Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-21

Filing 46

MINUTE ORDER denying without prejudice 16 the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant John Doe's (67.176.99.17) Motion to Dismiss the Matter, Quash and for a Protective Order, by Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty on 9/4/2012. (mehcd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 12-cv-00835-REB-MEH
MALIBU MEDIA, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DOES 1-21,
Defendants.

MINUTE ORDER
Entered by Michael E. Hegarty, United States Magistrate Judge, on September 4, 2012.
Before the Court is a Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant John Doe’s
(67.176.99.17) Motion to Dismiss the Matter, Quash and for a Protective Order [filed June 13, 2012;
docket #16] filed by John Doe #7.
First, with respect to Doe 7’s request to quash, none of the parties have filed the subpoena
to which Doe 7 objects. To the extent the present motion seeks to quash or modify a subpoena
issued through any district other than the District of Colorado, this Court must deny such request
without prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 45(c)(3)(A), only “the issuing court” may quash or modify a
subpoena (emphasis added). See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (only
the issuing court has the power to act on its subpoenas); In re Digital Equipment Corp., 949 F.2d
228, 231 (8th Cir. 1991) (court in district where underlying action was pending did not have
jurisdiction to rule on objections to deposition subpoenas obtained in another district). “Subpoenas
are process of the issuing court, and nothing in the rules even hints that any other court may be given
the power to quash or enforce them.” In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d at 341 (citations omitted).
With respect to the remainder of the motion, due to its varied requests for relief, adjudication
of the single motion will likely require different standards of review and legal analyses of both
dispositive and non-dispositive issues. In the interests of judicial efficiency and the proper
management of its docket, the Court denies the motion without prejudice and instructs Doe 7 to
file his remaining requests for relief each in separate motions, as applicable. See D.C. Colo. LCivR
7.1C (“A motion shall be made in a separate paper.”)
Finally, the Court reminds Doe 7 of his obligation to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a),
which states in pertinent part,
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney’s name – or by a party personally if the party is
unrepresented. The paper must state the signer’s address, email address, and

telephone number.
The Court acknowledges Doe 7’s request to proceed anonymously, as revealing his identity may
effectively moot the motion to quash. At the same time, the logistics of litigation necessitate that
a movant disclose his contact information to the Court. See D.C. Colo. LCivR 10.1K. Therefore,
if Doe 7 wishes to re-file his motion(s) in accordance with this order and all applicable local and
federal court rules, he must first (or contemporaneously) file a motion to proceed anonymously and
provide to the Court his name, address, telephone number and email address in accordance with Rule
11(a) and D.C. Colo. LCivR 10.1K. If Doe 7 wishes to keep his identifying information
confidential, he may file his Signature Block separately, and may request that the document be
maintained under Restriction Level 2 pursuant to the procedure set forth in D.C. Colo. LCivR 7.2.
The Court may strike any motion or other filing that deviates from the requirements of this order or
from those set forth in the applicable local or federal rules.

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