitrarily deprive Plaintiff through
1
On April 5, 2012, Magistrate Judge Mix was assigned to this case to handle all non-dispositive
pre-trial matters, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and issue recommendations on
dispositive matters, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. # 14.)
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an act of discrimination in retaliation for his previous allegations against U.S. Magistrate
Judge Mix, his equal protections of the law, and that their nonfeasance or misfeasance
has interfered with the due course of justice.” (Doc. # 106 at 2.) Plaintiff also
baselessly asserts that “both court officials have dragged their feet when it comes to
ruling on Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive/preventative relief, and/or shaped and/or
arranged their case law, legal authority to deny Plaintiff all his motions for injunctive
relieve . . . .” (Id. at 1.)
Although Plaintiff fails to identify under what rule or statute he seeks recusal, the
Court will construe his motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Title 28 U.S.C. § 144
provides a procedure whereby a party to a proceeding may request the judge before
whom the matter is pending to recuse himself or herself based upon personal bias or
prejudice either against the moving party or in favor of any adverse party. Section 144
requires the moving party to submit a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias and
prejudice. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1305 (10th Cir. 1997). “The affidavit
must state with required particularity the identifying facts of time, place, persons,
occasion, and circumstances.” Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987).
Although the Court must accept the facts alleged in the supporting affidavit under § 144
as true, the affidavit is construed strictly against the moving party. See Glass v. Pfeffer,
849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). “[C]onclusions, rumors, beliefs, and opinions are
not sufficient to form a basis for disqualification.” Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939
(10th Cir. 1987) (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921)). The moving party
has a substantial burden “to demonstrate that the judge is not impartial.” United States
v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Title 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides a broader scope for claims of prejudice and
bias. Glass, 849 F.2d 1267. Under this section, a judge “shall disqualify [herself] in any
proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” and § 455(b)(1)
provides that a judge shall also disqualify herself where she “has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party[.]” The goal of this provision is to avoid even the
appearance of partiality and thereby “promote public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860
(1988). Pursuant to § 455, the Court is not required to accept all factual allegations as
true, “and the test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would
harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” Glass, 849 F.2d 1268 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Hinman, 831 F.2d at 939. “A judge should not recuse [herself]
on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.” Hinman, 831 F.2d at 939.
The standard is objective and the inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993
(10th Cir. 1993). However, the statute should not be used as a veto power over judges
or as a “judge shopping device.” Nicols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, the Court finds that recusal is not required under either
§§ 144 or 455. With respect to § 144, Plaintiff has failed to identify any facts concerning
Magistrate Judge Mix’s or the undersigned’s bias with particularity. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has failed to meet his substantial burden to demonstrate the impartiality of Magistrate
Judge Mix and/or the undersigned.
With respect to § 455, the Court finds that no reasonable person, knowing all the
relevant facts (i.e., Plaintiff’s disrespectful, baseless, and outlandish allegations of bias
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and prejudice) would harbor doubts about either judge’s impartiality. Moreover, to the
extent that Plaintiff’s motion arises from certain decisions Plaintiff deems unfavorable,
such unfavorable decisions are not sufficient to demonstrate that disqualification is
appropriate pursuant to either § 144 or § 455(a) because “judicial rulings alone almost
never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Furthermore, opinions held by judges as a result of what
they learned in earlier proceedings is not subject to characterization as “bias” or
“prejudice.” Id. at 551. “It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to
sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same
[party].” Id. To the extent Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Mix and the
undersigned have “dragged their feet” in ruling on his motions, the Court assures
Plaintiff that it aims to rule on his motions in a timely manner. The Court notes that
Plaintiff filed a motion on April 18, 2013 and another on April 29, 2013, then filed the
instant motion requesting recusal of both judges less than a week later on May 2, 2013.
Plaintiff then supplemented his April 18th motion on May 9, 2013. This timeline does
not demonstrate that the Court has failed to make timely rulings on Plaintiff’s motions.
Accordingly, the Court finds that denial of Plaintiff’s motion is warranted.
Lastly, the Court notes that in this case and others, Plaintiff has repeatedly
lodged disrespectful, baseless, and outlandish allegations of bias and prejudice against
Magistrate Judge Mix and the undersigned. The Court has previously admonished
Plaintiff for this behavior. (Case No. 06-cv-01222-CMA-KLM, Doc. # 312 at 4, Order
Denying Motion to Recuse Magistrate and Trial Judge) (“The Court admonishes Plaintiff
for his incessant practice of [baselessly] insulting the judiciary and making a mockery of
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these judicial proceedings. This behavior will no longer be tolerated.”); see also Escobar
v. Holditch, 2011 WL 3924970, *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2011) (reminding Plaintiff of
admonishment)). At all times during the course of this matter, the undersigned has
found that Magistrate Judge Mix’s rulings are adequately supported by the law and her
analysis is thorough, correct, and impartial. The Court reiterates its admonishment of
Plaintiff for his incessant practice of insulting the judiciary and making a mockery of
these judicial proceedings. This behavior will not be tolerated. Plaintiff’s conduct has
interfered with “one of the principal purposes of our court systems – to provide safe,
effective forum for resolving disputes that is characterized by civility.” Lynn v. Roberts,
No. 01-3422, 2006 WL 2850273, at *7 (D. Kan. Oct. 4, 2006) (unpublished). Plaintiff
is warned that any future filings that contain disrespectful, baseless, and outlandish
allegations against the judiciary will result in such pleadings being stricken from the
record.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1)
Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse Magistrate and Trial Judge (Doc. # 106) is
DENIED; and
(2)
Plaintiff’s filing of any further pleadings that contain disrespectful,
baseless, and outlandish allegations against the judiciary will result in such pleadings
being stricken from the record.
DATED: May
15
, 2013
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
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